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PREFACE 
n recent years many analysts have focused their attention on an 
apparent ‘backlash’ against democracy and democracy promotion. 
Worldwide there is now a widespread contention that new challenges 
and obstacles have arisen to further progress in democratisation. FRIDE 
and CEPS have previously cooperated on exploring the general nature of 
the ‘backlash’.1 In this volume we turn to a more specific European 
neighbourhood focus, and explore the general issues relating to 
democracy’s travails in more detail in the countries to the south and east of 
the European Union.  
The underlying question is whether, in an era of democratic 
pessimism, the European neighbourhood can offer any more optimistic 
conclusions. Parts of the region remain subject to the gravitational pull of 
the basic democratic values and fundamental freedoms at the heart of the 
European Union. Yet even here there are uncertainties over the strength 
and extent of this pull factor. In the Balkans there remain serious obstacles 
to achieving well-functioning democratic governance systems, even among 
new member states such as Bulgaria and Romania. While the European 
neighbourhood policy proclaims its objective to widen the democratic 
space beyond its frontiers, and countries such as Georgia and Ukraine have 
manifest European ambitions, the EU’s unwillingness to extend official 
membership perspectives dampens the incentives for democratic reforms. 
The ‘colour revolutions’ have become disappointing experiences. The EU 
itself suffers from acute problems of reconciling its enlargement and 
deepening with democratic legitimacy. This dampens the credibility of 
further expansion. In the EU’s Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood, 
there have been attempts by France to re-energise the Barcelona process, 
but here securitisation appears to be the pre-eminent dynamic.     
                                                     
1 P. Burnell & R. Youngs (eds), Democratisation’s New Challenges, London: 
Routledge, 2009, forthcoming. 
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In this context we asked a group of experts to write short essays 
covering fifteen different case studies from across the neighbourhood 
region, assessing a common range of questions:   
1. Is democratisation now in retreat, or just stagnating? Do we risk 
exaggerating the importance of recent setbacks? Why did the colour 
revolutions in Eastern Europe stumble, rather than lead to a cascade 
of imitators? 
2. What is happening to the normative appeal of democracy? Are there 
emerging ideological competitors to liberal politics? Do serious, 
sustainable alternatives to democracy exist? 
3. What is the changing impact of certain structural factors, such as the 
perceived threat of radical Islam in countries of Muslim culture, 
corrupt state capture, energy resources and rent-seeking behaviour, 
and the movement towards multipolarity? How does the financial 
crisis impact on political trends? 
4. How have external democracy promotion efforts evolved and been 
received? Is international democracy promotion running out of 
steam? 
5. Is the influence of the ‘Europeanisation’ process on democratic 
practice still advancing? What has been the impact of the slowing of 
the EU’s enlargement process, alongside the limited scope of its 
neighbourhood policy? 
Our chapters address these specific questions in three groups of 
states. First, those countries in or close to the European Union: Bulgaria, 
Romania, Serbia and Turkey. Second, states of the former Soviet Union: 
Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. Third, three Arab states of the southern Mediterranean: Morocco, 
Algeria and Egypt.   
We have leant heavily on our authors to offer short and sharp essays 
that hone in directly on the most pertinent recent developments and policy 
implications for European democracy promoters. We are honoured as 
editors to have been able to assemble a group that includes experts 
renowned for the analysis of their respective countries. Our aim has been to 
benefit from this wealth of experience and knowledge to offer accessible 
accounts to policy-makers and those interested in the general political 
challenges that today beset the European neighbourhood.  
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As will become apparent, our case studies offer no simple, uniform 
answers to these questions. In an introductory overview, Michael Emerson 
draws out some of the key points of comparison across our case studies in 
an attempt to respond to the questions we set our authors. In particular, he 
distinguishes between those countries struggling with democratic 
transition, on the one hand, and those more deeply resistant to democratic 
norms, on the other. The headline conclusions are that very different 
dynamics are at work in different parts of the neighbourhood; the EU’s 
traction is diminishing in some places but offers under-utilised potential in 
others; and that broader factors such as the financial crisis may still 
ultimately have positive or negative effects on democracy. The initial 
overview chapter draws out some pointers for future European policy. But 
we offer no simple prescription. We hope that the reader takes from the 
accounts offered by our team of experts a realisation that overly dramatic 
interpretations of current events are best resisted.  
 
Richard Youngs 
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1. THE LONG AND HAZARDOUS ROUTE 
TO DEMOCRACY: 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
his book is a sequel to Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, 
published by CEPS in 2005,1 at the time of the so-called ‘colour 
revolutions’, which were just unfolding in Georgia (rose), Ukraine 
(orange), Lebanon (cedar) and even in Kyrgyzstan (tulip). There was also 
talk of democratic ‘springs’, if not revolutions, in countries such as Egypt 
and Syria. These movements received sufficient media attention to make 
the ‘colour revolution’ language take off as a powerful political idea, to the 
delight of democrats worldwide and to the consternation of authoritarian 
leaders.  
Our book of 2005 even concluded:  
In the European neighbouring regions from the former Soviet 
Union states to the north and the Arab world to the south there 
develops a fresh momentum to the democratic transition, with 
apparent contagion of ideas and revolutionary behaviour in which 
2004-05 may mark the beginning of something reminiscent of 
major historical episodes on the European continent such as 1789, 
1848 and 1989.2 
These conclusions turned out to be a little premature at best. The 
colour revolutions have disappointed to say the least, and a powerful 
                                                     
1 M. Emerson (ed.), Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, CEPS Paperback, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2005. 
2 Ibid., p. 12. 
T 
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counter-attack has been mounted by the authoritarian leaders, led explicitly 
by Vladimir Putin in Russia, and followed in less obvious ways elsewhere. 
One of the contributors to our 2005 book, however, Ghia Nodia from 
Georgia, was even then sober and prescient enough to have warned that 
“Georgia may become a kind of banana republic where every ruler is 
accused of authoritarianism, to be removed through a ‘revolution’ by 
another ruler who then recreates the system in a somewhat different 
style”.3 
Political scientists have attempted to capture these swings in the 
apparent fortunes of the democratic cause, with titles that caught the mood 
of the day, ranging from The End of History by Francis Fukuyama4 to “The 
End of Transition”5 and “The Democracy Backlash”6 of Thomas Carothers. 
The scholarly debate has come a long way since the optimistic teleology of 
Fukuyama’s End of History. While his hubris was soon discredited, there 
remained an optimism among analysts in the 1990s that the ‘democratic 
community’ was set on a course of steady incremental expansion. In recent 
years this view has come to be questioned as the facts suggest the need for 
more sober reflection. The world’s most respected democracy experts have 
dissected the ‘democracy backlash’ (Carothers) or ‘rollback’ (Diamond).7 
They have pointed to a range of disquieting trends: a stalling of the ‘third 
wave’ expansion of democracy; the increased skill and determination of 
autocrats to neutralise democracy support; the prospect of other political 
systems performing better than democracy on development goals and 
consequently gaining more legitimacy; and the West’s loss of power to 
influence democratic reform around the world.  
A new book, edited by Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs,8 sets out a 
critical assessment of the ‘democracy backlash’ proposition. The work of a 
                                                     
3 Op. cit., p. 3. 
4 F. Fukuyama, The  End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 
5 T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, January 2002, pp. 5-21. 
6 T. Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”, Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2006. 
7 L. Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008. 
8 P. Burnell & R. Youngs (eds), Democratisation’s New Challenges, London: 
Routledge, autumn 2009, forthcoming.  
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group of democracy experts here concludes with a plea for a more nuanced 
understanding of the current challenges to international democracy. In 
debating the ‘backlash’, care must be taken to distinguish between factors 
of an underlying structural nature and those linked to, say, the changeable 
policies of successive US administrations. Different factors are at work: an 
apparent rise of competing ideologies for democracy; multipolarity; 
smarter authoritarian techniques to resist democracy support; and a post-
Iraq delegitimisation of democracy promotion. Overall the trends are 
mixed, with some notable democratic regressions existing alongside other 
states making notable progress towards democratic consolidation. It is not 
true that the current challenges to democracy are unprecedented. One must 
not generalise from the singular factor of Russia’s reaction to the colour 
revolutions – often what people have in their mind when they refer to the 
backlash. Polls show that citizens across the world continue to seek more 
participatory and open governance. It is doubtful whether Russia, China or 
political Islam present ideological alternatives to democracy that gain wide 
support and aspiration. Whether the financial crisis will boost or hinder 
democratisation also remains uncertain. In short, there are serious 
challenges, but their nature and extent vary between regions and countries. 
It is this conclusion that inspired us to delve deeper into the 
dynamics that prevail more specifically within Europe’s neighbourhood.  
Our starting assumption is that the process of achieving democracy is 
in any case a long and hazardous one, which in many European countries 
took one, two or even three hundred years to mature. While history may 
appear to have been accelerating under the impact of economic integration, 
the mobility of people and modern communication technologies, it remains 
true that democratisation is tied up with the deepest of societal 
developments over generations.  
We have attempted to draw out of recent and current developments a 
set of narratives from fifteen case studies in three primary political regions: 
states in or closest to the European Union, states of the former Soviet Union 
and states of the Arab world. Each of these reveals something about the 
fundamentals of democratisation’s uneven course in the European 
neighbourhood. It is a story that is far from monolithic, and also far from 
‘the end’ of anything. From these studies there is ample confirmation that 
democratisation is invariably a long struggle, over decades and even 
generations. For this reason it may be useful to begin with a short reminder 
of the historical emergence of democracy in Europe, from ancient Greece 
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two millennia ago to the more recent political history of Europe since the 
17th century.  
Historical perspectives on the emergence of democracy in Europe 
Contemporary political experiences in the European neighbourhood 
confirm that democratisation is a process deeply bound up with the 
foundations of political culture and societal identity, and that the 
challenges to democratic reform are formidable where these foundations of 
democracy are weak, or only newly born, or even virtually non-existent. If 
Europe stands for a strongly entrenched but diversified model of 
democracy, and seeks to promote the extension of democratic practice into 
its near neighbourhood and beyond, it is reasonable to ask how Europe 
itself became democratic, over what time horizon and with what kind of 
dynamics. 
The democracy of Athenian Greece began with a popular uprising 
against the rulers in 508 BC and an effective regime change. This led to 
developments in political philosophy and practice to the point where the 
word ‘democracy’ was invented. The ideals of that time included personal 
freedoms and equality before the law, the election and rotation of public 
offices, public assemblies that could exercise direct democracy, the 
supreme authority of the courts of law and the avoidance of corruption. 
Nonetheless democracy was still a controversial proposition, contested by 
Plato, who preferred the ‘philosopher king’ model. Aristotle for his part 
was prescient in his portrayal of political dynamics, which finds some 
echoes in current experiences of the post-communist transition: 
When there came to be many men alike in their excellence, they 
ceased to put up with kingship and instead, seeking something 
shared, established a polity. As they became worse and began to 
make a profit from common affairs, oligarchies arose, for they 
made wealth something honorable. Then these oligarchies 
changed first into tyrannies, and from tyrannies into democracies. 
For by always bringing power to ever fewer people in search of 
base profit, they made the multitude stronger, which attacked [the 
ruler], and democracies arose. Now that city-states have become 
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even larger than before, it is not very easy for any system of 
government but a democracy to come into existence.’ 9 
The reputation of Athenian democracy passed into the lasting 
political awareness of Europeans as soon as the continent emerged from its 
dark ages, when classical studies became the essence of higher education 
under the Renaissance.  
Ancient Rome made its contribution too, with for example Marcus 
Aurelius advocating a polity that assured equality of rights and freedom of 
speech. He advocated ‘kingly’ government, however, which respected the 
freedom of the governed. Both Plato and Marcus Aurelius were thus 
advocating regimes that emphasised respect for the equality and civil 
liberties of the people, without democracy, however, which risked 
degenerating into a tyranny of the people. 
The first democratic political event recorded in Europe after the dark 
ages of the first millennium was at Uppsala in Sweden in 1018, where an 
assembly established the principle that the power of the king resided with 
the people; in this case the people were rejecting the king’s request to go to 
war with Norway. The first legal basis for human rights in Europe was the 
English Magna Carta of 1215, and later the Habeus Corpus Act of 1679 and 
the Bill of Rights of 1689. In the late 17th and 18th centuries there were 
contrasting developments. England was progressively curtailing the power 
of the monarchy versus the parliament, with supporting philosophical 
contributions in favour of liberty and human rights published by John 
Locke. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth established the first 
constitution in 1697. The city states of Italy, Switzerland and the Hanseatic 
League tended more towards oligarchic government. Machiavelli argued in 
support of civil liberties to limit the power of the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Pope. The French Enlightenment, led by Voltaire who had been 
influenced by John Locke during a stay in England, was struggling against 
feudalism, absolute monarchy and also the power of the Church. Voltaire’s 
advocacy had a wide reach across the continent, and he served as political 
adviser to Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, also influencing Catherine 
                                                     
9 Aristotle, “Politics”, ref 1244, 11-12, text in English reproduced in Thomas R. 
Martin, with Neel Smith & Jennifer F. Stuart, Democracy in the Politics of Aristotle, 
edition of 26 July 2003 (http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article_aristotle_ 
democracy?page=10&greekEncoding=). 
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the Great in St Petersberg. He advocated civil liberties and the rule of law, 
but not democracy, for this was the time of the ‘enlightened despot’.  
The breakpoint then came with the wave of violent revolutions and 
regime changes, led by the French Revolution of 1789 with the guillotining 
of the monarchy, alongside the American Revolution that cut away from 
the King of England and established a republican constitution in 1788 and a 
Bill of Rights in 1791. De Tocqueville provided intellectual and ideological 
linkages between Europe and the new United States, publishing his 
“Democracy in America” in two volumes in 1835 and 1840. In the first half 
of the 19th century Europe saw repeated waves of revolutionary violence 
aiming at varying blends of political liberties and independence. John 
Stuart Mill’s tract “On Liberty”, published in 1859, was an influential 
philosophical contribution. From then on until the First World War there 
was a broad sweep of political developments, ranging from extension of 
the right to vote to expansion of the power of parliaments, as the 
bourgeoisies of Europe grew in their power and determination to be 
represented at the time of industrial revolution. This even spread to Russia, 
where the absolutist tsarist monarchy gave way to an alliance of 
bourgeoisies and aristocrats that pressed for and secured a first parliament 
(the first Duma) in 1906 in a protest against the scandalous clique of 
oligarchs that were colluding with Rasputin to influence the tsar. But this 
was too little and too late. The Bolsheviks wanted stronger stuff and got it. 
The fragile European democracies of the post-First World War period 
were vulnerable to the social tensions created by the Great Depression, and 
so arose the forces of fascist totalitarianism in Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, paralleling the grip of communist totalitarianism in the Soviet 
Union.  
And so on into the post-Second World War period, with the cause of 
democracy and human rights led first by the Council of Europe, 
establishing the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in 1948. The European 
Conventions were largely following the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1947, but with the crucial difference that Europe created a supreme court 
enabling the individual to take his state to court over infringements of his 
rights, with its judgments having binding supranational force. 
Unlike human rights, democracy remained uncodified. However, 
when it came to the enlargement of the European Union to include post-
communist states, something systematic had to be done. The EU’s 
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‘Copenhagen criteria’ adopted by an EU summit (in 1995) stipulated that 
the new member states would have to demonstrate their commitment in 
theory and practice to the principles of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. This led to the long and arduous process of accession 
negotiations, with the Commission publishing regular reports on the 
performance of the applicant states according to a grid of institutional tests, 
with a certain model of democracy having de facto to guide the pen of the 
drafters of the Commission’s assessments. This exercise seems to 
correspond to the dictum that democracy is impossible to define, but one 
can recognise it when one sees it, just as one can recognise undemocratic 
practice. Important supporting contributions are being made by 
international NGOs, such as Freedom House, which publishes an 
exhaustive “Nations in Transit” annual volume for all European and 
Central Asian former communist states, with quantified gradings according 
to an extensive definition of democracy under: Electoral process, Civil society, 
Independent media, National democratic governance, Local democratic governance, 
Judicial framework and independence, and Corruption.10 While this NGO is 
supported by the US government, Europeans find no reason to dissent 
from the content of its work, which implies a trans-Atlantic consensus over 
the meaning of democracy. 
While these developments in the EU have been driven by concern for 
the new post-communist democracies, it should be remembered that not all 
the old democracies of the EU are always in complete conformity with the 
European democratic model under any of its variants. In the 1990s a neo-
fascist party in Austria led by Jorg Haider did alarmingly well in the polls 
and entered a coalition government. The EU was so concerned that it 
devised an amendment to the treaties, creating a procedure under which a 
member state deviating grossly from European political norms and values 
could have its voting rights in the Council of Ministers suspended. The 
Berlusconi regime in Italy is coming under criticism inter alia for the prime 
minister’s business control of both TV and newspaper media.  
While this has been a brutally short account, there still emerge several 
major points that are relevant for the purpose of the present project. 
                                                     
10 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Democratization in East Central Europe and 
Eurasia, New York. 
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First, European perceptions of democracy stretch back over the 
experience of several recent centuries, with intellectual links even further 
back to ancient Greece and Rome. European democracy has deep 
philosophical and ideological foundations that have proved sustainable 
over history.  
Second, by comparison, the alternative ideologies of fascism and 
communism led to tragic failure. Fascism was based on national patriotism, 
chauvinism and ethno-racism, which descended into totalitarianism, 
genocide and war. While communism was a beautiful egalitarian and 
democratic idea in theory, and yielded impressive advances in public 
education and health care, it also slid into totalitarianism, with murderous 
purges and a disastrous effect on the economy. 
Third, there have nonetheless been major cleavages in European 
political philosophy between the enlightenment and liberal democracy 
schools, in which the former embraced civil liberties and equalities, human 
rights and the rule of law without representative democracy. From Plato’s 
‘philosopher king’ to the ‘enlightened despot’ of the 18th century, through 
to the undeniable problems of some of Europe’s newest democracies, there 
have been warnings about the hazards of democratic governance and the 
advantages of strong and enlightened leadership.  
Fourth, these warnings and alternatives are being effectively used by 
some of today’s authoritarian regimes for self-justification. Yet these 
regimes seem incapable of producing any overarching political ideology. 
Today Russia is making the most energetic attempt to create an alternative 
ideology, but again this is based on the siren calls of national patriotism 
and enemy images with a slide into ethno-patriotism bordering on racism. 
The term chosen for public use during Putin’s presidency, ‘sovereign 
democracy’, is seen to have nothing democratic behind it beyond the wish 
to be independently different from Western democracy. Even the use of 
democracy in this term seems to imply recognition of the normative quality 
of core democracy. As for Medvedev’s presidency, the ‘rule of law’ is given 
headline billing, without mention of the word democracy, and might be 
viewed as seeking an implicitly ‘neo-enlightenment’ model, i.e. a 21st 
century variant on Europe’s 18th century enlightenment.  
Fifth, Europe has a long tradition of democratically motivated regime 
change by revolution, ranging from the full-bloodied French revolutionary 
model of 1789, to the 1848 model of regime overthrow contagion across the 
continent, through to the cascading collapse of communist regimes some 
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twenty years ago. But it has also seen many of these regime changes go 
astray, including, most dramatically, the short-lived liberal democratic 
moments at the beginning of the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian 
revolution of 1917, and many cases of failed revolutions and counter-
revolutions. The pertinence of this for today is that one should not be so 
surprised when a given wave of revolutions, such as the ‘colour 
revolutions’ of five years ago, fail to live up to initial euphoric expectations; 
moreover today’s authoritarian leaders in the European neighbourhood 
may be understandably fearful of those nice-sounding democracy and civil 
society promotion programmes of the West. 
Current narratives from the European neighbourhood 
From countries in or close to the European Union 
We concentrate on four cases – Bulgaria and Romania as new member 
states since 2007, Serbia as seeking membership in due course, and Turkey 
as a long-term accession candidate. All four cases have seen the process of 
Europeanisation at work, in which movements towards the broad 
European model of democracy have been accelerated or intensified by the 
conditionalities of accession negotiations. But this accelerated development 
has more recently shown signs of stagnation or even partial reversibility. 
The story of Bulgaria is presented by Gergana Noutcheva as a case 
study in the hazards of only partial reform measures in the early stages of 
the post-communist transition. There was a failure to secure thorough 
replacement of the former communist elites, allowing new interest groups 
to be formed who gained access to monopoly rents and then sought to 
protect these by any means, including links with criminal networks in a 
mafia underworld. Bulgarian society had access to reasonably fair elections 
but until recently failed to elect majorities for comprehensively reform-
oriented governments. The EU accession process secured just sufficient 
apparent reforms to allow accession to go ahead on 1 January 2007, 
whereupon the pressure from Brussels was off, and reforms stagnated or 
even went into reverse. A conventional wisdom was formed that the EU 
accession process could be influential during the negotiation stages, but 
lost all force after accession. This depressing message was gaining ground 
until a new and unprecedented twist to the relationship with the EU 
emerged. Bulgaria’s misappropriation of EU funds reached such 
conspicuous proportions that in 2008 the EU sent in its anti-fraud squad (an 
agency called OLAF), which produced sweeping criticisms to the point that 
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the European Commission suspended significant amounts of funding. At 
this point Bulgarian public opinion woke up, and while the government 
reacted defensively, public opinion was jubilant at the tough measures 
being taken by Brussels, and identified the Commission and not their 
government as the defender of their interests. The political consequences 
were not immediate, but by July 2009 a new government was formed that 
swept away the previously ruling and discredited parties. While Gergana 
Noucheva is cautious about the likely consequences of this political change, 
it seems clear that there is a new game at play. The role of the EU as 
substantial financier, backed up with incorruptible investigative powers, 
may have produced a tipping point, with a new political set of checks and 
balances in which public opinion and the EU combine to produce a boost to 
the clean-up of Bulgaria’s democracy.  
Romania was twinned with Bulgaria in acceding to the EU on 1 
January 2007, after having been detached from the main group of fast 
transition countries who made it in 2005. The story, recounted by Alina 
Mundei Pippidi, is also one in which the basic institutions of democratic 
government are in place, but degenerate into a system of distributing 
public goods to the advantage of particular groups and ruling parties. In 
this case there has been the extraordinary spectacle of the parliament 
mounting anti-anti-corruption efforts. But whereas the presidency in 
Bulgaria was part of the debased system, in Romania President Basescu has 
been waging what the author describes as an anti-corruption civil war 
against parliamentarians. The list of specific corruption charges against 
ministers and parliamentarians makes impressive reading. The headline 
feature of this struggle has been the fate of Monica Macovei as minister 
responsible for the independent anti-corruption agency (DNA). She was a 
highly popular and respected personality, only for the parliament to try to 
dismiss her or to weaken the agency’s powers. The parliament went to 
work with its anti-anti-corruption measures in February 2007, attempting 
explicitly to undo measures taken at the insistence of the European 
Commission as a condition for accession. The author is surprised that 
Romania did not receive as tough a treatment as Bulgaria, although that 
could still come. The conclusion drawn by the author is that sustainable 
democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe has mainly come through 
emulation and diffusion, rather than to rely on negotiated conditionality 
with the EU. If conditionality is the main driver of reforms, this becomes 
unsustainable after accession. The author, out of modesty, includes no 
account of the campaign she led with NGOs publicly blacklisting 
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parliamentary candidates before the 2004 elections, who were seen or 
seriously suspected of corruption, which forced the withdrawal of many of 
them. It should also be borne in mind that Romania’s former communist 
regime under President Ceausescu was for decades the most brutally 
repressive of all Central and Eastern Europe, and the only one to be 
overthrown in a violent bloodbath. If the recent story has been one of short-
term relapse after accession, it is nonetheless one of a continuing struggle 
for serious democracy, rather than a collapse or suppression of any such 
efforts.  
Serbia is ranked under most measures as being in the same league as 
Bulgaria, Romania or other Balkan states such as Croatia, as countries with 
a consolidated pluralistic democracy, but still suffering from deep 
corruption through gross ‘state capture’. This is defined by Vesna Pesic as a 
system of effective power of the ruling political parties to divide and 
distribute amongst themselves the resources of the public sector. The 
electoral process, since the end of the Milosevic regime a decade ago, has 
itself been free and fair, while media freedoms have been sustained, and 
civil society is vigorous. Yet this system has democratically produced 
parliaments and governments that systematically abuse their powers. The 
author describes this as a ‘bastard transition’. Yet there is an ongoing 
struggle between those who want clean government and those who wish to 
protect the corrupt state capture system. A key question is why the 
democratic electoral processes have not won this struggle. A theme in the 
Serbian case is how the struggle for or against state capture is aligned with 
other cleavages in Serbian society and politics, between pro-Europeans and 
ultra-nationalists who warm more to Russia and its link to the culture of 
the Orthodox church; between those who do or do not support the sending 
of indicted war criminals to The Hague, and between different intensities of 
feeling over the independence of Kosovo. The tragic severity of this 
struggle was witnessed by the assassination in 2003 of Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjic by criminals associated with conservative anti-European 
‘patriots’. Since then the struggle goes on, with recent electoral victories for 
the pro-European reformist forces, but without their gaining sufficient 
majority power in the parliament to push through a radical clean-up. 
The case of Turkey, recounted by Senem Aydin Duzgit, has seen the 
EU accession process and democracy-related conditionalities also at play as 
a key influence and anchor, especially during 2000-05. But two further 
features, absent in the preceding cases, leave heavy imprints on Turkey’s 
incomplete democratic transition: the role of civil-military relations and the 
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rising force of political Islamisation. Turkey’s politics of the second half of 
the 20th century were punctured by a succession of military coups, 
seemingly once a decade. Turning points in the substantial demilitarisation 
of politics were seen in the transition to democracy in 1983, reversing the 
1980 coup, followed by success in the 1990s in the civil war against the PKK 
Kurdish separatists. The intensity of the perceived PKK threat has been and 
remains an important factor governing the feasibility of democratic 
reforms. The issue of Islamisation rose to the top of the political agenda 
with the election in 2002 of a single party AKP party government. Initially, 
this was seen as a highly positive development in Brussels, as the AKP 
government pushed through successive reform packages driven by the 
EU’s Copenhagen criteria. It was also seen as a model development by 
those concerned with the prospects for democracy in the Muslim world, 
and in Turkey’s Arab neighbourhood in particular, where democratically-
oriented Islamist parties have been at the forefront of challenging 
authoritarian regimes.  
Since 2005, however, the author sees grounds for increasing concern 
over Turkey’s democratic consolidation, as all of the three drivers just 
mentioned have gone into reverse. The EU accession process currently 
stagnates under the influence of French and German leaders who explicitly 
oppose full membership and instead propose a ‘privileged partnership’, 
with the erosion of the EU’s reformist influence and credibility. In addition, 
the Iraq war has destabilised the Kurdish issue, and PKK violence and the 
military response is back. Finally we see the rising strength of Islamisation 
at both grass-root and top political levels, the latter witnessed in 2008 by 
the election of Abdullah Gul (with a headscarf-wearing wife) as president, 
followed by attempts (albeit unsuccessful) at the Constitutional Court to 
ban the governing AKP party. In conclusion, the author’s message is one of 
considerable concern for Turkey’s democratic consolidation, observing a 
weak underlying normative appeal of democracy for much of the 
population, and growing mistrust between the secularist establishment and 
Islamists.  
From former Soviet republics 
We first look at Ukraine and Georgia as hosts to Europe’s two celebrated 
colour revolutions, followed by Armenia and Moldova where the struggle 
for better democracy is very much alive. We pass then to states where 
democracy is practically extinguished, starting with Russia as self-
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appointed leader of the opposition to democracy, followed by Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
George Knutsishvili’s account of Georgian politics since the Rose 
Revolution, notes that after the revolution President Saakashvili introduced 
constitutional changes that greatly enhanced his powers at the expense of 
the parliament, alongside measures of extra-legal expropriation of much of 
the wealth of those who had become rich in the first wave of post-
communist privatisation. The Rose Revolution won excess credit from the 
west from the start. The regime became a “hybrid mutant power 
conglomerate”. Georgia’s vibrant civil society was partly instrumental in 
the popular uprising that Saakashvili succeeded in exploiting, and many 
civil society leaders initially joined the government. Remarkable progress 
was seen in reducing petty corruption and liberalising the economy. But 
the harsh social impact of these measures and opposition to Saakashvili’s 
arbitrary rule was mounting when Georgia suffered a devastating military 
defeat in the August 2008 war with Russia, which Saakashvili had been 
provoked into initiating. At any event this brought in its wake a new phase 
in Georgian politics. Before, Saakashvili could steamroller the opposition. 
Now, civil society is actively involved in mediating solutions. The external 
threat is used to justify exceptional and authoritarian measures, yet what 
emerges is a “weird velvet authoritarianism”.  
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution is the subject of a more nuanced and 
complex reading by Alexander Bogomolov and Alexander Litvynenko than 
the usual external frame of analysis, which asks whether the system has 
lived up to the expectations of 2004, or whether it has simply got bogged 
down in irreconcilable political rivalries. For the authors, the Orange 
Revolution marked a new and authentic level of social mobilisation and 
self-reflection on Ukraine’s past, present and future. The possibility of 
political competition was at stake. The nature of the ensuing political 
competition continues to be conducted as a zero sum game by party 
leaderships, consisting of opaque multi-layered cliques, whose success is 
based on their perceived mastery of selling the private interests of their 
oligarchical supporters as political projects. A more adequate political 
representation of the new diversity in society and expanded middle classes 
has not yet been achieved. Thousands of medium-sized entrepreneurs, who 
have built their businesses on real economic production rather than corrupt 
rent-seeking, now represent a values-driven group. They are not yet 
politically effective, but their time ripens. At the same time the expectations 
created by the Orange Revolution have exposed the poverty of unreformed 
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state institutions, revealing a crisis of bureaucracy. Medium-level civil 
servants come to appreciate the need for more transparent governance. 
Ukrainian democracy is seen in the maturing of civil society, with the 
normative appeal of democracy working its way from the bottom up, even 
if such tendencies have not yet reached a tipping point. The collapse of the 
attempt in June 2009 of the Yulia Timoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich blocs 
to form a political alliance was due to both internal dissent within the two 
parties and fierce criticism from civil society and the media. The authors 
conclude that Ukraine’s democratic advance, which has been very real in 
the ways just described, is still entering a period of serious risk in terms of 
its sustainability. At this point the European Union’s Eastern Partnership 
initiative seems to reflect a view that the region has become some kind of 
ambiguous political space whose problems are going to sort themselves out 
in due course. Ukraine needs more than this to support its fledgling 
democratic self-consciousness, especially because Russia for its part has 
another strategic objective. 
Armenia and Moldova follow logically as two countries that have 
been edging towards colour revolutions. Richard Giragosian views 
Armenia as a relatively plausible site for a real struggle for democracy 
because of the absence of petro-riches. It has nonetheless been an 
outstanding ‘kleptocracy’ for the extent to which the ruling clique has kept 
its hands on the country’s meagre resources. Yet the elections of early 2008 
marked a turning point. The opposition became united under the 
leadership of Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former president who had been 
ousted by the two earlier incumbents, President Robert Kocharian and 
Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian. Underlying factors were resentment of 
income inequalities due to rampant corruption and denial of employment 
opportunities, and constitutional reforms that raised the expectations of the 
population. Ter-Petrosian was instrumental in pulling the population out 
of their political apathy and uniting the previously fragmented opposition. 
In the elections of 2008, the carefully scripted game was for the prime 
minister to succeed the president (with elements here from the Putin-
Medvedev model). Protests over irregularities in the election, which gave 
Sarkisian a first-round victory, were followed by sustained street 
demonstrations day after day and night after night, reminiscent of the 
Orange Revolution. However, in this case the incumbent leadership 
responded with heavy-handed police intervention that left 10 dead, 
followed by a month-long state of emergency that resembled martial law. 
Yet the repression of opposition demands for real democracy in Armenia 
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no longer seems possible. The leadership’s overreaction was counter-
productive and has not quelled the demands or vigour of opposition 
movements. Richard Giragosian concludes that while the crisis remains 
unresolved, a new transition era in Armenian politics seems to have begun. 
The struggle is engaged for something more like real democracy over a 
corrupt clique seeking to organise a quasi-dynastic succession. 
Since independence Moldova has seemed to steer a middle course, 
avoiding either consolidated authoritarainism or a radical colour revolution 
movement. Instead there has been political pluralism, with elections more 
or less free and fair and uncertain in their outcomes, and indeed changes in 
the political colour of governments. The ethnic pluralism of Moldova, with 
significant Russian and Ukrainian minorities, is compounded by the fact 
that the Moldovans of Romanian-Moldovan culture are themselves divided 
into groups favouring Moldovan statehood alongside those more inclined 
to become part of Romania again. All parties are broadly pro-European, 
even if for the communist party, ruling from 2001 to 2009 this has been 
more of the lip service variety. The leadership is active in playing politics 
with both the EU and Russia. However, Moldova has a border now with 
the EU and not with Russia, and many Moldovans acquire Romanian and 
therefore EU citizenship. Avoidance of Belarus or Azeri-style 
authoritarianism seems also attributable to the dispersal of economic 
power, without an industrial or resource base offering the basis for state 
capture or the buying in of a leadership clique on a decisive scale. The 
Transnistrian conflict however is viewed by most Moldovans with 
indifference, and has had none of the regime-consolidating role that has 
been seen in Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabak. Such features of the 
Moldovan political landscape appeared quite stable until the April 2009 
parliamentary elections, when the communist leadership resorted 
increasingly to authoritarian methods. When the election results were 
protested in the street the government and police responded repressively, 
to the point where opposition parties were provoked into even more 
vigorous political protest. With the election failing to deliver a majority to 
the communist party, a fresh election was convened for July. At this point 
the number two personality on the communist ticket, Marian Lupu, 
defected from the communists and joined a previously marginal social 
democratic party, with the alliance of democratic parties achieving an 
improved score, and able to control the formation of a ruling coalition, but 
without a clear majority. It was already clear that the Moldovan electorate 
had brought an end to the creeping authoritarianism of the communist 
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leadership. Even the title of the chapter by Nicu Popescu and Andrew 
Wilson changed as this book was under preparation, with the key words 
amended from ‘incremental authoritarianism’ to ‘fragile pluralism’, which 
almost seems to be signalling a regime change. 
Russia is the most explicit and important instance case of ‘backlash’ 
against western precepts of democracy. There were two turning points, 
corresponding roughly to the beginnings of Vladimir Putin’s two terms as 
president. Under Boris Yeltsin Russia had been making a rather chaotic 
transition towards the western model of pluralist party politics and civil 
liberties. Putin came to power seeing Russia then as a weak state, risking 
worse, and suffering from a very feeble international standing. He 
immediately set to work to re-establish a ‘vertical of power’, for example 
scrapping the election of regional governors in favour of their nomination 
by the Kremlin. The oligarchs were warned to keep out of opposition 
politics, with the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky serving as a message. At 
the same time a hugely powerful clique of favoured business leaders and 
apparatchiks were co-opted into the power structure, effectively lured by 
the available petro-wealth that the state could distribute. The terms 
‘managed democracy’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ were introduced into 
public discourse to suggest a different and authentically Russian political 
order. The second turning point was Putin’s response to the Georgian and 
Ukrainian colour revolutions around 2004-05. Putin interpreted these as 
western-inspired, if not directly supported, regime changes. The model was 
a direct threat to his political objectives. He therefore decided on legislation 
to clamp down on NGO activity that could threaten his vertical of power. 
Domestic NGOs were subject to onerous registration and inspection 
conditions, while western NGO activity was made virtually impossible. At 
the same time the Russian government went about creating its own 
instruments of soft power, for deployment with officially funded 
information and advocacy offices set up in Paris and New York, and more 
substantially through funding Russian associations and activists in the near 
abroad, including in hyper-sensitive places as Crimea. Some argue that this 
effort is characterised by ideological emptiness. However, in Elena 
Klitsounova’s view, Russian soft power should not be underestimated. The 
strong presidential regime and resistance to foreign democracy promotion 
has serious attractions for a number of post-Soviet states, including 
Azerbaijan and certainly Central Asia. 
The petro factor has been an even more fundamental factor in 
shaping political developments in Azerbaijan, both structurally and 
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instrumentally, according to Leila Alieva. However the post-Soviet period 
had begun with a popular front government that aimed at real democracy 
and, for example, facilitated the creation of some 300 NGOs, which were 
even given free offices in Baku to get started. But early in 1993 the Popular 
Front was overthrown by Heidar Aliev’s coup, which may be viewed as the 
first democratic ‘backlash’. As the oil/gas boom followed, Heidar Aliev 
used the resources of the petro-state to buy in a ruling elite, which was 
consolidated by state ownership in the petro sector, establishing a structure 
that wielded a monopoly of power. Petro-corruption provided not only 
resources to buy the loyalty of the elite, but also blackmail opportunities to 
curb possible moves of individuals into opposition. Petro resources 
provided the basis for far stricter control of elites than in Ukraine or 
Georgia. Civil society was also weakened by job opportunities for young 
western educated professionals in the petro sector. The domestic 
concentration of power was further facilitated by the oil/gas price boom of 
the early 2000s. The population benefited from some trickle-down of the 
oil/gas boom and thus a feel-good or feel-better factor. Heidar Aliev, with 
his KGB experience, was adept at consolidating control over all the power 
ministries and agencies. The Nagorno-Karabak conflict added to the 
legitimisation of the regime, with its nationalist-patriotic discourse, and 
rationale for strict government controls. Aliev correctly understood the 
pragmatic nature of US and EU policies, whose oil interests spurred the 
case for regime stability. The dynastic succession from Heidar Aliev to his 
son Ilham in 2003 has seen the effective continuity of Heidar’s politics, with 
huge propaganda images of him as father of the nation now on display 
everywhere, with his son no doubt the beneficiary. The authors’ conclusion 
is that if major resource riches are developed before the establishment of 
strong democratic institutions and culture, the ‘oil curse’ upon democracy 
will surely follow.  
Kazakhstan has obvious features in common with Azerbaijan, in 
particular its petro-wealth, which allows the buying-in of an elite and the 
consolidation of a strongly presidential regime that could stamp out major 
political opposition. Kazakhstan’s major relationships with its two big 
neighbours, Russia and China, are further factors curtailing Western 
attempts to push the pace of democratisation. On the other hand 
Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnicity is a factor that causes fault-lines in society, 
constraining the authoritarianism of President Nazabayev. There are 
limited media freedoms and a relatively open society, even if Nazabayev, 
president for the entirety of the post-Soviet period, has suppressed all 
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significant political opposition and continues without term-limits to his 
office. The relatively open society goes with Nazabayev’s aim to establish a 
favourable image of his regime in Europe and the world, as witnessed by 
his strategy document “Path to Europe” published in 2009, and winning 
agreement on Kazakhstan’s forthcoming presidency in 2010 of the OSCE. 
Kazakhstan thus promotes the image of a ‘neo-enlightenment’ form of 
authoritarianism, with the rule of law and certain room for civil liberties, 
but without representative democracy as a prospect for a long period to 
come. Neil Melvin sees the transition paradigm as having reached a dead 
end in Kazakhstan, and the need for Europe to focus on the alternative 
paradigm of long-term socio-economic development as the motor for 
democratic reform is more plausible. Here the EU can play a role, and 
could for example offer Kazakhstan inclusion in the Eastern Partnership, 
helping shape a modernisation characterised by civil society.  
Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, president since 1994, has been 
branded Europe’s ‘last dictator’, but this title is under challenge, as others 
in the petro-state group become ever more consolidated in their 
authoritarianism, while Lukashenko’s regime is itself under pressure for 
change. Until recently his personal rule was being reinforced, notably with 
the removal of term-limits for his presidency by referendum in 2004, and 
his re-election in 2006. This election nonetheless saw a certain surge in civil 
activism, even if the opposition candidates failed to gain more than 25% of 
votes, and thereafter the regime clamped down on opposition leaders and 
closed down many civil society NGOs. But other major changes in the 
political environment push for change, including the enlargement of the 
EU to Belarus’s frontiers, the end of Russia’s energy subsidies, and the 
catastrophic fall in Russian demand for Belarus’ export of industrial goods 
resulting from the current economic crisis. It has been forced to obtain 
credit from the IMF. The regime’s corruption has become more 
conspicuous and tarnishes the leadership’s image of custodian of a social 
contract with the people. A new generation among the ruling elite, led by 
the presidents’s son Viktar, push for a more open and pragmatic policy that 
would help improve relations with the EU. The EU is opening a Delegation 
in Minsk, and Belarus was invited in 2009 to join the Eastern Partnership. 
Relations with Russia worsened sharply as Lukashenko refused to endorse 
Russia over the war with Georgia in 2008. All these developments lead 
Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silicki to conclude that Belarus has now entered a 
buffer-zone between Russia and the EU, no longer qualifying for 
description as a Russian satellite. Democracy has not yet come to Belarus 
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but the prospects for a real struggle seem far more propitious now than 
ever. 
From the Arab world 
Of the three Mediterranean Arab states studied – Morocco, Algeria and 
Egypt – the first has succeeded best in projecting a reputation for prudent 
political liberalisation. The European Union has on these grounds awarded 
Morocco with ‘top-of-the-class’ ranking among the Mediterranean 
neighbouring states, with the signature in October 2008 of a new 
‘advanced’ political framework agreement. Kristina Kausch sees a picture 
of consolidated semi-authoritarian rule by the monarch, corresponding to 
the notion of ‘smarter authoritarianism’. There has been liberalisation in 
politically non-threatening degrees, with a somewhat wider space for 
political parties, civil society and the media, while real political opposition 
has been kept firmly under control. Civil liberties have been legislated, but 
with many loopholes the regime can exploit. Electoral processes have been 
formally competitive, but with significant limitations to pluralism. The 
moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party has achieved a significant 
presence in parliament, as opposed to the more radical Justice and Charity 
movement, which operates outside the official political process. The 
effective powers of the parliament are very weak, and even government 
ministers are doubled by the real power-holders among the Makhzen – the 
patronage network of the palace. There are only rare instances of open 
coercion or violent repression, and these are usually well covered-up or 
explained with resourceful public relations. Elites have been co-opted, and 
civil society promoted through government-controlled NGOs (GONGOs). 
Counter-terrorism measures, facing the real threat of the ‘al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb’ and other terrorist organisations, have been instrumenta-
lised for justification of authoritarian controls. The EU seems to be hoping 
for gradual but credible democratisation, but this is not happening, and the 
EU seems to have no traction over political reform, with its conditionalities 
and incentives lacking decisive strength. The timescale for political reform 
is nowhere explicit: is it a matter of decades or generations? In the 
meantime is there a sustainable model of relative political enlightenment 
over civil liberties without real political pluralism, with the timescale so 
stretched that change is hardly perceptible? The constitutionalisation of the 
monarchy is an old and long story in European political history, and one 
that seems to have a long run ahead of it in Morocco. 
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The Algerian story has been a rougher one, ever since the very 
difficult and violent de-colonisation episode. In 2009 President Bouteflika 
was elected for his third term of office, which has been interpreted as 
another instance of democratic backlash, and an end to political alternance, 
driven by oil rents and anti-terror factors. But this thesis is contested by 
Hakim Darbouche. His narrative of Algerian politics sees the Chadli 
presidency of the 1980s first ushering in economic liberalisation, ending in 
1989 with institutional reforms that ended the political monopoly of the 
FLN, and introducing a degree of effective pluralism. But the army high 
command was still the ultimate arbiter of politics, as dramatically shown in 
1992 with the overthrow of the Islamist party FIS on the verge of its 
electoral victory. Bouteflika became president in 1999 as the army’s choice. 
He was quite successful with amnesties that sought to heal the wounds of 
civil war, in achieving a degree of reconciliation with France and economic 
progress. However, in his second term beginning in 2004 Bouteflika 
progressively gained the upper hand over the army, consolidating the 
civilianisation and rationalisation of executive power. This is a 
precondition for the institutionalisation of politics in Algeria, but needs 
supporting with measures to entrench the rule of law, where Bouteflika’s 
record is still disappointing. The distribution of oil rents created a new 
elite, thus also diluting the power of the army. Bouteflika’s political success 
in winning a third term in office, with the aid of constitutional reforms, 
should not be interpreted as a democratic backlash, since in the absence of 
viable democratic institutions and an effective civil society, the alternative 
would have been the return of the military to pre-eminence in the power 
structure.  
Egypt experienced a nascent democratic spring of considerable 
vigour in the period 2004-05. This was a period of mobilisation and 
diversification of political opposition, with both old forces (the Muslim 
Brotherhood) and new ones (the Kifaya movements) at play, with vocal 
support from the media. The ruling regime was forced to make limited 
concessions. The 2005 parliamentary elections were the turning point, 
however, when the regime was seriously threatened by the prospects of 
major Muslim Brotherhood success. This led to an abrupt end to the 
democratic spring, with the incarceration of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, 
and military tribunals taking over cases that the civil courts were supposed 
to address. There was even the penalisation of judges contesting election 
fraud. The de-liberalisation process continued with constitutional reforms 
in 2007, which extended the emergency powers of the president, ended the 
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judicial supervision of elections, and banned the participation of religious 
parties. Dina Shehata analyses the causes of this de-liberalisation, placed in 
a context of decades, which since the 1960s has seen successive cycles of 
liberalisation, de-liberalisation and repression. This time there have been 
important influences coming from the politics of Egypt’s neighbours, 
including the successes of radical Islamist parties Hamas in Palestine and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iranian threats to Arab regimes via their 
support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Also at play were the decline of the 
normative political reputation of the United States during the Bush 
presidency and the disastrous democratic regime change by war in Iraq. 
Nonetheless the story is not over. In recent years opposition groups and 
civil society have become increasingly vibrant, and with the growth of 
middle class interests the greater pluralisation of society will surely 
continue, and with it the underlying demands for democratic liberalisation. 
For the author external actors should concentrate their efforts on economic 
and civil society development, while keeping clear of direct involvement in 
constitutional matters. 
Two primary categories 
Looking at these case studies analytically, rather than in conventional 
regional groupings, two primary categories may be distinguished, between 
struggling transitions and various species of autocratic dynasties (see table 
below). While these two categories now seem on the whole to be quite 
robustly differentiated, there are some borderline cases that could be 
candidates for a category-switch, to which we shall return. 
Struggling transitions  
For this first category of countries the term ‘transition’ is still relevant, even 
if the process has been going on for two decades now, and proves to be 
longer and more painful than had initially been anticipated. It embraces 
countries that have exited communism and are both in principle and in 
many substantive practices aiming at the European model of democratic 
politics, but whose democracies are vitiated by deep defects, mainly in the 
realm of corrupt state capture of economic assets. Identification with 
Europe is a general feature and the leverage of EU conditionality is 
relevant, albeit with varying degrees of force.  
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Table 1. Struggling transitions and proliferating dynasties 
 Struggling transitions Proliferating dynasties 
In or close to the EU Bulgaria 3.04 
Romania 3.36 
Serbia 3.79 
Turkey 
(rest of Balkans) 
 
Former Soviet Union Georgia 4.93 
Ukraine 4.39 
Armenia 5.39 
Moldova 5.07 
Azerbaijan **** 6.25 
Belarus *** 6.57 
Kazakhstan ** 6.32 
(Uzbekistan) ** 6.89 
Russia * 6.11 
Arab Mediterranean (Lebanon) 
(Palestine) 
Morocco ***** 
(Jordan) ***** 
(Syria) **** 
Egypt *** 
(Libya) *** 
Algeria ** 
***** Monarchy 
**** Republican dynasty (father-to-son succession) 
*** Potential republican dynasty (father president without term-limit, son politically 
prominent) 
** Presidency without term-limit 
* Presidency subject to term-limit, but with faked compliance, and circumvention in 
practice (alternating presidency and prime minister). 
Note: The dynasties are rated by stars according to their institutional quality as 
dynasties, rather than the strength or quality of their authoritarianism. The numerical 
ratings are taken from Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, where the scale is from 
1.00 (= the most democratic) to 7.00 (=the most authoritarian).  
( ….. ) countries in brackets are not subject to case studies in this volume. 
 
Into this category we place the countries in or close to the EU – 
Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Turkey, and several but not all of the 
European former Soviet republics – Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia.  
These are all countries in which the pursuit of sound democracy is an 
ongoing struggle. Success is not assured, but the normative appeal of 
democracy is evident, even if its advocates are fighting continuous battles 
either amongst themselves (as in Ukraine), or with those who prefer the 
corrupted order (as in Serbia or Romania). 
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Notably absent are the driving forces that are common in the second 
category of proliferating dynasties: petro-riches and radical Islam.  
Turkey is a complex case, reminding us that our primary categories 
are of course simplifications. Its present AKP government is that of a 
moderate and democratic Islamist party that likes to make comparisons 
with Europe’s Christian democratic parties. But there is also a residual role 
of the military lurking in the background as guardian of Turkey’s Kemalist 
secularism, should the Islamists go too far. In addition, the resurgence of 
PKK terrorist acts puts stress upon the observance of human rights by the 
security forces. But overall the vibrancy of Turkey’s political pluralism 
keeps it in the category of a democracy struggling at an advanced stage of 
transition towards the European model.  
The general characteristics of the struggling transitions are seen in the 
opposition between two contradictory forces. On the one hand there is the 
appeal that European democratic norms and models hold for society, and 
on the other hand the hazards of the partial or inbalanced progress of the 
political and economic reform processes that are at the basis of corrupted 
systems.  
The case studies show how the Europeanisation process can in turn 
be driven by some combination of two different paradigms: conditionality 
and emulation. Conditionality is massively at play for countries that are 
acceding or candidate states, and here the whole rule book is thrown at 
them by the European Commission, with regular reports resembling term 
reports at school. By contrast the countries with European aspirations but 
without membership perspectives have to rely on emulation. The relative 
force of the two paradigms is a matter of debate. The cases of Bulgaria and 
Romania show clearly how, when the force of conditionality ends upon 
accession, there was earlier a degree of forced and unsustainable 
compliance with the European norms, which is reversible. While this 
reversibility has tended to become an accepted view, the Bulgarian case has 
produced a new conditionality mechanism, with withdrawal of EU funding 
applied in the absence of adequate steps to de-corrupt their use. Given the 
considerable importance of this funding for the poorest member states, this 
mechanism can have real leverage. Also noted in the Bulgarian case was 
the response of public opinion, which was so incensed by the gross 
corruption of the political leadership and its probable links with criminal 
gangs that it effectively allied with the European Commission. Nonetheless 
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the analysis of the Romanian case suggests that long-term emulation has to 
be the basic mechanism for the sustainability of sound democracy. 
‘Emulation’ is essentially the same as what was described in an 
earlier paper as a ‘gravity model’ of democratisation.11 The term ‘gravity 
model’ originated as a theorem of economics to explain the intensity of 
trade relations between countries as a function of geographic proximity 
and economic weight. For its democratisation variant the explanatory 
factors are again proximity, both geographic and in terms of cultural and 
historical identity, and then the perceived attractiveness of the political 
regime of the neighbour.  
Of particular significance here is the split between Russia and its 
other European former Soviet states – Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and 
Georgia. For all these four latter countries Europe stands not only for 
democracy and human rights, but also for freedom from Russian 
hegemony. For Ukraine the Slav cultural and historic commonality with 
Russia is of course a massive fact, but the heavy-handedness of Russian 
national patriotic discourse and efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet 
space fits uneasily with Ukraine’s cultural and regional diversity. 
The theorem of partial or poorly sequenced reforms as a hazard for 
democracy seems to be the main explanation of the struggling transitions, 
or what one of our authors calls ‘bastard transitions’. At the heart of this 
hazard has been processes of privatisation moving relatively fast in 
comparison with the maturing of democratic governance. Privatisation can 
be achieved speedily in a ‘big bang’, as was the case in Poland and Russia, 
but even at a more measured pace it can be largely done within a decade. 
But if there is little or no pre-existing democratic tradition, the time-scale 
for a maturing of comprehensive political reform is surely much longer, 
and a matter of generations rather than years or a decade or so. Newly 
empowered leadership groups in such cases have found the temptation to 
use their powers for enrichment overwhelming, when simple 
administrative decisions allocate arbitrarily hugely important shares of the 
nation’s economic assets. But the processes of corruption have become 
more complex and sophisticated, with control rather than ownership of 
economic assets offering the possibility for enrichment of the power-
                                                     
11 M. Emerson & G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of 
Democratisation, CEPS Working Documet No. 214, CEPS, Brussels, November 2004. 
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holders. This has led to the phenomenum of state capture as described in 
several case studies, whereby political parties entering into government 
divide and allocate the spoils of office, with party loyalists being rewarded 
with remunerative positions in state enterprises and government 
departments. Further, close links develop between the oligarchs and 
political leadership, with ample opportunities to trade mutual advantages. 
These features are also prevalent in our second category of authoritarian 
dynasties, but in those cases one observes a cumulation of corruption with 
other features that result in authoritarianism rather than just perverted, 
distorted or dysfunctional democracy.  
The colour revolutions, or street protests in alliance with opposition 
leaders that overthrow corrupted regimes, are to be seen as attempts to 
break out of these forms of rotten democracy. But their recent record, in 
Georgia and Ukraine, has disappointed.12 Georgia reverted to heavy-
handed authoritarianism, masquerading as democracy through the 
eloquent speeches to western audiences in fluent English by President 
Saakashvili, until the war in August 2008, leading on to new political 
dynamics with an uncertain outcome. Ukraine slipped into dysfunctional 
democracy, with chronic instability and conflict between leadership 
groups. But Armenia and Moldova are both cases where there emerge 
rising underlying societal demands for cleaner democracy. 
Our reading of these struggling democracies is in general one in 
which popular demands for cleaner democracy are vibrant, and while these 
demands are not yet met, neither can authoritarianism acquire sufficient 
critical mass to dominate. It leaves open the question of possible slippage 
between our two primary categories, of the struggling transition and 
authoritarianism. Moldova has been closest to having seen such a slide into 
authoritarianism, or effectively towards the Belarus model. This slide 
seems now to have been reversed, and in the next section we will even 
consider whether the Belarus regime may be risking a slide in the opposite 
direction. 
                                                     
12 The Kyrgiz ‘tulip’ revolution saw an ephemeral democratic opening, which has 
now been clearly closed down. 
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Proliferating dynasties 
For this second category we adopt an elastic concept of dynasty. It starts 
with some old, regular monarchical dynasties such as that of Morocco, to 
which can be added Jordan. 
It includes some new apparent dynasties, where ageing and 
authoritarian presidents have paved the way for family succession, such as 
has already happened in Azerbaijan and Syria, and is at least the subject of 
speculation in Egypt, Libya and Belarus where the sons of the presidents 
already have major political roles, to which group might also be added 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
This group overlaps with other regimes that have also seen term 
limits removed to permit presidents-for-life, as in Algeria, Egypt and 
Kazakhstan. Tunisia is also clearly in this category, as is the rest of Central 
Asia. 
Finally, there is the case in which the letter of the law over term-limits 
for the president may be respected, but where the intention of the 
constitution is abused with a system of alternation between the posts of 
president and prime minister by a single individual. A further feature is the 
informal ‘family’ succession in which the incumbent president selects his 
successor to be partner in this conspiracy against the constitution, and 
organises some formal elections to endorse the process. This regime has 
been worked out in practice by Putin in partnership with Medvedev, and 
could in theory run on for life. Given the comparative youth and robust 
health of Putin (55 years) and Medvedev (43 years), it might mean adding 
up to another three decades in office to the first decade already served. 
Prime Minister Putin illustrated the nature of the regime in September 2009 
with the following words: “There was no competition between us [with 
Medvedev] in 2007 and we won’t have any in 2012 [upon the next 
presidential election]”.13  
These several species of dynasties have several common features of 
note. All are consolidated authoritarian regimes that are able to control 
affairs to exclude any meaningful political pluralism and democratic 
competition, although all go through the motions of formal or façade 
democracies with the usual institutions and elections.  
                                                     
13 Financial Times, 12-13 September 2009. 
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All are countries where identification with Europe and its norms is 
weak, or even negative in terms of identifying with other competing 
political concepts or images, such as Eurasianism, sovereign democracy, 
managed democracy, or Arab democracy. Russia is a complex hybrid case 
here, identifying itself as both European and Eurasian, indeed insisting that 
it is Europe, while purporting to define its own alternative European 
normative order. Kazakhstan is also projecting a Eurasian discourse with it 
‘path to Europe’ programme, reminiscent of Morocco’s bid for EU 
membership in the 1970s. 
All are countries in which the transition paradigm has withered 
away, or is now at a dead-end. This is because there is no longer (if there 
ever was) a sense of movement towards the liberal-democratic model of 
society and politics, and the authoritarian dynasty is strongly entrenched.  
However, some of these states strive for a certain ‘neo-enlightenment’ 
branding, with relatively open societies and the avoidance of brutal 
repression. Some observers, in particular from the NGO community, argue 
that these are just a matter of international public relations efforts.  
What explains authoritarianism? The basic motives are surely lust for 
power and wealth. But the questions we must pursue are the means by 
which authoritarianism is sustained against the pressures for open and 
equal political participation. 
Among the explanatory factors, petro-riches is a factor of some 
significance, but clearly not at the level of any mono-causal explanation. 
Among the countries studied, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Russia 
are petro-states, to which Libya could be added. Of all these cases 
Azerbaijan is the one where our author most stresses the mechanisms by 
which the petro-riches provide the basis for political control by an 
authoritarian leadership together with a co-opted elite. The mixing of state 
control and corruption further serves to solidify the loyalty of a favoured 
elite, given its potential for the blackmailing of dissenting voices.  
Several states are using the enemy image and consequent need for 
ultra-nationalist patriotism as a bonding agent with the population. This is 
strongly developed in Russia, using a variety of threats including NATO 
expansion, US missile defence plans in Eastern Europe, and the conflict 
with Georgia that had been simmering for years before the war of August 
2008. The Azeri regime has instrumentalised the Nagorno-Karabak conflict 
to bolster its popular legitimacy, as has Morocco over the Western Sahara.  
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Islam features in one way or another in almost all the authoritarian 
dynasties. But this is a complex and multi-faceted matter. Most of the states 
of Islamic culture studied here are using counter-terrorism or counter-
Islamic radicalism to justify severe security regimes. The terrorism of 
suicide bombing and other acts of murderous violence are realities or 
credible threats almost everywhere. But the dynamics of political Islam are 
a complex interplay between on the one hand moderate and 
democratically-oriented Islamist parties and groups, and on the other hand 
factions or parties that are both radical and violent.14 In both Morocco and 
Egypt, for example, democratically-oriented Islamist parties have sought 
significant political participation, but have been either repressed or 
restricted to marginal roles. This in turn has damaged their political 
credibility to the benefit of more radical Islamist movements, which in turn 
feeds the justification of extreme security regimes. The secular-Islamist 
divide can also be a source of serious political tension, as in Turkey, Egypt 
and Algeria, undermining democratic practice or adding a justification of 
repression.  
Conclusions – an ongoing struggle 
There is virtually no well-functioning democracy in the neighbourhood of 
the European Union,15 which now finds itself surrounded by states that fall 
broadly into either one of two categories. In one category there are the 
states that have seen the post-communist political transition processes go 
astray and take on various guises of distorted, perverted, or dysfunctional 
democracy. This group includes the newest member states of the EU. On 
the other hand there is a set of authoritarian regimes in which the 
concentration of power has become increasingly consolidated, as witnessed 
in the various forms of dynastic succession. 
One might be tempted to see these developments as confirming 
certain views, currently in circulation, that the colour revolutions of 2004-05 
failed and that the influence of the European Union as a promoter of 
democracy is also failing, even for some of the new member states. 
                                                     
14 M. Emerson, K. Kausch & R. Youngs (eds), Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2009. 
15 This excludes the case of Israel as an advanced economy and a vibrant 
democracy. 
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After reviewing in some depth what has actually been happening in 
these neighbouring states, we prefer to take a different and more nuanced 
view.  
The colour revolutions of 2004-05 may not have matched up to the 
expectations and euphoria of the moment, but they have still marked 
important steps in the political history of these states, and reveal the 
deepening role of civil society in sustaining the struggle for better 
democracy.  
The colour revolutions episode has also seen a parting of the ways 
among other neighbouring states. Russia has mounted its own counter-
offensive against the European model of democracy at home and abroad, 
and this meets with a positive echo in various authoritarian states, most of 
all in Central Asia. On the other hand in Eastern Europe there are several 
new candidates warming up for colour revolutions, for example Armenia 
and Moldova, to judge by the powerful street protests against electoral 
irregularities and popular indignation over corruption and income 
inequalities. These countries all have some sense of European identity, even 
if membership of the European Union is not on the horizon.  
The authoritarian states, which have formal or informal dynasties, 
have a considerable degree of commonality across several explanatory or 
supporting features: petro resources, political Islam as a suppressed form 
of opposition, and radical Islamic groups as a source of terrorism that lead 
to repressive counter measures. These states also have little or no sense of 
European identity; on the contrary, most stress their ‘otherness’, be it on 
secular nationalist or Muslim cultural grounds.  
It remains for the European policy-maker to draw conclusions for 
democracy promotion strategies.  
The demands for democracy from societies in the struggling 
transition countries are increasingly vocal. This process may be a struggle, 
but it always has been so in the historical emergence of European 
democracy. The EU will continue to set the standard, but emulation rather 
than conditionality may be the most effective and durable mechanism. 
Nonetheless, the EU is developing new leverage on some new member 
states through control of its funding, and its associated political role in 
allying with civil society and public opinion in their struggle against 
corrupt governance. But the EU also needs to develop systematic methods 
to address serious democracy deficits in any member state, new or old, and 
here the European Parliament might best take the lead. 
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For the authoritarian states without a European perspective, there 
may well be a long period ahead when a brand of ‘neo-enlightenment’ may 
be the most plausible positive scenario, i.e. one in which representative 
democracy remains a very thin and formalistic affair, but where the 
improvement of civil liberties and respect for human rights is achievable. 
Some states, such as Morocco and Kazakhstan, seem to be heading in that 
direction, or at least are seeking to promote an image and expectations of 
this order. For many of the authoritarian countries of the neighbourhood, 
the transition paradigm has reached a dead end. A different scenario is 
needed, focusing on long-term socio-economic development and the 
emergence of new middle class and educated elite interests as the future 
drivers of democracy. This seems implicit in the actual policies of the 
European Union, which focus most attention on human rights, and barely 
still mention the word democracy. A more deliberate and positive framing 
of such policies is called for. 
Finally, the European Union needs to develop a more open and 
constructive posture towards moderate and democratically inclined 
Islamist opposition parties in several Arab states. These parties have been  
tending to gain popular support and legitimacy, while being widely 
repressed or given only token political roles. These repressive tendencies 
are storing up trouble, causing the moderate opposition elements to be 
discredited, to the advantage of more radical groups. This is a vicious 
circle, leading to further repressive measures in the name of countering 
radical Islam and terrorism. Through their diplomatic acquiescence with 
the policies of authoritarian leaders, the European Union is undermining 
the cause of democracy as well as its own political reputation as advocate 
of democracy and human rights.16 
 
                                                     
16 This theme is addressed in detail in Emerson, Kausch & Youngs, op. cit. 
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2. BULGARIA: RULE OF LAW WANTED 
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA 
“Other countries have the mafia… In Bulgaria, the mafia has the country.” 
Atanas Atanansov in the New York Times, 15 October 2008. 
 
ulgaria joined the EU on 1 January 2007 with serious unanswered 
questions about the quality of its domestic governance. Two issues in 
particular cast a shadow over the picture of this new democracy – 
massive high-level political corruption and the curious incompetence of the 
authorities to tackle organised crime. Linked to both problems is the still 
lumbering and inefficient judicial system that fails to create the perception 
among Bulgarian citizens that it stands as a guarantor of social justice 
rather than a protector of private interests. While it is normal for 
unconsolidated democracies to experience certain difficulties on the road to 
democratic governance, the case of Bulgaria stands out for the persistence 
of these problems and the suspicion of close ties between the political 
establishment, big business and even the criminal networks of the 
underworld. The special cooperation and verification mechanisms put in 
place by the European Commission at the time of Bulgaria’s accession is a 
reflection of the deep concerns that the rule of law in the country is not yet 
up to EU standards. 
The first two years of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU showed that if 
reforms were slow to deliver results before accession, they stagnated and 
even went in reverse after accession. The Transparency International 
corruption perception index showed a worsening trend in 2007 and 2008, 
with Bulgaria’s score dropping to 3.6 in 2008 from 4.1 in 2007. The country 
dropped from 57th place in 2006 to 72th place in 2008 in the world ranking of 
B 
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corruption-clean countries.1 In February 2009, the European Commission 
reported a downward trend in initiated proceedings and convictions in 
high-level corruption cases by the Bulgarian judicial authorities in the 
course of 2008.2 No significant change was observed for the same year with 
regard to the prosecution and trial of organised crime cases, even though 
high-profile mafia killings have declined.3 Notwithstanding the protracted 
reform of the judicial system in Bulgaria, the doubts about its efficiency, 
professionalism and impartiality in delivering verdicts remain.  
Perhaps the most embarrassing episode in the country’s post-
accession record to date was the colossal mishandling of EU funds that 
compelled the European Commission first to threaten to suspend aid to 
Bulgaria in July 2008, and then to permanently withhold €220 million of 
pre-accession funding (PHARE programme), freezing another €300 million 
of post-accession funding in November 2008.4 The Commission further 
withdrew the accreditation of two government agencies charged with 
disbursing EU money for failure to guarantee sound and transparent 
management of EU funds. For Bulgaria, the poorest EU member state with 
a GDP per capita standing at 29% of the EU average and an 
underdeveloped transport and institutional infrastructure, this 
development is dismal.  
The politics of partial reform 
What have been the reasons for the slow progress in improving the rule of 
law in Bulgaria? Bulgaria was one of the laggards of Central and Eastern 
Europe in initiating and sustaining institutional and policy reforms in the 
1990s. Bulgarian society was not prepared for a deep and fast transition to 
                                                     
1 See the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) available 
at www.transparency.org. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 
10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
2 See the Interim Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism, European Commission, COM(2009) 69final, Brussels, 12.2.2009, p. 5. 
3 Ibid., p. 6. 
4 See Kerin Hope & Theodor Troev, “Bulgaria Loses €520m EU Funds”, Financial 
Times, 26 November 2008. 
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democracy or a market economy and did not produce clear pro-reform 
political majorities at election times. As a result, the communist-era elite not 
only continued to govern at all levels in the critical first years of transition 
but also took the opportunity to profit economically from the situation at a 
private level. While the country began a process of economic liberalisation 
and democratisation, the reform steps were very timid and not comparable 
to the commitment of other Central European countries to fast and deep 
modernisation.  
Partial reform proved fatal, as it created groups with vested interests 
in blocking further reform and obstructing the introduction of clear and fair 
rules for everyone in the system.5 In a seminal work on the politics of post-
communist transition, Joel Hellman (1998) challenges the conventional 
wisdom of initial reforms breeding further reforms through the gradual 
empowerment of a pro-reform constituency, and argues that in some post-
communist countries the ‘net winners’ of the early transition period were 
able to gain access to monopoly rents and, being unwilling to share those 
gains with other societal groups, thus become the major impediment to 
comprehensive reforms in the later years of transition. In the case of 
Bulgaria, this meant that the agents of incomplete change – whether in 
business, the judiciary, public administration or politics – have had to 
balance two contradictory objectives: on the one hand, supporting 
Bulgaria’s preparations for EU membership as this opens a new window of 
opportunity for increased profits, and, on the other hand, guarding their 
privileged positions by not allowing a loss of control of the rent-seeking 
opportunities in specific sectors/niches. Bulgaria’s accession preparations 
to the EU can be explained by this model of partial reform – just enough to 
make it to the club but not enough to be a respectable member of it.  
Corruption and clientalism are the outward face of rent-seeking. 
Bribery is used in hospitals to obtain services from medical staff; in schools 
and universities from teachers; in municipalities from local officials; on the 
roads from traffic police; in courts from judges; in public agencies from 
civil servants, especially those in charge of public procurement or 
                                                     
5 See Joel Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-
Communist Transitions”, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1998, pp. 203-34; Venelin 
Ganev, “The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as State Breakers in Post-Communism”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-25. 
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European fund administration, and so it goes on. Nevertheless it was the 
scale of high-level political corruption left unpunished that sent shock 
waves to the Bulgarian public and to the Brussels bureaucracy. The year 
2008 stood out for the number of corruption scandals in Bulgaria, with very 
few consequences for the alleged perpetrators. In January 2008, it was 
revealed that the Director of the State Fund for Republican Road 
Infrastructure (Veselin Georgiev) had been channelling construction 
projects to his brother’s company (estimated at 120 million leva) in a clear 
breach of conflict of interest regulations. When two employees of the Road 
Infrastructure State Fund were caught with bribes of 25000 leva each, one 
of them being directly in charge of the EU Funds Directorate, Georgiev was 
forced to resign. In response, the European Commission stopped 
disbursing money for infrastructure projects in Bulgaria in February 2008. 
The ultimate loser here of course is the average Bulgarian citizen, who 
continues to use a road network in desperate need of investment and 
improvement. 
In March 2008, an even bigger scandal erupted, involving leaks of 
information about ongoing investigations into criminal networks by the 
Interior Ministry and directly implicating the Interior Minister, Roumen 
Petkov, a top civil servant in the Bulgarian Socialist Party, who was in 
charge of fund-raising for the party coffers. For weeks Petkov refused to 
resign but circumstances forced him to reconsider after it was revealed that 
at the end of 2006 he had secretly met two businessmen with criminal 
dossiers – publicly known to be two of the biggest mafia bosses in Bulgaria 
(the brothers Galevi) – to ensure calm in the criminal underworld in the 
run-up to the planned EU accession in January 2007.6 
In July 2008, days before the publication of the European Commission 
monitoring report on Bulgaria, an OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) 
report to the Bulgarian authorities was leaked to the press providing 
detailed information about a criminal network of companies around two 
businessmen – Nikolov and Stoikov – involved in the misappropriation of 
EU funds. The report asked the Bulgarian government why no criminal 
charges had been brought against them. From OLAF’s point of view, the 
evidence was there and inaction on the case could only be equated with 
                                                     
6 See Theodor Troev & Kerin Hope, “Minister pays price for Bulgaria shootings”, 
Financial Times, 17 April 2008. 
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vested interests within the state institutions to protect the individuals 
implicated in the affair.7 Public media in Bulgaria identified Stoikov as one 
of the sponsors of the political campaign of Bulgaria’s President Georgi 
Parvanov.8  
All these cases are just the tip of the iceberg; a lot more is believed to 
be going on under the surface. In fact, they are only examples of what has 
been known by the Bulgarian public for years and what the leader of the 
Turkish minority party Ahmet Dogan publicly admitted himself a while 
ago – that there are ‘circles of firms’ around each political party that fill the 
party treasuries in exchange for publicly financed projects and favourable 
legislation. In the early transition years, the process of privatisation of state-
owned assets provided ample opportunities for office-holders to create and 
nurture their cronies. With privatisation over, it is EU funds that have 
become the focal point for a great deal of these murky exchanges. 
The Bulgarian transition has also been marred by a high degree of 
criminality that the state apparatus has either been unable or unwilling to 
tackle seriously. Successive Bulgarian governments have argued that they 
are doing everything they can to limit criminal activity and bring to justice 
the perpetrators of shocking mafia-style murders that gripped the country 
in the years before Bulgaria’s EU accession. As yet there have been no 
judicial convictions in any of the high-profile show cases, a fact that 
remains inexplicable for the external observer. In April 2008, another 
shocking murder occurred, taking the life of Georgi Stoev, a well-known 
writer on the criminal world in Bulgaria in recent times. Days before he 
was shot dead, Stoev had announced on TV that he had more interesting 
information to disclose. The logical question is: if evidence about the 
criminal acts of certain individuals is available, why are the state 
institutions not doing more to sanction them? Either the capacity-building 
efforts of the pre-accession process were in vain or the suspicion of close 
links between some political circles and criminal networks holds true. The 
political leadership of the country has not done enough to convince the 
public that the state authorities work professionally and in the interests of 
the citizens only.  
                                                     
7 “Bulgaria’s Shame”, Financial Times, 20 July 2008. 
8 See Theodor Troev & Kerin Hope, “Bulgarians ponder impeaching leader”, 
Financial Times, 19 July 2008. 
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The limits of the EU’s transformative power 
The EU factor was instrumental in getting a reform dynamic underway in 
the late 1990s and maintaining the pressure on successive governments 
until Bulgaria’s EU accession.9 In the year prior to joining, the possibility of 
postponing accession by one year was legally conceivable, if not politically 
feasible, and the European Commission managed to turn it into a credible 
threat by pushing the political leaders in Sofia to keep moving on the 
reform of the judiciary and on the fight against corruption and organised 
crime.10 With accession a reality on 1 January 2007, the only available 
instruments at the Commission’s disposal remained the threat of activating 
the three safeguard clauses from the Accession Treaty, the monitoring 
mechanism of verifying progress on commitments in the area of rule of law 
undertaken at the time of signing the Accession Treaty and the possibility 
of withholding EU funds in cases of proven mismanagement. Of all three, 
the refusal to disburse earmarked money was by far the most serious and 
politically damaging for Sofia.  
While Bulgaria is not the only EU member state ever to be accused of 
the embezzlement of EU funds, the scale of such wrongdoings in the 
country has been such that the European Commission made it a political 
question in 2008 and linked it to the annual reporting on the country’s rule 
of law performance. In July 2008, the Commission issued a special report 
on the management of EU funds in Bulgaria, drawing public attention to 
the gravity of the problem and calling for “credible, structural corrective 
actions and a fundamental reform.”11 This warning was later turned into 
action by cutting funds in the face of continued foot-dragging and minimal 
results, notwithstanding the stated good intentions of the Bulgarian 
authorities on numerous occasions. In an interview published in the daily 
Dnevnik in November 2008, Catherine Day, the Secretary General of the 
                                                     
9 See Gergana Noutcheva & Dimitar Bechev, “The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria 
and Romania’s Accession to the EU”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 22, 
No. 1, 2008, pp. 114-144. 
10 See Gergana Noutcheva, Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU: Postponement, 
Safeguards and the Rule of Law, CEPS Policy Brief No. 102, CEPS, Brussels, May 2006. 
11 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Management of EU funds in Bulgaria, European Commission, COM(2008) 496 
final, Brussels, 23.7.2008. 
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European Commission, asked for a profound change of the system of EU 
fund management and expressed the concerns of Brussels about the links 
between the management of those funds and politics.12  
In fact, the Commission’s 2008 reports articulated publicly what 
many Bulgarian citizens had been thinking privately for some time. And 
while the immediate reaction of the political establishment to Brussels’ 
criticism was defensive, denying political involvement in EU fund 
management and citing unfair treatment, double standards and 
disappointment with the harsh tone, the Bulgarian public was jubilant at 
the tough measures announced by the European Commission. The 
government was quick to announce that all lost EU funds would be 
compensated by national funds from the budget surplus whereas business 
organisations and civil society groups openly demanded EU rules in 
spending Bulgarian taxpayers’ money. In short, the Bulgarian population 
identified the actions of the European Commission, and not those of the 
Bulgarian government, with the public interest.13 
Yet, this external support for the rule of law and good governance in 
the country has not been able to bring about deep political change though 
empowering the champions of democratic reform in the domestic context. 
The centre-right political opposition in the country has not managed to 
capitalise on Brussels’ criticism by leaning on the powerful wave of public 
discontent in the aftermath of the Commission sanctions. In fact, the 
Stanishev-led coalition government representing the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party, the party of the ex-king NDSV and the Turkish minority party DPS 
(Movement for Rights and Freedoms) has survived seven no-confidence 
votes in the Parliament since coming to power in 2005. Relying on a stable 
parliamentary majority and facing a weak and fragmented political 
opposition, the three-party coalition has enjoyed a very comfortable 
parliamentary life throughout its mandate. Outside parliamentary politics, 
however, popular support for the political parties in government has 
                                                     
12 See interview with Catherine Day, “Politicheska volya ima, no sistemata ne 
raboti” [There is political will but the system does not work], Dnevnik, Sofia, 28 
November 2008. 
13 See interview with Ivo Prokopiev, “Sanktsiite na Brjuksel sa v interes na 
grajdanite i biznesa” [The sanctions of Brussels are in the interest of the citizens 
and business], Dnevnik, Sofia, 27 November 2008. 
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sharply declined, with the exception of the Turkish minority party, which 
has a stable electorate.  
The main political beneficiary of the latest corruption scandals has 
been the centre-right political party GERB (Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria) of the populist Mayer of Sofia Boiko Borisov, 
which has steadily been gaining political ground since its foundation in 
2006 and which won the most seats in the European Parliament elections in 
2007. That GERB represents a true opportunity for change is highly 
unlikely, given the opportunistic nature of party formation in Bulgaria in 
the last decade. GERB positions itself as an anti-systemic party that stands 
for clean politics and a break with the old practices of party clientalism but 
it is yet to show how it will behave in office.  
What has been most regrettable in the Bulgarian transition story is 
that civil society has remained fairly weak and has grown more 
disillusioned with politics over time. As a result, there has been marginal 
domestic pressure on office-holders to raise governance standards and 
improve the quality of public life in the country. Elections could have been 
the time to show discontent with the ruling parties but the sanction vote 
has not been sufficient to change the nature of politics in Bulgaria 
profoundly. Political parties coming to power have always had a 
disappointing performance record, leading Bulgarians to despair and to 
trust the EU institutions more (58%) than their national ones (34%), as the 
latest Eurobarometer data confirm again.14 It is for this reason that the 
European Commission sanctions of July-November 2008 were extremely 
popular among Bulgarian citizens, feeling disempowered to influence 
patterns of change from within. 
Conclusion  
Bulgaria’s democratisation is a partial success story that leaves much to be 
desired in terms of good governance. In theory, the fundamental conditions 
of democracy do exist in the country – free and more or less fair elections, 
relatively independent media, checks and balances within the institutional 
set-up to guarantee the separation of powers between the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary, freedom of association and a high number of 
                                                     
14 See Standard Eurobarometer 70, January 2009 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_bg_nat.pdf). 
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civil society organisations. Yet this does not amount to a system in which 
the rule of law always prevails. External actors have been key in helping 
put in place the formal requirements of a democratic system, but for the 
system to produce good governance, a change of mentality from within is 
needed. The political class needs to start regarding public office as a service 
to the citizens rather than as a fast-track to personal enrichment. Society 
itself needs to demand more of its designated representatives and to 
persistently put pressure on public institutions at all levels to deliver 
quality services on a daily basis. External incentives and disincentives can 
still be part of the process, and a welcome corrective, but alone, they will 
not be able to achieve much. Improvement is possible but it will come 
slowly and incrementally. 
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3. ROMANIA: OUTSMARTING THE EU’S 
SMART POWER 
ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI 
f ever a test case was perfectly designed for Europe’s smart power, it is 
the situation of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. These countries break 
the circularity of the argument over the EU’s transformative power. 
They were not invited to join the EU after they were successful in their 
transitions, but rather as their transitions hung in the balance and the 
power struggle between the old and the emerging elites was far from over. 
They were invited in the express hope that EU accession would be a strong 
enough incentive to drive these transitions back on track with greater speed 
and purpose. And considerable success followed in all three cases, most 
notably in Slovakia. They managed to accede by the deadline and, despite 
immediate setbacks after accession, their democratic institutions resisted. 
Nevertheless doubts persist that their Europeanisation is no more than 
superficial, lacking any real substance. Romania is a particularly 
challenging case. It had the worst Freedom House Nations in Transit 
democracy scores of all EU accession countries, and these did not improve 
convincingly after joining. According to Freedom House, Romania is still 
the only accession country on the wrong side of the consolidation dividing 
line. Even the accession process presented a far from linear evolution: 
Freedom House downgraded Romania three times during this interval. 
Romania has of course come a long way since the time of Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s dictatorship. Its evolution is all the more remarkable since it 
was the only East European country with a bloody revolution (one 
thousand dead in circumstances that remain unclear) and a transition 
dominated by former communists. Ion Iliescu, a reformed apparatchik with 
barely disguised authoritarian tendencies, has won three out of the first 
four presidential mandates, using the army and vigilante coal miners to 
I 
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defend his regime. As there was no organised opposition under 
Ceausescu’s harsh regime, the challenger elite has encountered significant 
difficulties in providing a viable political alternative. The entry of Romania 
into the EU is due to high popular support for accession, which brought all 
parties to a common denominator and made accession a common political 
project. But Romania’s current problems are also rooted in the 
opportunistic behaviour of its elites. The country had barely entered 
Europe when its political class started to undo reform commitments made 
to Brussels. 
Corruption battles 
Romania succeeded in becoming a member of the European Union on 1st 
January 2007. In the immediate aftermath of Romania’s accession, on 2nd 
January 2007, the battle started against Justice Minister Monica Macovei, 
who had been the champion of anticorruption measures agreed with the 
European Commission. The Senate voted a motion against Minister 
Macovei, denouncing the ‘failure’ of justice reform. The motion had been 
prepared in December 2006, but was postponed until Romania’s accession, 
as Macovei was Romania’s most trusted minister within European Union 
institutions. On February 13th, 81 senators, more than just the opposition 
members, voted against Minister Macovei. However, as there was no 
constitutional procedure for the Parliament to dismiss a minister in 
Romania except by dismissing the entire cabinet, the result of such a no-
confidence motion was not binding for the Prime Minister, National Liberal 
Calin Popescu Tariceanu. The phrasing of the motion was particularly 
embarrassing for Romania, as it was practically an inventory of legislation 
passed following Romania’s commitments to Brussels in order to make the 
country accepted in the EU.  
As public opinion sided with Macovei, who also enjoyed huge 
support from international media and the European institutions, she was 
not dismissed outright. Negotiations and pressures dragged on for a few 
more weeks, with the European Commissioner for Justice and Home 
Affairs making public statements in her favour. But in the end, the PM 
dismissed her anyway. Her successor spent less than a year in office, 
chiefly trying to fire the head anticorruption prosecutor (office of DNA) – 
but he was himself fired by President Traian Basescu when charged in a 
corruption case. The fight between an informal parliamentary majority, 
formed by all the parties except the president’s Democratic Party and the 
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directly elected President Traian Basescu supporting the anticorruption 
bodies, lasted for four years, until the 2008 election returned a new 
majority. Its culmination came in 2007, when two thirds of the Parliament 
impeached Basescu, on grounds judged to be insufficient by the 
Constitutional Court. A month later he was constitutionally reinstated by a 
popular vote, with two thirds in his favour this time. But the conflict 
remains emblematic of Romania’s trouble-ridden politics. It boils down to a 
conflict over the rule of law; a clash between the directly elected national 
leader and Parliament; the open defiance of Brussels and the forfeit of the 
promises Romania made to be accepted into the EU. But as Romania has 
enjoyed robust economic growth since 2001, reaching a peak in 2008, when 
other countries were hit by the crisis, the political troubles have for a long 
time not translated into economic ones. The 2008 national elections actually 
saw the demise of radical populist parties: the Greater Romania Party had 
its base eroded by the more recent New Generation Party, and none of 
them made it to the electoral threshold. Joining forces in 2009, they 
managed to send two representatives to the European Parliament. They 
applied to join the Popular Party group, however, suggesting that they are 
more opportunistic than radical. 
Corruption had surfaced as the chief concern in Romania by 2002-
2003, under the government of Social-Democrat Adrian Nastase, which was 
also a key time for EU accession. The rise in public concern over this issue 
coincided with the alleviation of older and more critical fears, such as 
hyperinflation. Under Nastase, currently indicted on several counts, and 
defending himself by means of parliamentary immunity only, corruption 
had openly become the modus operandi of the government. Until then it 
had been more hidden. 
‘Corruption’ in postcommunist societies is generally systemic and 
goes beyond mere bribery. It cannot be understood in the same terms as 
corruption in developed Europe, where a bribe is inseparable from graft: in 
postcommunist Europe bribery is often a way of opening access to 
excluded contenders in a distribution system that is anything but random. 
Postcommunist corruption can best be defined as the discretionary 
distribution of public goods as a ground rule by a non-autonomous state 
for the benefit of particular groups or individuals. These public goods 
included nearly everything, as at the beginning of transition everything 
belonged to state property - but gradually diminished as privatisation 
progressed and market institutions have consolidated. Inequality before the 
law remains a crucial component of post-communist corruption and 
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distribution of public funds, including the remarkable new resources of EU 
money (which replace the resources from privatisation) persists in being 
anything but random, even after accession. Passing ‘special’ legislation to 
favour certain economic interests is another important feature. By 2003, 
Romania’s top businesses also headed the catalogue of unpaid loans to 
state banks, debts to the tax authorities or the social security budget, almost 
without exception. Money for local governments strictly followed party 
lines, causing two thirds of them to migrate to the government party in just 
one electoral cycle (the Social-Democrats) in order to obtain funding. In 
other words, even if the country formally complied with EU requests 
(basically adopting legislation or creating new institutions without any 
serious attempt at implementation) Romania’s economic and political 
orders were clearly particularistic and pre-modern. The 2004 elections put 
an end to the Social Democrat majority, but they did not deliver a sufficient 
majority to President Basescu, whose party did not put on a convincing 
performance to change this situation. His main ‘instrument’ was Minister 
Macovei and her revamped Anticorruption Agency, but the Parliament, 
with some help from the Constitutional Court, managed to stall all 
investigations directed at top politicians by reinventing immunity for MPs 
and ministers (which had been dropped upon 2003 constitutional reform).  
By autumn 2007 however, due to efforts by prosecutors (that were 
strongly encouraged by Brussels), nine ministers and eight MPs were under 
investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA). In June 
2007, Justice Minister Tudor Chiuariu, the successor to Ms Macovei, had 
tried to fire the prosecutor in charge of political cases. Politicians have 
repeatedly tried to control the DNA’s activity by modifying its legal status 
or scaling back legal anticorruption instruments. A new law was passed in 
late March 2007, decriminalising certain aspects of bank fraud that were 
previously under the jurisdiction of the DNA. The law is likely to be 
applied retroactively, so decriminalisation would apply to bank officers 
that received kick-backs for granting illegitimate loans, leading to the 
dismissal by the DNA of numerous cases that were pending. The 
culmination of this anti-anticorruption activity came in October 2007, 
when, according to the President of Romania, a draft emergency ordinance 
was prepared to close down the DNA and merge it with the department 
against organised crime within the General Prosecutor’s Office. The DNA 
was originally set up as an independent agency at the special request of the 
European Commission. Meanwhile, despite being subordinated by a 
Parliament Act to the General Prosecutor, it has so far preserved its 
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separate organisation, with its Chief Prosecutor remaining independent 
and its own judicial police force being directly subordinated. Due to its 
special legal status, it is better organised and far ahead, in terms of 
performance and resources, of the rest of the General Prosecutor’s office. 
Merging with the rest would not only have created the opportunity to fire 
its chief, but would have ended the privileged status the EU had accorded 
it for so long and brought it into line with the rest of the Romanian 
judiciary.1 The president made a live TV appearance appealing to the 
government not to enact the ordinance; the European Commission also 
showed its discomfort, though much of it through informal channels, so in 
the end the ordinance was not promulgated.  
Politicians investigated by the DNA invariably claim that the 
investigation is a political witch-hunt. One frequent theme is that the 
former party of President Basescu, the Democratic Party (DP), is spared by 
the DNA. There is no credible evidence to back this allegation. A review of 
the cases from the three main political parties shows that no party was 
spared. The Social Democratic Party had Adrian Năstase (former president 
of SDP) sent to trial for accepting bribes, blackmail and influence traffic; 
Şerban Mihăilescu (MP, former Minister Secretary General of the Romanian 
Government) was tried for accepting bribes (cash and hunting rifles); Ioan 
Stan (MP) is under investigation for exercising undue influence as a party 
leader in order to obtain funds, goods and other undue advantages; Miron 
Mitrea (MP and former minister of transport) is indicted for accepting 
bribes. Other MPs and SDP mayors are also facing indictment. They make 
up the most numerous group, but they were also far more years in 
government than any other party. From the Democratic Party the DNA 
charged Gheorghe Falcă (mayor of Arad and godson of the president of 
Romania) for the crimes of accepting bribes and abuse of office against the 
public interest; Ionel Manţog (former secretary of state), for accepting 
bribes, making false statements and abuse of office; Stelian Duţu (MP) for 
abuse of office against the public interest; Cosmin Popescu (former 
secretary of state) for intellectual forgery and for aiding a criminal; as well 
                                                     
1 European Commission reports assess the DNA positively, “The work of the 
National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) shows a positive track record over the 
past six months”. See February 2008 report, p. 4 (see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
secretariat_general/cvm/docs/romania_report_20080201_en.pdf). 
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as other mayors and lower-ranked politicians. At the beginning of the year 
the National Liberal Party had only a few mayors and regional leaders 
under investigation. However, since remaining in government by 
themselves the NPL and DAHR seems to have given in to temptations of 
all kinds. Minister Macovei claimed that her conflict with PM Tariceanu 
was due to her opposing ‘special destination’ bills being passed by the 
government. Bills of this kind generally provide exemptions of every kind: 
a number of companies are exempt from the general bankruptcy law 
(although Romania’s EU engagement prohibits it from any state help to 
businesses), a certain privatisation is exempt from general privatisation law 
and its safeguards, a certain tender is organised by different rules than 
general procurement legislation, which was brought in line with EU law 
and is therefore very demanding. The Romanian media as well as YouTube 
showed video and audio recordings of Liberal ministers for Labour and 
Agriculture engaged in shady dealings. In a video recorded by prosecutors 
the minister for Agriculture is seen accepting an envelope of cash and a 
basket of salami. The National Liberal Party Labour minister was also 
tapped when pressurising a regional official to grant public contracts to his 
son’s newly set-up company.  
This deep linkage between business and politics, well-known in Italy, 
especially before the mani pulite, is difficult to fight and the combat waged 
by Basescu and Macovei had all the features of a civil war. In 2005 a new 
director of the tax office, Sebastian Bodu was appointed, with the result 
that companies finally paid their dues. He was sacked by PM Tariceanu 
two years later, simply for warning that new legislation (which favoured 
certain car importers) is against competition acquis. There were also steps 
back on procurement legislation and on the politicisation of the 
administration, which had never really gone away before returning in 
force. A long-awaited revision of the criminal code ended in lighter 
sentences for corruption. The Commission opened infringement 
procedures for a few other notorious cases, all of the same type: the formal 
transposition of EU demands is followed by complete subversion in 
practice, generally due to clientelism. How could the head of a government 
with nine ministers indicted for corruption, for instance, allow the newly 
created telecommunications agency to be independent and not politically 
controlled, in an area so rich in graft opportunities? 
Unfortunately, corruption in Romania is not only related to parties 
and businesses, but cuts across the most important institutions of society. 
Romanian media has gradually been captured, after having been largely 
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free and fair at the end of the 1990s. After 2006, concentration in media 
ownership continued to increase in Romania. Three owners enjoy more 
than two-thirds of the TV political news market. One is the controversial 
businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu, who owns the daily Cotidianul, the 
investigative magazine Academia Catavencu, and a radio station at the head 
of his influential television channel, the all-news Realitatea. Vantu also 
started his own news agency, Newsin, and a business TV channel. Mr 
Vantu has so far managed to escape conviction, despite been charged on 
several counts. He was the patron of Romania’s largest national investment 
fund (the FNI), a sort of pyramidal game that collapsed in 1999, leaving 
him with a fortune. Dan Voiculescu, another oligarch in the media 
landscape, as well as a politician, owns three TV channels, a daily, and a 
financial weekly that openly wage his political battles for him. The national 
screening agency for Securitate files, the CNSAS, exposed Mr. Voiculescu 
as an informant to the communist police in 2006. He is also notorious as 
having worked for an agency that laundered Ceausescu’s money in the 
1980s. Naturally, the agenda set by this kind of media looks like a 
permanent war on anti-corruption, not on corruption.  
EU measures 
The obvious question at the end of this review is why the European 
Commission, pushed to the end of its tether by the lack of commitment 
from Romania’s political bodies, did not activate the safeguard clause that 
had been specifically created for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to 
protect the EU from these countries’ eventual breech of assumed legal 
commitments. It would have been the first time such a tough post-accession 
mechanism was introduced, but the penalties proved inadequate relative to 
the monitoring mechanism. Activating the clause means at worst that 
Romania’s court sentences would no longer be recognised in the European 
Union. Bad publicity aside, this move would not directly harm the 
government or the parliament as much as it would affect European 
companies doing business in Romania. Although the idea of applying the 
clause was discussed at the Commission, it was promptly dropped and 
relegated to the ‘lessons learned’ chapter for further accessions. The 
Commission was more innovative in the case of Bulgaria, which saw its EU 
funds cut – but in Romania evidence of direct fraud is scarce. Seeing the 
systemic distribution of public funds, fraud is hardly necessary for 
Romania’s top ‘business politicians’, who prefer to do things legally and to 
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hire lawyers to defend them from the Commission infringement 
mechanisms. 
There is an additional, political reason why the EU seemed paralysed 
in the face of Romania’s negative developments. Now part of EU, 
Romanian parties relate to their respective European families on an equal 
footing. The Liberals in the EP thus defended the Liberal Party, even in its 
worst decisions. Social Democrats behaved somewhat better, trying to 
convince their Romanian counterparts that they needed to clean up their 
act. As for President Basescu, he is largely unknown at the European level 
and enjoys little trust. While Macovei was known and trusted, having 
worked for the EU institutions before becoming a minister, Basescu 
remains a mystery; a populist president from New Europe, and a 
committed transatlanticist with little record on EU integration. Some of his 
enemies’ criticisms, who compare him to Putin (or  Sarkozy) might not 
have been without consequence for his PR at the EU level. His failure to 
reappoint Macovei after the 2008 elections has further engendered mistrust, 
as well as the appointment of some of his relatives and close relations to 
various positions controlled by him. Although likely to be reelected in 2009, 
his victory will be seen by many as too ambiguous to cheer for.  
Should we therefore conclude that Romania was just ‘not ready’, and 
a one year delay of the EU accession date would have allowed reformers 
like Ms Macovei to consolidate their gains? Hardly so: one year is unlikely 
to have changed the deep-seated malaise reported there. The conclusion is 
rather that conditionality prompts unsustainable change, a change that 
does not survive the lifting of sanctions. The deep Europeanisation of 
Eastern Europe seems to have been achieved more by emulation and 
diffusion than by the reward and punishment mechanism related to 
accession. At the end of day, democracy promotion succeeds by helping the 
domestic drivers of change, not by doing their job for them. Only 
Romanians themselves can do this. 
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4. SERBIA’S STATE CAPTURE 
VESNA PEŠIĆ 
erbia has achieved a ‘semi-consolidated democracy’ status in the 
Freedom House ranking of 2008.1 Among the ex-communist countries 
of Eastern Europe, Serbia is classified in this second-highest group of 
states, sharing the same regime-type status as its neighbours Romania and 
Croatia, which have slightly better scores than Serbia, and with 
Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia, which have lower scores.  
These generalised indices reflect both Serbia’s positive and negative 
trends on the road to a consolidated democracy. To illustrate these trends 
the indices of democratisation can be divided into two categories. The first 
is electoral democracy. The second relates to democratic institution-
building – the need for an effective parliament, a transparent, responsible 
and efficient government, independent regulatory bodies preventing 
corruption and independent judicial institutions.  
In the first category, Serbia has shown positive trends over the last 
nine years since the 2000 transition. It has consolidated electoral democracy 
to the point of no return. No serious party or association would now 
question elections as the only legitimate way to choose citizens’ 
representatives for the main decision-making bodies. No observers, 
domestic or foreign, questioned the fairness of the numerous elections held 
in Serbia since 2000. This positive evaluation is due to the full guarantees of 
freedom of speech, the press and the right to assembly. To this should be 
added the extensive range of civil society organisations, both foreign and 
domestic, which have played a significant role in the democracy-building 
                                                     
1 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2008 – Democratization from Central Asia to 
Eurasia, New York/Washington, D.C./Budapest, 2008. 
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process. Conditions for their activities have been improved by the passing 
of a new law governing NGOs in June 2009. This law had been postponed 
for years, eliciting constant complaints from the NGO sector.  
The media are generally independent and have not proved an 
obstacle to free and fair elections. But their broader role, meant to control 
the government and investigate corruption, has undergone some 
regression. The recent intimidation of journalists (the case of Dejan 
Anastasijevic, a journalist of the weekly Vreme, and the editors-in-chief of 
the radio show Pescanik) and the media alignment with specific political 
parties, their tycoon financiers and the secret service, all demonstrate a 
negative trend. 
Serbia introduced a new constitution in November 2006. Observers 
such as the Venice Commission see it as a step forward from the old 
document of the Milosevic era. Important improvements include a package 
on human and minority rights and the consequent reduction of ethnic 
tensions in Serbia. Weaknesses have also been pointed out. An ethnic 
community that still suffers broad discrimination is the Roma community. 
Shortcomings also include the inadequate guarantees of judicial 
independence and the ‘party’ selection of MPs from the electoral lists. 
Criticism has been aimed at the relatively limited degree of 
decentralisation, regionalisation and guarantees for the autonomous 
provinces. The most recent criticism was directed at the Serbian 
parliament’s failure to approve the Statute of the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina. Serbia remains a highly-centralised country, a feature that has 
become an obstacle to deeper democratisation and economic development. 
There is a huge and growing gap in development between north and south-
east Serbia: the ratio in economic wealth between the developed and 
undeveloped part of the country is 7:1.  
Among Serbia’s key failures in democratisation are the lack of rule-
of-law and weak countervailing institutions. These weaknesses are 
connected with widespread and systemic corruption. From 2002-2006, 
Serbia made some progress in fighting corruption by passing new laws on 
regulatory and controlling institutions. But these positive trends were 
halted in 2008 because the laws curbing corruption were sabotaged and left 
unimplemented. In autumn 2008, the Serbian parliament passed a law 
establishing an Agency against Corruption and elected its Council. 
However, its inception has been scheduled for 2010 so it still has no 
influence. Political stagnation is corroborated in the EC Progress Report on 
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Serbia, published in November 2008. The criticisms regarding the political 
and legal institutions voiced in the Report are nearly identical to those 
expressed in the 2007 Report. The Report notes weaknesses in the work of 
all chief institutions: parliament, government, public administration, 
regulatory authorities, judiciary and the civilian oversight of the armed 
forces. It highlights the high level of corruption and the insufficiently-
effective struggle against it – Serbia has fallen down Transparency 
International’s corruption index. The report ascribes such failings to the 
non-transparent funding of political parties, disrespect of the conflict 
prevention law, officials’ failure to declare their assets, the lack of an anti-
corruption office and inefficient monitoring of privatisation procedures and 
budgetary expenditure by independent institutions.  
The main cause of Serbia’s poor advancement in institution-building 
is the specific form of corruption in the country. The phenomenon of state 
capture is described in detail elsewhere.2 In Serbia, state capture signifies 
the power of the ruling parties (those forming the coalition government) to 
divide the state and the whole public sector amongst themselves as spoils, 
which every ruling party freely disposes of, without control. This division 
of party spoils is conducted at all levels of authority. One may note the 
consolidation of this bastard child of transition. It undermines state 
institutions and the public good for the sake of political party leadership 
interests in collusion with the interests of the tycoons. They are secretly 
funding all major parties, thus corrupting state institutions. In the past two 
or three years, many citizens have become aware of the reality of state 
capture but no serious attempts have been made to confront it.  
Within the limbo of corrupt state capture, in which private and party 
interests override public interests, democratic institutions have become so 
weak that they are teetering on the brink of chaos and disintegration. This 
refers both to the government and the parliament. The parliament has been 
almost constantly paralysed. The ruling majority has been unable to 
operate normally. The weakening of the institutions leads to constant 
delays in fulfilling EU accession requirements. The parliament blockade 
has impeded the adoption of necessary laws; the government has failed to 
                                                     
2 More on the onset and attributes of state capture in my paper State Capture and 
Widespread Corruption in Serbia, CEPS Working Document No. 262, CEPS, Brussels, 
March 2007 (www.ceps.eu). 
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fulfil its own plan and submit the laws to the parliament for adoption. As 
the director of the Serbian EU Integration Office (SEIO) noted, in 2008 
Serbia managed to complete only 29% of its accession-related tasks. This 
dramatic situation has improved somewhat in 2009, however. The statute 
of the parliament was changed and obstruction was curbed. Parliamentary 
efficacy has improved and 50% of EU accession-related tasks have now 
been completed. The ‘road map’ to inclusion on the Schengen white list is 
almost complete. On 16 June 2009, the EU proposed giving the green light 
for visa elimination to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, starting in 2010.  
Weak EU traction 
Traditionally, Serbia has been ambivalent in its relations with the West. 
Throughout Serbian history to the present day two political positions, pro 
and contra Europe have been in tension. The forces against the West 
believe that Europe is an enemy of Serbia’s national interests. They look for 
support from Russia as a real friend, culturally close and belonging to the 
same Orthodox Church worldview, which is suspicious of the ‘Catholic 
West’. The pro-European position advocates the modernisation of Serbia, 
naturally by relying on the West and progressive European values, culture 
and economy. There is no doubt that in the critical times after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the dismembering of Yugoslavia, Serbia under Milosevic 
chose the anti-European position. Seeking to enlarge its territory and unite 
as many Serbs as possible, it was extensively involved in the 1991-1995 
ethnic war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
With the fall of Milosevic in October 2000, it was thought that pro-
European forces would assume the decisive role. The candidate of the anti-
Milosevic Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), Vojislav Kostunica, won 
the position of president of Yugoslavia, and by the end of the year, DOS 
won the Serbian parliamentary elections and Zoran Djindjic of the 
Democratic Party (DS) became Serbia’s prime minister. Djindjic was a true 
reformer and strongly pro-European. Because of this orientation and his 
able and energetic leadership, he was a threat to the conservatives – the 
anti-European ‘patriots’. They plotted against the prime minister and 
assassinated him in March 2003.  
In the parliamentary elections of 2003, the same pro and contra EU 
polarisation appeared: the nationalists of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 
became the strongest individual party. However, the pro-European parties 
were able to create a coalition government led by Vojislav Kostunica. In the 
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presidential elections of 2004, Boris Tadic, president of the DS, won against 
Tomislav Nikolic of the SRS. In November 2005, the EU approved the 
feasibility study by which negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with Serbia (and Montenegro) could begin. Although, 
during Kostunica’s government 15 Serbs accused of war crimes turned 
themselves in and were extradited to The Hague Tribunal, SAA 
negotiations were stopped in May 2006 because Ratko Mladic had not been 
arrested and extradited to The Hague Tribunal. Serbia claimed that it could 
not locate Mladic. It maintains this claim, insisting on its clear political will 
and its extensive, constant efforts to arrest Mladic. Cooperation with the 
ICTY has remained the biggest problem for Serbia’s advancement towards 
EU integration. It has also been the source of negative attitudes toward the 
EU. Although the SAA was subsequently signed and ratified by the Serbian 
Parliament, it was immediately ‘frozen’ by the EU because Ratko Mladic 
had not been imprisoned. 
The ‘historical’ battle between pro and contra EU forces was present 
in all subsequent elections. Following the parliamentary elections in 
January 2007, the SRS was again the strongest individual party, but the pro-
European parties were able to create a coalition composed of Kostunica’s 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the DS of Boris Tadic (as the strongest 
party in the coalition) and the G17 plus, with Kostunica as prime minister. 
In the 2008 presidential elections, Boris Tadic once again defeated Tomislav 
Nikolic of the SRS. In March 2008, the second Kostunica government fell 
because of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  
New parliamentary elections (May 2008) were especially important 
because the main issue was whether Serbia should sign the SAA and join 
the EU, despite the fact that the majority of EU countries supported 
Kosovan independence. The EU helped Serbia’s pro-European coalition by 
offering Boris Tadic signature of the SAA. This happened just before 
election day. For the first time in Serbian history, the “List for Europe” 
became individually the strongest political force winning the most seats in 
parliament. But it did not receive sufficient votes to create a parliamentary 
majority. A pro-EU government was created by convincing Milosevic’s 
Socialist Party to change sides from ‘contra EU’ to ‘pro EU’. Being defeated 
on the EU question once again, the SRS split in two on the occasion of the 
SAA ratification by parliament. Tomislav Nikolic, who was in favour of 
ratification of the SAA, created a new party accepting Serbia’s future in the 
EU on condition that Kosovo remain part of Serbia.  
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Kosovo has been the crucial issue in Serbia’s relations with the EU 
since the beginning of talks on Kosovo’s status in September 2006. All 
major parties have rejected the Ahtisari proposal for a “controlled 
independence” of Kosovo. They have all agreed to incorporate Kosovo in 
the constitution as part of Serbia. They have all agreed that Serbia will 
never recognise Kosovo as an independent state. The only dispute has been 
over whether EU support for Kosovan independence means that Serbia 
must refuse all further talks about EU integration, including the signing of 
the SAA. Kostunica is against the SAA, while Tadic coined a “Kosovo and 
Europe” stance, insisting that these two issues are not connected. Boris 
Tadic and his “List for Europe” won elections under the slogan “Kosovo 
and Europe”. Serbia got a ‘pro-European’ government, which declared that 
the fight for Kosovo and EU integration were equally-important priorities. 
The ambivalent, and in the long term, contradictory goals contained in the 
slogan “Kosovo and Europe”, reflects the still-hazy vision of Serbia’s 
future. Serbia has not relinquished its ambivalence about its priorities: 
should it focus on the Serbian national issue (now represented by the 
‘defence of Kosovo’ and the ‘defence of the Republika Srpska’ line), or aim 
towards development, modernisation and EU membership? 
Serbia prioritised the ‘defence of Kosovo’ in 2008, focusing its foreign 
policy solely on that issue. It continually declares that it will never 
recognise Kosovo. However, the impression is that given the tough impact 
of the economic crisis Serbia will expedite the EU integration process. This 
suggests that Serbia’s hesitations on which way it should go will become 
more practical and less ‘existential’. Right now, it must obtain the money it 
lacks. Serbia can only turn to the EU for aid and this is why one may expect 
European rhetoric to prevail in the immediate future. Whether EU traction 
finally wins or not will depend on Serbia’s ability to break with the past. It 
simply means extraditing Ratko Mladic (and Goran Hadzic) to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as the 
final two accused who remain uncaptured out of 46 in total, and on a more 
functional and pragmatic treatment of Kosovo. 
Serbia and the global crisis 
It is difficult to predict how much influence the global crisis will have on 
Serbia. It is certain that it has already influenced the Serbian economy, 
which has fallen into deep recession and is predicted to contract by 6% in 
2009. There is no doubt that the Serbian economy and the financial 
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situation is in freefall. Everyday life is dramatically worsening: many 
people are not able to pay their debts; job loss and an already-high 
unemployment rate are increasing; economic activity is declining; salaries 
are shrinking; prices are rising because of private and state monopolies; 
credits are extremely expensive, thanks to a 13% interest rate to prevent 
inflation; illiquidity is spreading (the accounts of 60,000 small and medium 
companies have been blocked); investments are low; import and exports 
have suffered a 25-30% decline; and the budget deficit is rising, despite two 
rebalancing adjustments already having been approved. The government 
has introduced measures against the crisis but their effectiveness is hard to 
gauge. A new stand-by arrangement with the IMF was recently signed and 
a three-billion-dollar credit to save Serbia from bankruptcy has been 
approved.  
But the global crisis is not only economic. It is also a crisis of meaning 
that characterises today’s developed world. So, the main question for 
Serbia is whether the crisis will help the Serbian political elite introduce 
important changes, such as taking responsibility for the public interests and 
needs of the citizens, or whether it will continue with its own decay and 
corruption. To initiate key changes, Serbia must completely unblock its 
future, and above all, its stance towards EU integration. This means that 
Serbia must break with its past and its 19th century nationalistic ideologies.  
After the last elections, despite the victory of the pro-European forces, 
it has become clear that the confusion in Serbian policies remains. In 
principle and in rhetoric, Serbia wants to join the EU, especially during 
election campaigns which are rife with promises of “a better life and higher 
standards”. As soon as the elections pass, the pro-European government 
begins to stray. It postpones resolving the intricate centuries-old Serbian 
national issue that provides cover for huge corruption and misuse of 
authority. As said, the EU helped Serbia last year, before the elections, to 
elect a progressive government by signing the SAA. Now, a majority of EU 
countries are giving support to Serbia, but just ‘in principle’, being 
disappointed with Serbia leaders’ rhetoric on Kosovo, the International 
Court of Justice, military neutrality and the rejection of NATO. They will 
do little to convince the Netherlands to unfreeze the SAA agreement with 
Serbia, since the new Serbian government did not do enough in 2008 to get 
closer to the EU, including through cooperation with the ICTY. The 
primary conditio sine qua non for joining the EU – handing Ratko Mladic 
over to the ICTY – is the key step in breaking with the past, because Mladic, 
too, is part of the ‘national issue’ that has to be resolved.  
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The key question is whether the crisis will force the present 
government to act against a captured-state system; in this system, all 
democratic and independent institutions are deeply dependent on and 
under pressure from political parties and their bosses, who decide which 
laws will be passed and whether they will be applied. More often than not, 
they are not applied. But now, with the economic collapse, the uncertainties 
many face, the procrastination and sabotage of the laws and the direct 
damage to the citizens of Serbia caused by endemic corruption, huge 
dissatisfaction is rising among the population with the governing political 
elite. This is demonstrated not only in numerous polls, but also by the 
behaviour of the people during the elections in two local Belgrade 
communities in June 2009. Only about a third of the constituency turned 
out to cast a vote, sending a clear message of disapproval to the 
government and the leading parties. The second message is that if the pro-
European parties in the coalition, and especially the DS of Boris Tadic, 
continue with their false promises and fanciful lies about preparing for the 
EU, the conservatives will gain power with the new party of Tomislav 
Nikolic. His party, the Serbian Progressive party, has already won elections 
in both local communities in Belgrade, one of which was a stronghold of 
the DS for the last 12 years.  
If the present ruling elite gets the message from the citizens in time 
and understands that the crisis has not only changed the economy for the 
worse, but also the lives and minds of the people, they will introduce the 
necessary changes. If it does not learn from the crisis, Serbia will stay where 
it is now – in a hazy, unfinished democratic and economic transition, 
lagging seriously behind in its EU integration.  
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5. TURKEY: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION 
SENEM AYDIN DÜZGIT 
fter losing the battle for democratic consolidation in the 1990s, a 
decade full of mounting tensions thanks to the rise of Islamist 
politics and PKK violence, Turkey entered a more optimistic era of 
democratic reform from 2000 onwards with the growing strength of the EU 
anchor and shifting internal dynamics.  
The credibility of EU conditionality towards Turkey with the 
granting of candidacy status to the country and the prospect of accession 
negotiations, was among the major reasons behind the democratic reform 
process that was first initiated with a record number of 34 constitutional 
amendments in October 2001, to be followed by a new Civil Code in 
January 2002 and three ‘harmonisation packages’1 adopted in the follow-up 
to the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. The legislative changes introduced 
significant reforms, particularly in the field of human rights, protection of 
minorities, freedom of expression and freedom of association. They were 
later followed by four subsequent reform packages and two sets of 
constitutional amendments, all aimed to improve the democratic standards 
in the country.  
In addition to the EU anchor, domestic actors also played a crucial 
role in triggering the reform process. The AKP, after having come to power 
as a single-party government in the November 2002 elections, was very 
effective in translating the strengthened conditionality into real change in 
                                                     
1 A term of reference for a draft law consisting of a collection of amendments to 
different laws designed to amend more than one code or law at a time, which was 
approved or rejected in a single voting session in the parliament. 
A 
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the domestic sphere, both to guarantee its survival vis-à-vis the secularist 
establishment and to grant legitimacy to its heavy emphasis on democracy 
in its political ideology. Civil society also had a prominent role in 
promoting political reform in the country by making use of the extended 
public space facilitated by EU accession, which strengthened their claims 
for a more democratic Turkey. Reforms were also made possible by the 
decrease in adoption costs for traditional veto players such as the Turkish 
military and security establishment after the defeat of the PKK by the 
Turkish military, helping in turn to create an environment more conducive 
to political reform, particularly in the area of human rights and minority 
rights. 
Things, however, started to change from 2005 onwards, with changes 
in both the external and the internal environment. The last two years of the 
AKP’s first term in office, and especially the party’s second term in 
government, can be considered as a period in which democratic 
consolidation stagnated in Turkey. 
A stagnating democracy 
Little was done on the democratisation front during the last two years of 
the party’s first term in office. Despite occasional and rhetorical lip service 
to Turkey’s commitment to EU accession and, in a related fashion, to the 
reform process, no substantial moves were made in this direction. AKP’s 
second term in government promised more hope on this front. Soon after 
coming to power, the party started preparations on the drafting of a new 
‘civilian’ constitution with expanded individual rights and freedoms. This 
was a significant move, considering the primacy accorded to state over 
society in the 1982 constitution. The constitution project, however, was 
abruptly put on hold in early 2008 and followed by a proposal from the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to lift the ban on the wearing of 
headscarves in universities by a constitutional amendment. The AKP 
immediately joined this much-disputed MHP initiative, with the result that 
the amendment was later taken to the Constitutional Court by the 
staunchly secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP). The lifting of the 
headscarf ban in higher education could indeed be considered as a positive 
and necessary step, had it not been separated from broader constitutional 
reform, suggesting that some freedoms were being ranked above others. 
This initiative caused severe tensions on the political scene and added to 
secularist concerns that the AKP was gradually Islamising Turkish society.  
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Political tensions in the country reached a peak with the attempt to 
close down the AKP at the Constitutional Court in March 2008, on the 
grounds that “the AKP had become the centre for activities against 
secularism”. Even before the court case, the AKP was often perceived as 
attempting to appease the forces of status quo in Turkey, for example 
through its reluctance to abolish outright Article 301 of the Penal Code, 
which regulates offences that involve “insulting Turkishness, the Republic, 
the parliament and state institutions’’; or to undertake any reform relating 
to the Kurdish issue. This perception was strengthened after the court case, 
and it is often argued that there is now a modus vivendi between the party 
and the state establishment, especially on the Kurdish issue, on which the 
AKP discourse became even more nationalistic after the closure case. In the 
end the Court decided not to close down the party, but also concluded that 
the AKP had become the focal point for activities against secularism in 
Turkey. This is in fact a key concern of the secularists in the country, who 
fear that the government’s ‘piecemeal administrative decisions’ and ‘social 
influence’ will promote religiosity to the extent that the advances of the 
secular republic in areas such as gender equality will ultimately be eroded.2  
There has been progress on some issues, such as the law on 
foundations, which was further revised in favour of non-Muslim 
community foundations; the launching of a state channel that broadcasts 
solely in Kurdish and the investigation opened against a neo-nationalist 
gang named ‘Ergenekon’, accused of engaging in plans to stage a violent 
uprising against the government.3 However, these steps fall short of 
tackling the real democratic challenges that trouble Turkish politics and 
society. The Kurdish issue and its related human rights implications, along 
with the growing polarisation between secularists and Islamists – against a 
background of creeping Islamisation – remain the nodal points around 
which any substantial efforts at democratic consolidation will have to be 
made.  
                                                     
2 Murat Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications 
for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
No. 7, 2007, p. 1278.  
3 The investigation led to some strong opponents of the AKP including a 
prominent journalist, being taken into custody, which raised concerns that the 
government was using this investigation to suppress oppositional forces. 
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Normative appeal of democracy?  
It could be argued that the normative appeal of democracy is in fact weak 
in the case of Turkey. At the level of political parties, a strong rhetorical 
commitment to democracy as a political system can be observed. This, 
however, does not often translate into a normative value upheld by the 
main political parties in their enacted/proposed policies and their positions 
on certain issues.  
In the case of the AKP, it has often been argued that the party upheld 
democracy as a normative value, regardless of the prospect of EU 
accession. Prime Minister Erdogan’s repeated statement that in the case of a 
rebuff from the Union, they would continue the democratic reform process 
by naming the Copenhagen criteria as the “Ankara criteria” was probably 
the most commonly cited evidence in this regard.4 As the above discussion 
suggests, the waning of the reform zeal, particularly as EU accession 
prospects weaken, seriously clouds this assumption. Furthermore, it can 
also be observed that the undemocratic institutional measures for which 
the party elite was heavily criticised in the past are now utilised by the 
AKP itself, to strengthen its authority over the political system and the 
masses.  
For example, until recently, one of the public institutions much-
criticised by the AKP was the office of the presidency, which was attacked 
for using its undemocratic powers as granted by the 1980 constitution in 
exercising its control over universities and appointing rectors that were not 
democratically elected, but those who were closer to the ideology of the 
state establishment. The main ‘legitimising’ discourse of the party to such 
criticism was one that relied heavily on democracy. In its second term in 
government, however, instead of making any attempt to reform the 
undemocratic powers of the presidency, the party condoned the new 
president from the AKP cadres, Gül, making full use of his powers to 
appoint rectors regardless of the university elections.5 Thus, instead of 
                                                     
4 See, for example, Michael Emerson et. al., “The Reluctant Debutante: The EU as 
Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood”, in Michael Emerson (ed.) 
Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 
2005, p. 189. 
5 Milliyet, 30 December 2008. 
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reforming the key undemocratic measures of the 1980 institution, in some 
cases the party makes full use of them to strengthen its hold on power. 
A normative commitment to democracy also seems to be problematic 
for the main opposition party. Despite its rhetorical commitment to 
democratic values, the CHP, currently the major party of the secular left, as 
it defines itself, seems to be almost indistinguishable from the ultra-
nationalist MHP in its defensive nationalism and its reluctance to embrace 
democratic reform.6 This leaves the AKP with little opposition to push it 
towards a more democratic reform-oriented agenda. This weak normative 
commitment is also on display in intra-party democracy, where both 
parties, among others, have an organisational structure that is heavily 
reliant on the authority of the party leader and where little dissent is 
allowed. 
A mixed picture emerges when observing where civil society stands 
in relation to democratic values. It is largely accepted that civil society 
activity in Turkey increased considerably from the late 1980s onwards. 
However, analyses reveal that such an increase has not necessarily led to an 
increased internalisation of democratic norms by civil society actors. In fact, 
studies show that they overwhelmingly ‘instrumentalise’ democracy for 
their own rational ends with low degrees of normative commitment. For 
example, while the discourses of the main economic civil society actors, 
namely the business associations TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, uphold 
respectively a ‘liberal modernity’ and a ‘conservative modernity’ open to 
globalisation and the EU as an alternative to the state-centric structure of 
Turkish modernity, their claims to modernity as such seem to be much 
stronger than their commitment to democracy.7 
There are also problems regarding the normative appeal of 
democracy among the masses in general, creating an environment that may 
hamper democratic consolidation. A recent study suggests that a majority 
of the Turkish population does not uphold democracy as a ‘normative 
                                                     
6 Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists: Political 
Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey”, Journal of Southern Europe 
and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007. 
7 Fuat Keyman, “Civil Society and Democratisation in Turkey”, paper 
presented at a seminar on Democracy and Democratization in Turkey, 
Universidad Autónomo de Madrid, 21-23 November 2008. 
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value’, but instead has a ‘sectarian’ approach to democracy, meaning that 
the rights of those perceived as one of ‘them’ are upheld while the rights of 
those denoted as ‘others’ are disregarded. For example, while 43% of the 
respondents in the study were in favour of the abolition of the headscarf 
ban in universities, only 11.4% of the public seem to support the right to 
education in Kurdish.8  
Europe as an external anchor? 
The EU played a crucial role in the triggering of the democratic reform 
process between 2000-05. It can be argued that one of the main ways 
through which it did this was the application of a relatively credible policy 
of conditionality: by making EU accession a more realistic prospect, mainly 
through granting candidacy status to the country and taking the decision to 
open accession negotiations. Turkish accession has always been a subject of 
controversy in the EU. The intensity of the debate, however, grew as the 
accession perspective of Turkey became more ‘real’ (especially with the 
opening of accession negotiations) and as the internal discussions 
regarding the future of the European order were put under the spotlight 
with the referenda over the Constitutional Treaty. The mixed signals on the 
future of Turkish accession turned more towards the negative when 
prominent EU leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel 
expressed their reluctance to admit Turkey as a full member. 
In addition to this, the Cyprus problem continues to hamper the 
credibility of EU conditionality in Turkey by feeding into the mass 
perception of the EU in Turkey as an ‘unfair’ arbiter that solely punishes 
Turkey in the conflict. In December 2006, the European Council decided to 
suspend negotiations in eight chapters of the acquis, on the grounds that 
Turkey was violating its commitments under the customs union agreement 
and the additional protocol by refusing to open its ports to Cypriot vessels. 
This is now a precondition for the provisional closure of each negotiated 
chapter.  
The survey data show accordingly that in Turkey “people seem to 
have become less convinced of the potential benefits and eventual 
likelihood of membership, all resulting in overall lower levels of support 
                                                     
8 Ali Çarkoğlu & Binnaz Toprak, Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, 
Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey], TESEV, Istanbul, 2006, pp. 27-28. 
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for membership in the EU”.9 While support levels for membership were 
just above 70% between 2002 and 2005, this figure dropped to 57% in the 
first half of 2006, dropping further to 42% in the second half of 2008.10 
Another study finds that a clear majority of the population does not believe 
in the sincerity of the EU in admitting Turkey as a full member. 
Approximately 50% of the respondents argued that Turkey would not be 
accepted as a full member even if it fulfilled all the conditions for 
accession.11 The danger that this holds for democratic reform is that it 
reduces the electoral incentive for the adoption of costly reform to attain 
EU accession, ties the hands of the domestic reformers among the elite and 
civil society and thus also undermines the power of the Union as an 
effective external anchor for democratic reform. 
On top of this general problem of the credibility of EU conditionality, 
there is also a more specific problem that weakens the power of the EU in 
the democratisation of the country. It can be argued that the Leyla Şahin v. 
Turkey case in which the European Court of Human Rights in November 
2005 rejected the appeal to allow the wearing of the headscarf in 
universities can be considered a ‘turning point’ in the AKP’s perception of 
Europe in the promotion of democratisation in Turkey. A recent study 
suggests that this case led to a serious reassessment among certain 
segments of the party as to how far Europe could contribute to changes in 
Turkish secularism through an agenda of democratisation and human 
rights.12 
                                                     
9 Ali Çarkoğlu, “Changing Mindsets of Turkish Public: Should Turkey be a 
Member of the EU?”, Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies, Vol. 22, No. 
2, December 2006. 
10 Ibid. and Standard Eurobarometer 80, Country Report: Turkey, autumn 2008.  
11 Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007”, 
forthcoming in 2009 in a volume to be published by Springer (Germany), in 
cooperation with the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy (Athens, 
Greece). 
12 Senem Aydin & Ruşen Çakır, “Political Islam in Turkey”, in Michael Emerson & 
Richard Youngs (eds), Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: Perspectives from 
Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2007. 
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Structural constraints 
One of the main drivers of democratic reform in the Turkish case was the 
military defeat of the PKK in the late 1990s. The ceasing of terrorist activity 
had significantly contributed to the lowering of adoption costs of certain 
political reforms in the field of human rights and the protection of 
minorities. Largely thanks to the political instability in Iraq, the PKK 
renewed its terrorist activities in 2007, culminating in the Turkish military’s 
intervention in Northern Iraq in February 2008. The renewal of PKK 
terrorism enhances nationalist fervour among the public and the political 
parties, hindering substantial reform, particularly in the field of minority 
rights. 
Another structural constraint that currently stymies the reform 
process is the state of civic-military relations in Turkey. Although 
significant institutional reform has been undertaken in this realm, the issue 
is far from being resolved. This is mainly due to the fact that the classic 
‘democratic control of armed forces’ approach as upheld by international 
institutions such as the EU and NATO is insufficient for the Turkish case 
where in addition to institutional privileges, the military’s “legal, moral 
and political grounds for watching over the regime are formidable”.13 This 
was most recently observed in the reactions of the Turkish military to the 
possibility of Gül’s presidency where the armed forces were described as 
an institution that “has a stake in the debate” and that will “make its 
position clear when necessary”.14  
Furthermore, the current state of the economy does not look 
promising for the prospects of Turkish democracy. It is well-known that the 
AKP benefited from a highly favourable international economic climate 
when it first came to power in 2002. The economy had also by then started 
to reap the benefits of the structural reforms carried out by the previous 
coalition government in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis. The tide 
has now turned for the worse. The AKP will have to find novel means of 
tackling the challenges to continued economic growth and job creation in a 
                                                     
13 Ümit Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in 
Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone”, European Journal of Political 
Research, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2004, p. 110. 
14 Radikal, 28 April 2007. 
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highly unfavourable global economic environment, to sustain the support 
of the middle classes that play a crucial role in the moderation of its 
ideology.15 Unemployment rates are rising rapidly and growth predictions 
are shrinking by the day. The party seems very reluctant to acknowledge 
the presence of an economic crisis. If, however, the crisis deepens in the 
Turkish context, the appeal of nationalism and populism will undoubtedly 
increase as it did in the past, reducing the appeal of democratic reform. 
Probably the greatest impediment to the consolidation of democracy 
in Turkey is the growing Islamist-secularist divide. There is a huge degree 
of mistrust between the secularists and the Islamists in Turkey. The 
ambivalence in the AKP’s ideology as to where the party stands with 
respect to the role of Islam on issues that lie at the heart of secularism in 
Turkey (i.e. the public role of Islam) fosters fears among the secularists that 
the party has a hidden agenda of Islamising Turkish society. Its recruitment 
policies at both the central and the local levels, which rely heavily on 
ideological/communitarian ties and party policies that promote societal 
Islam (such as turning a blind eye to illegal Koran courses) enhance this 
perception. Indeed, as the famous Turkish scholar of Ottoman and Turkish 
history, Şerif Mardin, recently put it, the promotion of 
Islamic/conservative social values by the AKP, combined with social 
pressure backed by a new Islamic middle class, creates a strong potential 
for the increasing Islamisation of Turkish society.16 Such a possibility makes 
the secularist segments of Turkish society increasingly wary of democratic 
reform, fearing that more liberalisation will only contribute to the further 
Islamisation of Turkish politics and society.  
Conclusions 
It might be argued that Turkey is an example of a currently stagnating 
democracy due to a combination of both domestic and external factors. The 
low degree of normative appeal of democracy among both society and the 
                                                     
15 Şevket Pamuk, “Globalization, Industrialisation and Changing Politics in 
Turkey”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 38, 2008. 
16 Ruşen Çakır’s interview with Şerif Mardin in Ruşen Çakır (ed.), Mahalle Baskısı: 
Prof. Dr. Şerif Mardin’in Tezlerinden Hareketle Türkiye’de İslam, Cumhuriyet, Laiklik ve 
Demokrasi (Small-Town Pressure: Islam, Republic, Secularism and Democracy in 
Turkey from the View of Şerif Mardin’s Theses), Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008. 
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main political parties at large; the growing Islamic-secular divide that 
inhibits democratic development, the growing appeal of nationalism, the 
state of civic-military relations and the state of the Turkish economy 
currently weakens the prospects for democratic consolidation. On the 
external side, the EU is increasingly losing its power as the main external 
anchor of Turkish democratic reform, due to a weakening policy of 
conditionality and the resulting loss of confidence in the EU. This 
combination of domestic problems and the weakening of the EU anchor has 
the potential to return Turkey to the political upheaval of 1990s: an era lost 
to political and economic instability, rife with Islamism and Kurdish 
secessionism.  
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6. GEORGIA’S DEGENERATIVE 
TRANSITION 
GEORGE KHUTSISHVILI 
nce upon a time – admittedly not so long ago historically – Mikhail 
Saakashvili, Viktor Yushchenko and their closest allies were 
perceived in the East as bringers of democracy, and as Western 
‘Messiahs’ whose ultimate mission was to democratise Russia. They 
envisioned themselves as latter-day American-style founding fathers; their 
idea of a free, prosperous and law-based democratic future set them apart 
from the ‘cowboys’ around them who were governed by mob rule. Their 
message to their own societies was clear: you may have misgivings, but we 
will not be swayed, as we know we are doing the right thing for everyone’s 
future. Since 2004, Saakashvili’s favourite phrase has been “Whatever 
happens, we will bring this battle to an end”. The initial achievements of 
Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ were impressive: among other improvements, 
petty corruption was significantly reduced; power and gas supplies were 
ensured; many roads rebuilt and buildings repaired; and the corrupt traffic 
police were dismissed entirely and replaced with a reliable mobile patrol. 
No less impressive was the agreement signed with Russia regarding the 
closure of Russian military bases stationed in Georgia since Soviet times. It 
was announced that EU and NATO memberships were just around the 
corner, and EU symbols and flags appeared in public places alongside the 
newly-adopted national ones, as though Georgia was already an EU 
member. It was only later that the revolutionary leaders’ lack of 
understanding of democratic ideals and principles, and their disinclination 
to follow them, became apparent.  
November 23, the date of the revolution, is celebrated in Georgia as a 
national holiday. However, the old enthusiasm for this date is long gone. 
For the leader of a revolution to be true to his name as both a revolutionary 
O 
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and a self-proclaimed initiator of democratic reforms, these reforms must 
be prominent during the revolutionary party’s time in office. The 
introduction of fair elections is of paramount importance, legitimising the 
revolutionaries’ belief in democracy by ensuring that future leaders come 
to power democratically. Such a change would also prevent the 
establishment of a destructive pattern of recurrent revolutions. Georgia’s 
political structures still need to be reformed before a change in power can 
take place through elections; a non-revolutionary process. The 
‘revolutionaries’ have shown that they are unwilling to create an 
environment that would allow oppositional political thought to gain a 
foothold in society. Non-state TV channels cannot function without state 
interference, and domestic business is kept under state tutelage. Since the 
May 2008 elections, the ruling United National Movement – the president’s 
party – has had a constitutional majority in the new parliament, with only a 
nominal and practically non-functional minority opposition. The 
government perceives this as another victory for democracy in Georgia: 
political alternatives are seen as unnecessary if the ruling majority is doing 
a ‘good job.’ 
A comparison between early 2004 and mid-2009 shows a dramatic 
deterioration in perceptions of the now widely-discredited ‘colour 
revolutions’. Instead of the hoped-for open societies with developing 
market- and law-based state systems and the ability to promote democracy, 
the former Soviet countries have become authoritarian power 
conglomerates badly in need of democratisation themselves. Georgia’s 
ailing economy and almost non-existent agricultural industry are unable to 
provide sufficient support to the process of social reform.  
A path paved with good intentions  
In the years following Georgia’s colour revolution, the wider world gave 
too great a credence to information provided by the government and the 
government NGOs (GONGOs). This led to an inaccurate perception of the 
true state of affairs, and subsequent unrealistic expectations of future 
development. The Bush Administration gave the Georgian leadership 
unconditional support, which assisted it in centralising power. 
After the January 2004 inauguration of the almost unanimously-
elected president Saakashvili, constitutional changes were introduced. 
These changes shifted the balance of power away from the parliament and 
towards the president. An ultimatum was then issued to those who had 
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profited under the Shevardnadze regime, forcing them to yield part of their 
fortune to the state in exchange for a guarantee of safety. Although this was 
technically illegal, international observers were still blinded by the 
euphoria of a popular victory and took a rather benign view of the 
Georgian government’s arrogant, risky manoeuvres. The leaders insisted 
on their need of an extraordinary amount of credit in order to have the 
maximum possible resources to carry out the difficult reforms and ensure 
democratic rule. Improvements in financial management and extreme 
forms of ‘fundraising’ led to a ten-fold increase in revenue in a two-year 
period. Remarkably, the majority of resources and international aid were 
allocated to military spending: over $1 billion in the first half of 2008 alone. 
However, Georgia’s resounding defeat in the August 2008 war 
demonstrated in spectacular fashion how inefficiently the augmented 
defence budget had been allocated and managed.  
The August 2008 war divided Georgia’s political situation into a 
‘before’ and ‘after’. Before the war, it had been relatively easy to 
manipulate elections; oppress TV companies; marginalise the opposition 
and ignore criticism, all the while retaining international support. After 
August, it seemed unlikely that this situation would continue. Georgia’s 
leaders sensed that a fundamental change had taken place; a change that 
was not merely the inevitable reconsideration of unconditional US support 
under the new administration. International media perceptions of Georgian 
policies had become largely negative; this negativity spread and coloured 
people’s views of the country as a whole. This feeling remained until spring 
2009, when passive US and EU support was gradually reestablished, 
although Georgia had fallen down the list of international priorities. 
However, nobody in Georgia itself had any doubt that the authorities 
would resort to whatever repressive measures they deemed necessary to 
retain their power if a real threat emerged from the growing opposition 
movement or from public protest. 
The leaders of the ‘Rose Revolution’ have demonstrated that they can 
learn lessons and diversify their approach, which has come as a surprise to 
everyone. A banner demanding president Saakashvili’s resignation has 
been hanging outside parliament since the mass protest on 9 April 2009, 
throughout the subsequent opposition activism, but there has been no 
police intervention to remove it. Nor was there even any attempt to halt the 
demonstration itself. However, groups of ‘unidentified’ masked people 
have threatened and attacked demonstrators on several occasions, mostly 
during the hours of darkness. Although a number of these individuals have 
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been photographed or recognised, there have been no effective 
investigations into the matter. It seems that the long-lasting stalemate may 
end in a temporary reaffirmation of the status quo.  
Independent civil society organisations have become increasingly 
involved in the process of mediation that aims to find a solution to 
Georgia’s political crisis. This intervention is deemed necessary because the 
ruling party does not have enough legitimisation nor is it representative 
enough to ensure national stability and sustainable development. In 
addition, the opposition fails to offer a viable alternative given its lack of 
clear vision and public support, and its inability to raise sufficient funds to 
guarantee the necessary political changes.  
A retrospective view of civil society 
Civil society in Georgia is primarily associated with the non-governmental 
sector, which for most of the population means NGOs. To date, Georgia has 
had no experience of significant formal trade union activities, which have – 
along with some religious institutions – shaped so much of the Western 
concept of civil society.  
In the mid-1990s Georgia’s non-governmental sector began to 
flourish thanks to Western assistance, a development encouraged by Zurab 
Zhvania, the then-Speaker of Parliament. The civil sector supported the 
newly-independent state’s proclaimed move towards Western values. 
Freedom of expression was curbed to a greater extent by the stereotyped 
opinions of the masses than by direct government regulations. The official 
stance toward NGOs was liberal, although large grants required the 
government’s tacit approval or GONGO partnership. After the first serious 
political crisis during Shevadnadze’s rule in 2001, the ‘young reformers’ 
group, led by Zhvania and Saakashvili, created a political opposition that 
invested in certain NGOs and media outlets that went on to play a vital role 
in the events of autumn 2003.  
After the ‘Rose Revolution’, many of its active protagonists with 
prominent roles in civil society took up key posts in the government, 
parliament and the presidential administration. In the immediate 
aftermath, Rustavi-2 TV declared that the Georgian civil sector had become 
‘disintegrated and hollow’, indicating that the ambitious leaders had 
formerly been at the core of Georgian civil society. Yet the media’s claim 
also proved that the new government had a certain political credo, which 
could be interpreted as follows: Georgian civil society turned into a 
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democratic government in order to democratise the country. Once this 
function had been fulfilled, there was no longer a need for a strong non-
governmental sector or a free media. In theory, the new leaders’ entry into 
government was supposed to lead to the development of a democratic 
power structure rather than bureaucratisation or even authoritarianism. 
The ‘logic’ for the government’s approach was that once democracy 
had been established and the devoted democrats were firmly in power, 
there was no longer any reason to tolerate the opposition. Seemingly, the 
only argument against applying this theory was that Georgia’s Western 
supporters – on whom the country’s survival largely depended – insisted 
on the existence of the the opposition. Since the death of wealthy TV mogul 
Patarkatsishvili removed the main critical challenge from the media, the 
political opposition was increasingly tolerated, although it was periodically 
accused of having links to Moscow. The government’s attitude also 
explains the partiality of the judicial system, and the fragility of private 
property rights in Georgia.  
When it comes to foreign policy, relations with Russia are a huge 
problem. But the Russian question is not being addressed rationally: formal 
appeals for dialogue have traditionally been combined with irritating, 
counter-productive moves, making the prospect of territorial integrity 
more unrealistic than ever before. These failures have increased the 
Georgian public’s level of discontent with the government; the August 2008 
war with Russia led the population to despair of their country’s prospects. 
The challenge of becoming a civil nation 
One positive change under the new administration has been the 
government’s restraint of the fundamentalist trends developing within the 
Georgian Orthodox church, the civil institution with the most – and the 
most consistent – authority in the country. Non-mainstream churches and 
confessions and religious minority groups felt much safer under the new 
leadership. It was expected that a similar feeling of security would develop 
among ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups, hopefully leading to 
reconciliation between the secessionist communities. However, in practice, 
a state system that barely defends human rights and is selective in its 
application of justice proved to be an unfavourable atmosphere for the 
encouragement of social integration among ethnic minority groups.  
The existence of stereotypical attitudes in Georgia toward secessionist 
Abkhaz and South Ossets highlights the challenge of successfully 
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integrating different ethnic groups into society. Prior to the revolution, 
most public discussions of the unresolved conflicts with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia degenerated into lengthy and ultimately fruitless debates on 
how the conflicts should be qualified: as ethnic; ethno-political; ethno-
territorial; political or something else entirely. The idea of ‘ethnic’ conflict 
has always been dismissed; the government does not perceive Georgian 
society as capable of fomenting xenophobia or suppressing minorities. The 
problem was usually classified as political and Russian-imposed. It was 
maintained that if Russia ended its battle with Georgia and left the country 
to its own devices, Abkhaz and Ossets would be able to live harmoniously 
in the same state. This unrealistic and counter-productive assessment of the 
situation is indicative of the Georgian tendency to relieve itself of 
responsibility for a problem by shifting this responsibility to a powerful 
external party. This approach removes the need for uncomfortable dialogue 
with persistent minority communities. Shevardnadze had to reject 
‘Georgian–Abkhaz’ and ‘Georgian–Osset’ as potential labels for the 
conflicts. Aware of the likely consequences, he avoided the label ‘Georgian–
Russian’, and instead the situation became known in official domestic and 
foreign channels as the rather unwieldy ‘Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia’. 
Saakashvili went through the same process, although his policy was much 
more proactive (and self-fulfilling) in illustrating the chilling reality of the 
Georgian–Russian conflict. This made the resolution of the Abkhaz and 
South-Osset issues a rather unrealistic outcome for the near future. 
Power politics, zero-sum games, strong rhetoric, the feeling of an 
external threat and a black-and-white interpretation of reality have made 
militarised mindsets increasingly common among Georgia’s population. 
When televised political debates need to cite an expert, they usually opt for 
Carl von Clausewitz; when a strong, successful statesman is required, 
Ronald Reagan is the politician of choice; and if the history of Europe is 
under discussion, Otto von Bismarck is quoted. It is likely that the 
Georgian government lamented the end of George Bush’s presidency, and 
hoped that John McCain would replace him. President Obama has been 
viewed mostly in terms of his stance towards Russia. Also under 
consideration are the potential consequences for Georgia if the US example 
prompts the West to negotiate existing problems with Russia using a soft 
power language that the Georgian administration deems too subtle for use 
in dealing with such a country.  
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Georgia and the global economic crisis 
So far, Georgia appears to have been largely unaffected by the global 
economic crisis. This apparent paradox is due to the ephemeral nature of its 
economy. The stability that the Georgian lari (GEL) has enjoyed since its 
introduction in 1995 can largely be attributed to stabilisation measures 
undertaken by the National Bank of Georgia. These actions followed the 
IMF’s recommendations and required the injection of huge sums of hard 
cash each year. As a result, inflation rates have been low. Since the August 
2008 war, foreign aid ($4.5 billion in total) has played a pivotal role in 
stabilising the domestic financial market and the banking industry. How 
much longer the Georgian economy can stave off the effects of the global 
crisis thanks to internal manoeuvres and foreign support remains to be 
seen, but some experts believe that time is running out. If the economy 
encounters difficulties, public discontent will no doubt increase 
significantly, and the opposition would channel this sentiment to urge the 
president’s resignation and early presidential elections.  
The government is currently attempting to minimise media coverage 
of economic difficulties, thus limiting the material the opposition can use 
against it. At the same time, it is trying to satisfy the primary needs of the 
basic consumer market, and avert debates regarding housing, poverty and 
social issues by maintaining that Georgia is under external threat. Every so 
often, high-ranking officials reveal Russia’s plans for an invasion of 
Georgia and subsequent regime change. A recent example of this is the 
discussion of Russia’s alleged plans to invade the Baltic States, Ukraine or 
Georgia in order to restore its domination over its ‘disobedient’ pro-
Western neighbours. 
Conclusions 
Georgia’s Rose Revolution leaves as its legacy an unusual power 
phenomenon. There has been an attempt to establish a kind of ‘velvet 
authoritarianism’, based on stagnant stability and maintained by continual 
references to an external threat: Russia. The idea of this threat justifies the 
authoritarian political system that has been implemented, and is 
reminiscent of the Brezhnev era, although on a smaller scale. There is an 
unwritten agreement between the power and the people, a policy of mutual 
non-interference unless money is at stake: wealth should be shared rather 
than used for political ends. A loyal citizen does not criticise the 
government’s policies and tactics. A loyal citizen should not question how 
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it can be possible to declare that escape from Russian domination is the 
goal while more and more strategic assets and energy systems are being 
transferred to Russian control. The power phenomenon that is developing 
in Georgia pushes the established boundaries of what can only be termed 
’imitational’ or ‘façade’ democracy.  
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7. UKRAINE’S BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRACY 
ALEXANDER BOGOMOLOV & 
ALEXANDER LYTVYNENKO 
he key concerns regarding Ukraine’s progress since the Orange 
Revolution of 2004 are the governability and consistency of the 
nation’s domestic and foreign policies. This discussion boils down to 
the issue of whether the nation’s political class, which demonstrated 
democratic aspirations in 2005, is capable of living up to its commitments. 
Could it instigate further progress? Or will it continue to be chronically 
immersed in domestic rivalries that jeopardise Ukraine’s credibility as an 
international actor? Western powers are assessing the country in terms of 
its performance. This is nothing unusual, as governments tend to see the 
world as an interplay of teams of politicians, officials, diplomats and 
economic agents rather than of societies and cultures. But such an approach 
is too superficial for a serious assessment of a nation’s democratic progress, 
which requires events to be looked at from the perspective of society.  
The social meaning of the revolution 
First and foremost is the question of what the Orange Revolution meant for 
Ukraine. Seen from the domestic perspective, the Orange Revolution 
addressed issues that went beyond democratic transition. In a period of 
post-imperial transition, Ukraine faced the challenge of refounding a civic 
nation. In this sense, its powerful social mobilisation has made it a great 
success. On a wider global scale, the November 2004 events produced a 
new revolutionary ethos by changing public views on what constitutes a 
modern age revolution in places as far apart as Moldova, Lebanon and 
T 
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Vladivostok.1 This provides a contrast to the persistent historic prototype of 
the 1917 Russian Bolshevik coup with its strong emphasis on mass violence 
and terror. The revolution sparked a process of re-assessing national 
history. Even Ukraine’s aspirations for EU integration and NATO 
membership have become an instrument of the nation’s ongoing self-
reflection.  
However, the Orange Revolution seems to have highlighted the 
country’s regional divides, leading to prolonged discussion among experts 
and politicians on Ukraine’s east and west, which ‘never shall meet’. Most 
of these impressions could, however, be attributed to the tactics of the 
major political forces and the modes of mobilisation they used during the 
2004 presidential campaign, coupled with the amplifying effect of the 
media. A more careful analysis shows that the reason why the east of 
Ukraine – primarily Donbas – voted for Russian-backed Viktor 
Yanukovych, while the West did not, stems not so much from linguistic 
identity, or supposed pro-Russian sentiments, as from the social structure. 
Most of Donbas and some other eastern urban areas are populated by 
communities with a dominant working class culture and a particularly high 
level of capital concentration. Contrary to the popular belief that Ukraine is 
politically divided into the predominantly Russian-speaking east, the 
bilingual centre and the Ukrainian-speaking west, linguistic identity in 
Ukraine shows no direct correlation to the way in which people conceive of 
themselves as a community or nation.2 
The Orange Revolution has done much to ensure the public 
endorsement of representative democracy as an institutional and legal 
arrangement. While the introduction of a democratic electoral system that 
forms the basis of a representative democracy is basically a legal reform, 
                                                     
1 In large-scale civic protest rallies on 14 December 2008 – January 2009 in 
Vladivostok over the rise of car import duties, protestors used orange flags and 
methods of civic mobilisation similar to those of the Orange Revolution. 
2 Opinion polls published by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Centre (31 May – 18 June 
2007) revealed that out of the 37% of the adult population that is Russian-speaking, 
72% think of themselves as patriots of Ukraine, 46% uphold ‘Ukrainian traditions’ 
and only 11% consider themselves affiliated to ‘Russian traditions’, while for 
bilinguals the latter ratio is 75% to 2%. See Alexander Lytvynenko & Yuriy 
Yakimenko, “Russian-Speaking Citizens of Ukraine: ‘Imaginary Society’ as it is”, 
Zerkalo Nedeli 18 (697), 17-23 May 2008 (http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/62942/).  
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which may also be modelled on external prototypes, the appropriation of it 
as a public value, as part of local political culture, requires significant social 
innovation. The failures of the Orange parties can hardly undermine the 
importance of this achievement, which remains unique in comparison with 
other post-Soviet countries, apart from the Baltics. Russia stands as the 
greatest contrast to Ukraine. The former country’s backslide into 
authoritarianism was largely due to the lack of public endorsement of the 
superimposed model of representative democracy. Russian voting 
therefore still represents a mere test of loyalty.  
The events of 2004 have opened up more avenues for civil society 
development, while specifically highlighting the role of the middle class in 
the advancement of democracy. A large community of citizens is immersed 
in daily political debates and civic actions, as events run by the Maidan are 
becoming a powerful matrix shaping social and political behaviour. 
However, Ukrainian civil society has already come up against the 
limitations of representative democracy. Real public participation – the 
very notion of a participatory democracy – still remains an issue, while the 
channels of communication between civic society and the government 
remain limited to the media and organised protests. This will hardly 
change while populism in both rhetoric and practice is still capable of 
winning more votes than a serious reform programme, and the middle 
class is not represented in parliament. Nonetheless, the mounting anti-
populist trend in public opinion indicates that this situation will not 
continue indefinitely. 
The shallowness of reform 
The Orange Revolution has also highlighted the deficiencies of the old 
institutions of government inherited from Soviet times and only 
superficially modified by the (pre-2004) Kuchma regime. The most obvious 
case in point is the system of distribution and delegation of powers at every 
level. The national government struggled with a poorly designed 2004 
constitutional reform meant to make Ukraine a ‘parliamentary-presidential 
republic’. The elite change failed to produce a regime change – Orange 
parties came to power without a clear vision of what needed to be done. 
Some 18,000 government officials were replaced on the principle of political 
loyalty, which has only served to reduce the institutional efficiency of the 
state. The professional level of civil servants has dropped, while the 
prevailing institutional culture and underlying philosophy of the civil 
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service have remained largely unchanged since Soviet times. The system 
has not been capable of assimilating modern, Western ideas of public 
administration. There is no clear divide between political and 
administrative functions, the procedures are poorly defined, and the entire 
technical organisation of the decision-making process is weak. Disregard 
for formal procedures, which results from an excessive politicisation of the 
public administration, is undermining the latter’s rational foundations. 
There persists a crisis of bureaucracy in an important social institution. 
However, this crisis is not new. Rather, it continues the pan-Soviet trend 
that took root in the late Brezhnev period. The opening up of the public 
sphere in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution has made the poverty of 
the unreformed state institutions only too obvious.  
The newly introduced proportional electoral system has made parties 
the main units of political competition. Internal democracy within parties, 
however, is still very weak. Parties continue to resist civil society’s pressure 
to open up their electoral lists. Major political blocks continue to seek 
power-sharing arrangements behind the scenes. This includes the latest 
attempt by the leadership of the two major parties – the Party of the 
Regions (PRU) and the Tymoschenko Bloc (BYuT) – to forge a lasting 
political alliance. By amending the constitution to provide for in-house 
presidential elections, two-round parliamentary elections and an extension 
of the current parliament’s term of office, this deal would effectively drive 
other groups out of politics and seriously decrease civil liberties and public 
participation. In June 2009, the deal was halted by media and civil society 
criticism.  
A profound lack of democratic culture within the elites continues to 
pose the most immediate threat to democracy. This negative phenomenon 
is, however, mitigated by a high level of competitiveness (including within 
the political blocks themselves). The collapse of the Tymoschenko–
Yanukovych power-sharing deal highlighted, among other things, a crisis 
of power relations within the large political blocks. This resulted from the 
contradiction between the authoritarian mode of their internal organisation 
and the competitive nature of the private interests forming their resource 
base, as well as a strong consensus in society against authoritarianism. On 
the other hand, the crisis has shown that with the current quality of the 
elites, their dominant cultural models and political behaviour, any attempt 
at power consolidation can only take the form of a backslide into 
authoritarianism. Paradoxically, the Tymoschenko–Yanukovych deal could 
mean that Ukraine will finally ‘speak with one voice’. The European 
80 | BOGOMOLOV & LYTVYNENKO 
 
Commission seemed to welcome this, but Ukrainian society almost 
unanimously interpreted this development as a threat.  
The quality of Ukraine’s ruling elites is now increasingly called into 
question both externally and internally. This is largely a result of the nature 
of the 1990s privatisation campaign, which led to a high level of rent-
seeking behaviour and corruption – in 2008 Ukraine was ranked 134th out of 
180 states on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index. 
The entrepreneurial practices of the early 1990s did not appear overnight 
after the country had adopted its free market course. Rather, they 
developed in the Soviet grey market environment, which did not allow for 
much initiative in the production industries. Heavy industries inherited 
from the Soviet times (gas, oil, energy sector and metal works, machine 
building, chemistry, transport) that formed the bulk of the newly 
accumulated capital have developed as non-market assets. Meanwhile, 
those who acquired these industries in the best cases gained their market 
skills as grey market traders. Early Soviet market reforms also started not 
from production but trade. When the mass privatisations rapidly unfolded, 
domestic venture capital was in short supply, while foreign investment had 
been limited by various risk factors, including local political obstacles. 
Assets were hence distributed non-economically and it soon became clear 
that it was easier to get rich by acquiring more for less than by investing 
seriously at a risk of losing.  
The fact that the ownership of assets acquired in the course of mass 
privatisation lacks legitimacy in the eyes of society is another source of 
investment uncertainty and a stimulus for continued rent-seeking 
behaviour. A major source of the persistence of both rampant corruption 
and rent-seeking are the assets that still remain largely undivided, 
primarily land resources. The country’s economy and livelihood, however, 
are not limited to the oligarchic large businesses. Thousands of medium 
scale entrepreneurs who built their fortunes in a competitive, not rent-
seeking, but often rent-paying environment, and who represent a value-
driven, moderately nationalist social group that is largely critical of the 
current government but has so far remained politically cautious, will not 
miss their chance to have a say in the nation’s democratic advancement. 
The time is now ripe.  
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Bottom-up change 
For the nation’s political culture, an important innovation has been the 
advent of public politics – politicians of all colours have eagerly embarked 
on a challenging enterprise of openly competing for voters. Political 
competitiveness had indeed been threatened in 2004, but the Orange 
Revolution helped preserve and enhance the level of competition among 
the elite groups. Since then, party politicians have embraced a type of 
political behaviour that comes close to the Schumpeterian competitive 
elites’ model of democracy. Limited though this may seem from a modern 
Western perspective, it is a big improvement for people who are still 
tempted by authoritarian methods of governing. Public politics are also 
essential to continued civic nation-building processes. Every nation needs 
its own set of heroes, foes, victories and failures that evolve over time. 
Although they have been branded ‘soap opera politics’ in Ukraine’s specific 
media environment, the events of the last five years have fuelled the 
nation’s ongoing self-reflection. 
The level and quality of democracy in Ukraine since the Orange 
Revolution have been defined by the increasingly mature civil society 
rather than the high offices. Hence, the normative appeal of democracy is 
also working from the bottom up. When banks unilaterally increased 
interest rates owing to the global financial crisis, the middle classes, whose 
businesses and livelihoods depended on loans, organised legal support 
groups to defend their rights in courts, meticulously following the so far 
dysfunctional redress procedures. Mid-level government officials 
increasingly appreciate greater transparency in the workings of the civil 
service as they have realised that this shields them from unwarranted 
political risks. These developments, however, have not yet reached a 
tipping point.  
The issue of more adequate political representation – both at 
parliamentary and local self-government levels – of the nation’s growing 
social diversity, and particularly of the middle class, still remains under-
discussed in public. While political competition continues to be seen as a 
zero sum game, major political parties represent opaque multi-tier clique 
structures with authoritarian chieftains on top. Their leadership is based on 
the perceived mastery of selling the private interests of their rank and file 
oligarchic members to the electorate under the guise of political projects, 
with rhetoric in lieu of ideology and no vision for the nation’s future. Every 
elite group presents its own version of the ‘national interest’, while its 
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actual political behaviour is primarily motivated by narrowly defined 
group and even industry-specific interests. As a result, many key areas are 
lacking meaningful progress, including: local self-government; 
decentralisation; land reform; reform in the energy, health and housing 
sectors; judicial reform; and the development of small and medium-sized 
businesses. Most of these areas have not been addressed because of the 
group interests of the current political elites, or because the appropriate 
reforms appear to be too resource-consuming and risky. Some progress has 
been made in reforming the higher education and defence sectors. While 
tactical thinking dominates the political scene, major strategic issues that 
stand to define the nation’s future are often reduced to the level of political 
bargaining chips. Only pronounced external threats affecting more than a 
single group’s interests can produce a short-lived consensus, as has been 
the case with the 2009 ‘gas war’ with Russia.  
The European dimension 
Developments since the Orange Revolution have highlighted the 
importance of external allies for Ukraine’s democratic advancement. While 
Ukraine has forged some strong alliances and useful partnerships at the 
bilateral level, relations with the European Union and leading countries of 
the ‘old’ Europe remain problematic. Hence, the EU’s role vis-à-vis 
Ukraine’s democratic advancement is controversial. To be sure, most of the 
setbacks in Ukraine-EU relations could be attributed to the Ukrainian elite’s 
domestic and diplomatic failures. However, in order to move forward, 
Ukraine badly needs greater exposure to Europe as a cultural community 
and a repository of knowledge and skills, particularly in the areas of the 
social sciences, the humanities and governance. Above all, democratic 
forces within the country need Europe’s moral authority and approval. In 
this context, it is not only the EU’s lack of political will to accept Ukraine’s 
membership, but also its reluctance to offer concrete benefits – such as visa 
liberalisation – that is so harmful for Ukraine’s fledgling democratic self-
consciousness.  
Much like its predecessors, the EU’s new policy instrument, the 
Eastern Partnership, still projects no clear vision of the region’s future and 
carefully avoids addressing the target countries’ current major concerns, 
such as the complexity of their relations with the former metropolis. The 
EU’s approach presumes that the region’s numerous problems will 
somehow fade away, with the former Soviet ‘space’ settling down on its 
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own terms while the EU’s policy continues to oscillate between cautiously 
measured engagement and withdrawal. Russia, on the other hand, does 
have a strategy towards both its Western former Soviet neighbours and the 
EU itself. Both Russia and the EU, albeit for different reasons, fail to 
appreciate the former Soviet nations’ growing diversity and the varied pace 
of their paths to political modernisation. They still conceive of those nations 
as some politically ambiguous ‘space’ wedged between ‘Europe’ and 
whatever remains of the collapsed empire. EU officials even propose a 
common vision with the other side of the ‘space’ and might even devise a 
unified policy approach toward this putatively problematic area. This 
stems from the shared need to “reach stability in those countries that are 
neighbours of both the European Union and Russia”, as stated in José 
Manuel Barroso’s address at the May 2009 Russia-EU summit. Clearly such 
a policy on the part of the EU prioritises security over democracy - but does 
it hit the target?  
If current policy approaches remain the same – and so far there has 
been no indication otherwise – the EU’s role as a prototype and stimulus 
for the region’s ongoing democratisation will be increasingly compromised. 
With Ukraine needing Europe much more than Europe needs it, Ukraine’s 
democratic advancement could then be at serious risk; the EU, in turn, may 
be faced with an increasingly volatile neighbourhood instead of the 
stability that it strives to achieve.  
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8. ARMENIA’S CRISIS FOR THE 
NON-DEMOCRATS 
RICHARD GIRAGOSIAN 
wo decades after a wave of sweeping democratisation that promised 
to usher in a period of stability and security, a series of recent 
setbacks has thrown such initial optimism into question. In countries 
ranging from Asia to the Middle East, previous gains in democratisation 
have been reversed, suggesting that the path to democracy is neither as 
certain nor as conclusive as once thought. Moreover, these setbacks reveal 
that forging resilient democracy requires much more than electoral reforms 
alone, but necessitates a much broader and deeper institutional framework 
bolstered by the rule of law. Even more crucially, durable democracy must 
be rooted more in democratic institutions than in the less predictable hands 
of individual ‘democrats’.  
For the still vulnerable states of the former Soviet Union, a disparate 
set of authoritarian leaders now share a common goal: to adapt to the 
threat of democratisation, mostly through a defensive and increasingly 
repressive response to demands for democracy by marginalising any 
opposition, muzzling dissent and manipulating the media. From this 
context, the so-called ‘colour revolutions’, or more aptly, the ‘revolutions of 
fruits and flowers’, of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, have only spurred 
a more concerted reaction by other post-Soviet authoritarian regimes to 
preempt the emergence of any credible opposition and prevent the 
development of a vibrant civil society. It was this reaction, most notably in 
the cases of the more authoritarian states of Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, 
which has now come to define the current stage of transitional politics in 
many of the former Soviet states. 
In the case of Armenia, however, there are still signs of hope. 
Although the chances for democracy in Armenia are continuously stifled, 
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both internally and externally, the outright defeat of democracy is far from 
certain. Since the onset of a serious post-election crisis in early 2008, which 
culminated in a violent confrontation between the authorities and the 
opposition that left at least ten people dead and many more wounded, 
Armenia remains plagued by lingering political tensions, exacerbated by 
profound political polarisation and mounting economic disparities. The 
Armenian authorities are also hindered by a lack of legitimacy and a ‘crisis 
of confidence’ that only undermines their political mandate and impedes 
their reform programme. But as the Armenian government remains either 
unwilling or unable to surmount this unresolved political crisis, the 
potential for true democratic change now rests with the combination of a 
‘re-awakened’ Armenian population and a newly unified and active 
opposition. 
Armenia in transition 
Like many of the other post-Soviet states, elections in Armenia have been 
increasingly marred by political violence and overall instability. In some 
cases, such as in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, elections have also 
served as triggers for actual revolutions. In all cases, the challenges of 
transition, including the stable transfer of power inherent in the process of 
political succession, have been exacerbated by the fragility of democratic 
institutions and the weakness of the rule of law. In the case of Armenia, this 
has been compounded by electoral shortcomings, as the country’s first free 
and fair presidential election was the last time the country’s elections 
merited such praise. Despite a record of tainted elections, entrenched 
corruption and a ‘closed’ authoritarian political system, however, Armenia 
has now entered a period of transition, driven by a newly unified 
opposition and a population no longer content with its previous apathy 
and disengagement from politics. 
Armenia’s transition began in late 2007, during the campaign for 
presidential elections. Although this transition was first evident only 
during Armenia’s February 2008 presidential election, its roots went much 
deeper, stemming from a serious internal confrontation between the 
opposition and the authorities. This confrontation represented a new 
degree of intensity in Armenian politics, largely due to the unexpected 
return to politics of former President Levon Ter-Petrosian. The former 
president, as the new leader of a unified opposition, was determined to 
confront the closed political system head-on, by setting a new challenge to 
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the carefully scripted hand-over of power from outgoing President Robert 
Kocharian, who was constitutionally barred from seeking another term, to 
his chosen successor, Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian.  
After a ballot marred by widespread voting irregularities and violent 
incidents of voter intimidation and outright assaults, official returns gave 
Sarkisian an overwhelming victory, thereby avoiding a second round run-
off ballot. Although the election results were immediately contested, Ter-
Petrosian and the opposition condemned the process as much as the results 
of the election. After public calls for a vote recount went virtually 
unheeded, with the authorities agreeing to only a few symbolic recounts in 
marginal districts, the opposition demanded fresh elections. At the same 
time, Ter-Petrosian mobilised his supporters and led them onto the streets, 
launching a series of rallies and demonstrations aimed at maintaining 
pressure on the authorities.  
Back to the future 
Unlike earlier political crises, the two key differences that endowed the 
2008 post-election crisis with an unexpected significance included a newly 
united opposition and an abrupt end to the traditional apathy of the 
population. This first factor was a considerable achievement, especially as 
Armenia’s traditionally fractured and marginalised opposition was able to 
unite behind the charismatic leadership of former president, Ter-Petrosian. 
After spending a decade in political seclusion, Ter-Petrosian emerged in 
2007 in a surprise move to challenge the country’s ruling elite by putting 
himself forward as a presidential candidate. The return of the country’s 
first post-Soviet president awakened many observers and threatened to 
upset the long-planned transition from Kocharian to Sarkisian. Ironically, 
the Ter-Petrosian campaign represented a direct threat to both Kocharian 
and Sarkisian, the very same leaders who forced him to resign in 1998 amid 
nationalist recriminations over Ter-Petrosian’s alleged willingness to adopt 
an unacceptably moderate approach to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan.  
Given the circumstances of his forced resignation, as well as the 
authorities’ concerted attempts to link much of the country’s problems to 
his administration, Ter-Petrosian faced an uphill battle throughout the 
presidential campaign. His efforts were also hindered by the overwhelming 
power of the incumbency, which was exerted through the use of 
administrative resources leveraging the influence of state resources and 
ARMENIA’S CRISIS FOR THE NON-DEMOCRATS | 87 
 
offices. As a result, Ter-Petrosian faced a pronounced disadvantage in both 
articulating his platform and countering the authorities’ assertions. Yet the 
disparity between the rival Ter-Petrosian and Sarkisian campaigns was 
most profound in terms of access to the media, with the country’s 
broadcast media dominated by an overly pro-government bias and 
alternative opposition and independent media outlets under pressure and 
threat. It was against this backdrop that the elections were won outright by 
Sarkisian.  
Although the election results were disputed, the most significant 
development of the pre-election period was the public perception that the 
opposition had been denied a fair contest, leaving the ordinary voter with 
little choice and even less voice. This also fuelled the second factor of the 
post-election crisis, a dynamic ‘re-awakening’ of the population, now 
mobilised by the opposition in mass rallies and public demonstrations. 
Much of this new energy was channelled into the streets, driven by a sense 
that public demands and personal rights were blatantly ignored or denied 
by the authorities. It was at this crucial point that Ter-Petrosian was able to 
reach far beyond the core group of his supporters and opposition activists, 
bridging the normally apathetic and politically uncommitted citizenry. For 
the first time, an Armenian political leader was able to forge a broad-based 
consensus bolstered by a platform for true political change rather than 
simply a personal pursuit of power. 
Armenia’s post-election crisis 
In strategic terms, the demonstrations were crucial, not only to pressure the 
authorities but also to sustain the opposition’s momentum. But the real key 
stemmed not from the opposition strategy, but from its tactics. These tactics 
involved, first, a combination of daily demonstrations of between at least 
20-30,000 protestors rallying in daylight hours and some 2-3,000 of the most 
determined demonstrators setting up overnight vigils, complete with tents 
and supplies. A second effective tactic was to broaden the opposition 
campaign as much as possible, with university students and young 
activists joining the protestors. Significantly, at this point, opposition ranks 
swelled with people not necessarily turning out to support the opposition, 
but to oppose the authorities. 
Although the post-election crisis continued to escalate with several 
weeks of massive demonstrations, the real tipping point for outright 
violence and instability was in the hands of the authorities and, more 
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specifically, expressed through the likelihood of a dangerously excessive 
over-reaction by the security forces. In an unusual meeting with senior 
military officers and security officials, Armenian President Kocharian 
strongly condemned the opposition for attempting to “seize power by 
illegal means” and vowed that he was “determined to take all measures to 
ensure law and order in the country.” Kocharian was reportedly not 
pleased by the performance of the security services, however, and urged 
them to be more vigilant and active, worried that the wave of 
demonstrations would prevent his successor from taking office.  
As tension mounted, opposition demonstrators staged increasingly 
serious mass protests, overnight vigils and even hunger strikes. In turn, the 
authorities, acting on the orders of Kocharian in his last days in office, over-
reacted to the crisis, culminating in an open and violent clash between 
opposition demonstrators and riot police on 1 March 2008 that left at least 
ten people dead, many injured and even more arrested.  
The confrontation prompted the authorities to introduce a one-month 
state of emergency, complete with sweeping restrictions on the media and 
on the freedoms of assembly and speech. Yet the state of emergency only 
deferred, rather than defeated the confrontation between the state and the 
opposition. By resorting to the imposition of virtual martial law under the 
terms of a state of emergency as an immediate reaction to the crisis, the 
authorities only fanned the flames of political discontent. Interestingly, it 
also demonstrated an inverse relationship between regime security and 
state stability, whereby each step to secure the regime posed an equal and 
corresponding move toward destabilising the state by further limiting its 
claims to legitimacy and public trust.  
Key differences 
Moreover, there were several aspects to the post-election crisis that were 
especially worrying and also particularly new, representing a watershed 
for both the course of democracy and political transition in Armenia. As 
with previous elections in Armenia, 19 February 2008 presidential contest 
was marred by allegations of serious voting irregularities, ranging from 
voter intimidation to flagrant vote buying. But unlike previous elections, 
the incidents of politically-related violence were particularly severe, 
ranging from attacks on opposition supporters to assaults on journalists. 
Such political violence is characteristic of the country’s political culture, 
which has become increasingly dominated by abusive and intolerant 
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political discourse, marked by heated personal attacks rather than sober 
policy debate. This also mirrors the dominance of personality over platform 
and the tendency for confrontation over accommodation that has come to 
define the recent years of Armenian politics.  
But even more dangerous was the linkage between the politicised 
violence and a deeper undercurrent of social discontent, driven by 
increasing inequalities in wealth and income and fuelled by unrestrained 
corruption. Although the foundations of social discontent have tended to 
be obscured by a combination of general public apathy and the veneer of 
economic growth, the failure to overcome or even address these challenges 
has only exacerbated and sustained a continuing crisis. In this way, the 
confrontation was less about the election results alone, and more deeper 
levels of internal discontent.  
A second factor that distinguished this election from others was its 
context of broad transition. More specifically, a broad transition that 
included the May 2007 parliamentary election, as well as the February 2008 
presidential context, came in the wake of important constitutional reforms, 
which not only introduced a number of significant institutional reforms but 
also raised the standards and expectations for political performance 
generally. Against the promise of political change inherent in these 
reforms, however, the most serious obstacle was rooted in the Armenian 
political system itself, which was already plagued by a profound lack of 
legitimacy and a serious resistance to political change among the country’s 
small ruling elite. In this context, the political reality was that the adoption 
of political reforms, no matter how impressive or influential, was 
insufficient to achieve real democratisation in Armenia. More significant 
was the absence of political will and commitment to change that was 
needed to implement true political reform in Armenia. In this context, 
Armenia’s 2008 presidential election was a watershed contest, not only in 
terms of electing a new president, but because it revealed a deeper political 
battle between a ruling elite resistant to change and a much larger populace 
no longer satisfied with the promise of gradual or evolutionary reform.  
The 2008 election was also different for a third important reason; as 
much as the election ushered in a new post-Kocharian period, it was also 
the end of an era, with the emergence of a new political elite. In this context 
of political elites, Armenia resembles both its neighbours, as the situation in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan also reflects the triumph of strong personalities.  
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The aftermath of Armenia’s post-election crisis 
Even prior to Armenia’s post-election crisis, politics in Armenia were 
polarised by competing affiliations to a narrow set of political leaders and 
parties. For the past decade, such political polarisation manifested itself in a 
division between supporters of the ruling elite and the largely fragmented 
opposition. In terms of national politics, neither camp demonstrated much 
more than a desire to simply attain or maintain power, offering little in 
terms of strategic vision or policy alternatives. At the same time, there has 
been an equally profound economic divide, with widening inequalities in 
wealth and income. But most importantly, it is the combination of this 
political polarisation and economic divisions that leads to the deep fissures 
within Armenian society as a whole. Against this backdrop, the Armenian 
government faces a serious ‘crisis of confidence’.  
Until the challenges of political polarisation, socio-economic 
inequalities and entrenched corruption are overcome, the population’s 
mounting discontent may reach a point of no-return and erupt into real 
social unrest. And until the Armenian authorities recognize the severity of 
this threat, the result will be not only a lack of legitimacy, but a profound 
democratic deficit for years to come.  
The post-election crisis in Armenia, after the wave of demonstrations 
and public protests over the February 2008 presidential election, is now 
comprised of three specific trends. First, the crisis remains unresolved, with 
little likelihood of a return to the pre-election status quo, as the Armenian 
people have expressed a new sense of civic empowerment. This is also 
rooted in the opaque and closed nature of the Armenian political system, 
where dissent is seen as a direct threat to the state rather than as a 
characteristic of a healthy democracy. Within such a closed political system, 
there is no mechanism for expressing political discontent, which 
exacerbates underlying tension and fuels more radical politics. 
Second, the crisis revealed a growing level of discontent, frustration 
and anger over the mounting inequalities and disparities of wealth and 
income (and of power) in today’s Armenia. The roots of that anger and 
frustration were not only in the politics of selection over election or from 
being denied any choice or voice in politics. The eruption of public anger 
and outrage was equally tied to years of widening disparities in wealth and 
income, and a pronounced lack of economic opportunity, or even hope for 
the future. And third, the crisis has ushered in a new period in Armenian 
politics, driven by strident demands for reform and progress. This is the 
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challenge for the Armenian authorities—to move forward toward a more 
open and fair political system based on consent and accountability, and not 
maintained by fear and repression. Moreover, the Armenian government 
must now learn to govern – not just rule – the country. Thus, as the political 
crisis remains far from resolved and is likely to continue, there is still a very 
real chance for a potentially unprecedented period of change, possibly 
marking the last page of this chapter of Armenian politics. 
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9. MOLDOVA’S FRAGILE PLURALISM 
NICU POPESCU & ANDREW WILSON 
n its short democratic history, Moldova had avoided most of the 
extremes of other post-Soviet states. It has never had a consolidated 
authoritarian regime where elections cease to matter, as in Belarus, 
Central Asia, Azerbaijan and arguably even Russia. Nor did it have any 
outburst of democratic pluralism comparable to the ‘colour revolutions’ in 
Georgia and Ukraine. However, after the general elections in April 2009 
Moldova suddenly came close both to an (unprepared) colour revolution 
and an (unplanned) authoritarian crackdown. Neither was fully 
consummated, leading to further elections in July 2009, which produced 
another surprise when the ruling Communist Party was defeated and 
pushed into opposition.  
Moldova can therefore claim credit as the only post-Soviet state (the 
Baltics aside) with an uninterrupted cycle of legal and constitutional 
transfers of power through elections since its independence in 1991. 
Nevertheless, Moldova’s political system remains over-centralised with 
very few checks and balances such as a free and independent media, a clear 
separation of powers or a system of political parties firmly believing in 
democracy. Moldova’s relative pluralism might be surprising, but it is also 
fundamentally fragile.  
Elections versus selections  
Moldova’s first president, Mircea Snegur left office peacefully after a free 
and fair election in 1996. The second president, Petru Lucinschi left after a 
constitutional reform, after which he was not voted in for a second term. 
The Communist Party of Moldova also lost the elections in July 2009 after 
eight years in power and attempts to perpetuate their power through less 
than democratic means.  
I 
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Moldova is also the only state in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States that is formally a parliamentary republic (since 2000), where the 
president is elected by the parliament. Despite eight years of rule by the 
Communist Party since 2001, with its obvious authoritarian tendencies, 
elections in Moldova have never become a mere formality. Moldova and 
Ukraine are the only CIS countries where elections matter, and election 
outcomes are uncertain. In 2006 the opposition won elections in Gagauzia – 
an autonomous region in the south of Moldova. More importantly, after the 
local elections in 2007 two thirds of local councils were won by the 
opposition, including the capital Chişinău where a young anti-communist 
with dual Romanian-Moldovan nationality, Dorin Chirtoacă of the Liberal 
Party (born in 1978), was elected mayor. It is hard to imagine the capital 
city going to the opposition in any other CIS state except for Ukraine. In 
fact, all major changes of regime since Moldova’s independence in 1991, if 
not every change of government, have come after contested elections that 
were broadly free, if not always fair.  
Despite these apparent achievements, however, Moldova’s political 
system remains less pluralistic than that of Ukraine after eight years of the 
Communist Party being in power.  
Moldova’s communist government 2001-2009 
The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) first came to 
power after the 2001 elections, when they won 49.9% of the vote and 71 out 
of 101 seats. The PCRM secured a comfortable re-election in 2005 with 46% 
and 56 seats. However, in order to secure the re-election of Vladimir 
Voronin they needed the support of some opposition parties. In the 
resultant deal, they promised a set of measures to democratise the political 
system. But after their setback in the 2007 local elections and with opinion 
polls predicting a much tighter parliamentary election in 2009, the 
Communists began to backtrack on many of their commitments to 
democratise.  
Most Moldovan parties, including the Communists, pay lip-service at 
least to ‘European values’. There is no local discourse of ‘sovereign 
democracy’, or opposition to ‘foreigners’ defining what is democratic and 
what is not. The legitimacy of the international community is high. EU 
membership is supported by 72% of the population and is the uncontested 
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foreign policy priority of the country.1 The EU-Moldova Action Plan is the 
cornerstone of the government’s programme and most of the laws adopted 
by parliament are screened for correspondence to the acquis communautaire. 
The country’s foreign policy is ‘multi-vectoral’, but the pro-European 
vector has been relatively stable, and the Russia-friendly discourse of the 
Communist government sounds more like Bulgaria or Slovakia’s careful 
foreign policy, rather than the fundamentally Russocentric foreign policies 
of Armenia or Belarus.  
But zooming in on Moldovan realities reveals a less rosy picture. Pro-
Europeanism is shallow. Laws that correspond to the acquis are poorly 
implemented. Moldovans are happy to adopt laws, reform the customs 
service, and implement new phytosanitary standards that help their 
exports to the EU. But when it comes to ensuring freedom of the media, 
non-interference of the police in political struggles or fighting corruption, 
standards are either stagnating or have gradually deteriorated under the 
Communist government. Police harassment, kompromat, increasing 
pressure on NGOs, media and political parties had all been part of the 
government’s toolbox, especially in the run up to the general elections in 
spring 2005 and 2009. In late 2008, PRO TV, the main TV station not 
controlled by the Communist Party, was under threat of non-prolongation 
of its license, and ultimately only gained a short-term continuation until 
after the vote. The police and prosecutors office opened criminal cases 
against several opposition leaders. 
In such a tense atmosphere, when the preliminary results of the 5 
April 2009 elections were announced showing a landslide victory for the 
Communist Party, thousands of people went out to protest on the streets. A 
few hundred violent protestors, possibly incited by government 
provocateurs, attacked and looted the presidential palace and the 
parliament building. The government responded with a severe crackdown 
in the following days. Hundreds were arrested, dozens were beaten and 
tortured, four people died, allegedly in police detention. A huge 
propaganda campaign against the opposition was unleashed, and tax 
authorities started to investigate and harass opposition parties and 
newspapers, and some of the more independent NGOs. The government 
accused Romania of staging a coup d’état, expelled the Romanian 
                                                     
1 Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, March 2009 (www.ipp.md). 
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ambassador and some two dozen Romanian journalists, took virtually all 
Romanian TV channels off the air, and introduced visas for Romanian 
citizens.  
The severity of the crackdown only underlined the fragility of 
democratic developments in the post-Soviet space, and demonstrated how 
effectively the Moldovan government has gradually implemented an 
incremental, ‘below-the-radar’ centralisation of the political system. 
However, the crackdown dissipated as quickly as it appeared. Within a few 
days most people were released. And by June virtually all those arrested 
were released, while the local opposition parties and the media became 
even more outspokenly critical of the Communist Party. The violent 
tensions of April quickly transformed into a political crisis by May 2009.  
Despite the Communists’ victory, they were one vote short of the 61 
deputies out of 101 needed to elect a new president, and to the complete 
surprise of most observers were unable to obtain the extra vote through 
either co-option or coercion of the opposition. After two failed attempts to 
elect a president in late May and early June, parliament had to be dissolved 
and new elections announced for 29 July. In early June the Communists 
received another blow, when Marian Lupu announced his departure from 
the party in disagreement with the April-May crackdown and the 
increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the party. Lupu had been number 
two on the Communist Party list for the April elections, former 
Communist-backed speaker of parliament in 2005-2009 and the most likely 
Communist Party candidate for the presidency (until the Communists 
promoted the technocratic Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii instead). Lupu 
was also the most popular Communist Party member after Vladimir 
Voronin and one of the most popular politicians in Moldova. Lupu took 
over the small Democratic Party as a vehicle for the July elections, and 
managed to attract a few young and respected professionals to its ranks. 
The July election results proved a surprise. Most predictions had 
suggested a narrow victory for the Communist Party and renewed 
deadlock in the new parliament. But the final results showed a narrow 
victory for the opposition. The overall result was 48 MPs for the 
Communist Party and 53 for the combined opposition. Compared to April, 
the Communists had lost 12 seats (from 60 to 48), the three liberal parties 
lost one (from 41 to 40), and Marian Lupu’s Democrats gained a decisive 
thirteen. Clearly, the shape of the future governing coalition was now in 
their hands.  
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A few days after the elections Marian Lupu decided to join the three 
liberal parties and create a governing coalition dubbed the ‘Alliance for 
European Integration’, thereby pushing the Communists into opposition. 
The main priorities of the Alliance were to dismantle Voronin’s ‘power 
vertical’, enforce the rule of law, accelerate the process of European 
integration, improve relations with Romania and Ukraine, and continue 
Moldova’s strategic partnership with Russia. At the time of writing it is not 
clear whether the Alliance for European Integration would be able to elect a 
new president, since they need at least eight votes from Communist MPs. 
Failure to do so would lead to yet more elections some time in 2010.  
Moldova’s fragile pluralism  
For its first two decades, Moldova was a steadier performer than virtually 
all other post-Soviet states. It did not see any great leaps forward through 
revolution, but nor did it suffer the sharp democratic regressions visible 
elsewhere. Under Voronin, Moldova was neither a consolidated 
authoritarianism nor a fully-fledged democracy. It was stuck in between. 
Moldova is not as centralised as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia or Belarus. 
There is therefore hope that, with international support, Moldova can pull 
back from the crisis it faced in 2009. 
The reasons for precarious pluralism are both domestic and external. 
Moldova is a politically diverse and divided society. Some 30% of the 
population are from national minorities (Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz and 
Bulgarians); but the majority Moldovan/Romanian population is also 
divided into roughly three identity groups that correlate strongly with 
political preferences. The first group of Moldovans consider themselves 
fully Romanian and call their language Romanian, and consider the very 
term Moldova to be a ‘Stalinist’, i.e. Soviet invention. Many also question 
whether Moldova is a state at all, and support unification with Romania. 
The second group are those Moldovans who acknowledge that there is 
some kind of Moldovan political nation, that Moldova should remain a 
state separate from Romania, but acknowledge that the language spoken in 
Moldova is Romanian. The third category is those Moldovans who 
consider themselves to be Moldovans, consider that they speak Moldovan, 
and are often anti-Romanian.  
These cleavages have ensured that no one community in Moldova 
has been strong enough to dominate the state or to impose its will on other 
parties and enforce authoritarian rule. Add to this mix the different 
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political aspirations of the minorities, and the result is what Lucan Way has 
called ‘pluralism by default’.2 All governments have had to engage in 
different degrees of cooptation and balancing between more than one 
community. Most governments have had eclectic flirtations with more than 
one group, which de facto has ensured some kind of check on executive 
power.  
Moldova may be relatively poor, but it benefits politically from a 
relative dispersal of economic power. Its people are (forced to be) self-
reliant. Unlike Ukraine or Russia with their concentrated economies, 
Moldova has little industry, and is predominantly rural and poor. Moldova 
has a huge number of migrant workers: perhaps up to 600,000 (out of a 
population of 3.8 million), more or less equally split between Russia and 
the EU. According to the World Bank, official remittances (i.e. those tracked 
through the banking system) made up 36.2% of GDP in 2007.3 Perversely, 
the population is therefore less dependent on the state for survival. 
Moreover, Moldova has no real big businesses or rent-supplying 
monopolies, through control of which a small group could win control of 
the country. The one big exception, MoldovaGaz, has been 50% + 1 owned 
by Gazprom since 1999.  
In such an environment, state capture takes different forms to other 
resource-rich post-Soviet states. State institutions are captured to create 
business or political advantages and to harass business opponents, but the 
state itself has fewer resources than its counterparts in Russia or 
Azerbaijan. Businesses that support the opposition have been harassed. 
However, enforcing political control over every business in the country is 
close to impossible.  
Perhaps paradoxically, the existence of the secessionist conflict over 
Transnistria has not made any substantial impact on Moldova’s quality of 
democracy. Such conflicts are often exploited to mobilise societies and to 
justify emergency governance. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia 
have all used this tactic. But the Transnistria conflict has not led to any 
populist politician taking the banner of national reunification to 
                                                     
2 Lucan A. Way, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, 
No. 4, 2002, pp. 127-141.  
3 See http://economie.moldova.org/news/moldova-hooked-on-remittances-
114028-eng.html  
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marginalise domestic opposition, fight internal and external enemies or 
militarise and radicalise society. The Moldovan electorate is largely 
indifferent to the Transnistrian issue. Only 2% of the population think that 
Transnistria should be priority number one, and only 10% name 
Transnistria as a top three priority.4 In comparison, in Azerbaijan some 53% 
of the population name Nagorno-Karabakh as the first priority.5 In 
Moldova the Transnistrian conflict is ranked in 8th to 10th place of 
priorities in most opinion polls. The existence of a secessionist conflict has 
therefore not provided fertile ground or excuse for political centralisation 
as has been the case for most other post-Soviet countries facing secessionist 
challenges. This disengagement of the population from the Transnistrian 
issue has been facilitated by the lack of any significant number of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) (as is the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia), or 
spillover effects from the conflict, such as terrorist attacks across the 
country (Russia and Chechnya), and by the fact that the conflict does not 
pose any visible threat to the survival of the state (as is the case of 
Armenia). Certainly the government uses the issue of Transnistria to divert 
attention from other pressing problems. TV news and print media are 
dominated by news about Transnistria. However, such media distortions 
have only a limited impact on what society expects from their government. 
The Transnistrian issue played only a marginal role in the events of 2009 – 
other than being used by Russia to draw Voronin closer. 
External factors have perhaps been even more important as an 
explanation for Moldova’s relative political pluralism. External actors are 
more influential in Moldova than in any other CIS state. On issues such as 
external trade, public opinion, foreign policy orientation, remittances flows 
or geography – Moldova has been the CIS state most exposed to the 
European Union. Support for EU accession is the highest among the CIS 
states6 (though Georgia’s support for NATO and EU accession combined is 
higher). European Moldova does not have a shared border with Russia, but 
does have one with the EU. Over 50% of external trade is with the EU 
                                                     
4 Institute for Public Policy, Public Opinion Barometer, October 2008.  
5 Azerbaijan in 2007: sociological monitoring, Azerbaijan/Baku: Friedrich-Ebert-
Foundation, Brussels, 2008. 
6 See Nicu Popescu & Andrew Wilson, The Limits of Enlargement-lite: European and 
Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood, ECFR Policy Report, 2009, p. 28.  
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(among the other CIS states only Russia matches this number), and only 
around 15% is with Russia.7 And Russia’s share of Moldova’s trade has 
been in steady decline in recent years. Many Moldovan citizens (perhaps 
up to 200,000) hold Romanian passports, which makes them EU citizens 
able to travel and work in most of the EU. Moldova is also the only CIS 
state that is more dependent on remittances from its migrants in the EU 
than those in Russia. Migrants to the EU have also tended to have different 
political expectations and preferences than migrants to Russia.  
The idea of European integration is also an uncontested foreign 
policy objective for most societal groups. This gives the EU some traction 
with public opinion, and undermines the popularity of discourses 
modelled on ‘sovereign democracy’. In fact most citizens would rather see 
the EU govern Moldova than Moldovan political elites. In such an 
environment the government cannot contest the normative appeal of 
European values. It can only fake adherence to them and try to bandwagon 
on the popularity of the EU idea (as the Communists, let alone the other 
parties, actively do). In addition, the EU ambassadors to Moldova have 
been quite interventionist in criticising anti-democratic abuses. In June and 
December 2008 they published open letters in which they raised questions 
about the democratic credentials of the Communist government, especially 
the involvement of state institutions in the process of political competition, 
the pressures on independent media and the freedom of expression. During 
Moldova’s political turmoil in the aftermath of the April elections when the 
EU Special Representative on Moldova spent months mediating between 
the political parties, he was the only channel for dialogue between the 
competing political forces.  
Moldova’s immediate neighbours, both Romania and Ukraine, play 
an important role. Moldova’s small national media market is heavily 
penetrated by media from Russia, Romania and Ukraine. Thus, while local 
media is heavily biased in favour of the government, there is some degree 
of media pluralism. Russian TV channels exercise particular influence over 
the Moldovan public as they are among the most popular media outlets in 
the country. Putin has high approval ratings in Moldova, and many 
international events such as the August 2008 war in Georgia or the 
                                                     
7 In 2007, 50.6% of Moldovan exports went to the EU, which provided 45.6% of 
imports, compared to 17.3% of exports to Russia and imports from Russia of 13.5%. 
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Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in January 2009 are viewed through the prism of 
Russian interpretations. Thus one can talk of a certain degree of Russian 
soft power in Moldova. Due to tense Moldovan-Russian relations in 2004-
2007 over Transnistria, Russian media have been rather critical of the 
Communist Party, which has balanced its internal media dominance. In 
addition, some parts of the population are heavily exposed to Romanian 
media. Their number is much smaller than Russian TV viewers, but still 
this provided some further degree of pluralism. In fact, Romania’s 
President Traian Băsescu also enjoys high approval ratings in Moldova, less 
than Putin but higher than Voronin.  
Russia has, however, had less success in exporting the ideology of 
‘sovereign democracy’ or the practice of ‘political technology’ to Moldova. 
Local demand is also weak, particularly for the former. Neither Voronin 
nor Moldova’s chief ‘political technologist’ Mark Tkachiuk uses many of 
the ideological tropes of ‘sovereign democracy’. To an extent, the opposite 
has been true. The Communists had some success in copying the main 
themes and techniques of the Orange Revolution in their 2005 campaign. So 
did the opposition. This meant there was more to be gained politically from 
aping ‘Orange’ reformism than Putinist authoritarianism; but it also meant 
that a potential breakthrough effect to strengthen Moldovan democracy 
was weakened by dispersal across the political spectrum.8 
In 2009 Russia openly backed the Communists, and persuaded the far 
left parties to stand down. On the eve of the election Voronin held a 
summit with Russian president Medvedev; the Russian ministers for 
foreign affairs and economy came separately to Chişinău to express 
support for the governing party; and even the new Russian Patriarch Kirill 
held two widely publicised meetings with President Voronin in a show of 
support. During the post-election crackdown against the opposition, media 
and NGOs, Russia publicly expressed its support for the actions of the 
Moldovan government on numerous occasions. The threat of a broader 
rapprochement between an increasingly authoritarian Moldova and an 
increasingly friendly Russia helped re-energise the opposition. 
                                                     
8 Luke March & Graeme P Herd, “Moldova Between Europe and Russia: 
Inoculating Against the Colored Contagion?”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4, 
2006, pp. 349-379. 
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The limits of incremental authoritarianism  
Moldova has been so weak and poor as a state that it has been very 
dependent on international support for most of its existence. Requests for 
macroeconomic assistance from the IMF, or negotiation for trade access and 
grants from the EU have provided the international community with 
stronger leverage than in states like Ukraine or Azerbaijan, let alone Russia. 
Moldova has also always needed EU and US support for conflict settlement 
in Transnistria. Moldova could not go it alone in enforcing authoritarian 
rule, partly because of this external conditionality. The Communist 
government has always had to play a more careful balancing game in 
comparison to most other post-Soviet governments.  
However, despite relatively strong societal and economic links 
between the EU and Moldova, the April 2009 post-election crisis 
highlighted some of the limits of EU influence. As society became 
increasingly polarised after the looting of the parliament and the 
subsequent crackdown, the EU engaged in mediation between the 
opposition and government. However, it felt constrained in its ability to 
criticise anti-democratic abuses by the government for fear that this would 
make Moldova turn increasingly authoritarian and adopt a closer 
rapprochement with Russia. This showed the limits of EU transformative 
power and its ability to enforce conditionality when local semi-
authoritarian regimes feel that they have other foreign policy options 
should the EU become an ‘uncomfortable’ partner. 
In order to deflect EU pressures for democratisation, the Communist 
government has sought to play Russia against the EU. It has sought to 
extract benefits from cooperation with the EU for geopolitical reasons and 
via implicit threats to realign itself with Russia, rather than by 
implementing genuine reforms. This has partly undermined the power of 
EU conditionality and pressures, and has widened the political space for 
creeping authoritarianism. Thus the ultimate cause of democratic slippage 
have not been any normative challenge or Russian style sovereign 
democracy, but rather the fact that Voronin’s implicit threats to change 
Moldova’s foreign policy vector into a more-Russian stance have 
undermined the monopoly of EU pressures for democratisation, making 
them less effective than in the Western Balkans, or in countries like 
Slovakia under Mečiar. 
However, in the end the check on the policies of incremental 
authoritarianism of the Communist Party came from the Moldovan 
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electorate. External pressures, primarily from the EU, made Moldova’s 
slide into authoritarianism less pronounced than in most other post-Soviet 
states, but it was local voters that imposed the final check on the 
Communist Party by voting against it in July 2009. In short, internal and 
external factors have converged to prevent Moldova sliding into 
authoritarianism, but together they have also ensured that its pluralism 
remains fragile. 
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10. RUSSIA’S RESPONSE: SOVEREIGN 
DEMOCRACY STRIKES BACK 
ELENA KLITSOUNOVA 
his chapter assesses the interplay between internal and external 
factors that might help to understand why Russia sees itself as a 
democratic state but is seen by many commentators as a rising non-
democratic power. The chapter is not so much about political development 
within Russia as the issue of Russia’s response to Western democracy 
promotion policies towards the country and its neighbourhood.  
It has already become accepted practice to discuss the last eighteen 
years of Russia’s political development by comparing and contrasting 
trends during the two terms of President Yeltsin with those of the two 
terms of President Putin. For many working in democracy aid, the 
attractiveness of this comparative approach is that it allows them to 
construct a “democratisation – rollback” dichotomy and then use this 
dichotomy to assess the highly fluid process of Russia’s post-Soviet 
transition.  
The process of democratisation started in the years leading up to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transformation of Russia’s political 
system was very much part of (or even a trigger for) a domino-effect 
process of anticommunist breakthroughs in Eastern Europe. In the early 
1990s the country appeared to have made a decisive break with the past, 
starting afresh with a new political system. The Russian political system 
lacked many key attributes of a liberal democracy, and not so many within 
and outside Russia would consider Boris Yeltsin a perfect democrat. Yet, 
the country moved towards a political opening, featuring multiparty 
elections followed by an attempted democratic consolidation. In the official 
discourse of Yeltsin’s presidency, ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ were presented 
as examples of an advanced politico-economic model that Russia should 
T 
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adopt. Many in Russia were optimistic about the possibility of positive and 
rapid democratic change and the ability of the West to contribute positively 
to such change. Not surprisingly, at that time democracy assistance from 
the West was carried out with the approval (or at least with the 
indifference) of the Russian government.  
After a rocky reform period in the 1990s, Russia entered the new 
millennium with a new president, new political rhetoric, and a new 
political practice. Many power structures that shape political institutions 
and processes have since been dramatically changed. While Russia is still 
on a path to reform, from the very beginning Putin’s agenda has been more 
insistent on protecting Russia’s self-defined interests as well as on restoring 
the ability of central state agencies and actors (and of the office of the 
president in particular) to project authority across the whole country. As 
Dmitri Trenin puts it, “control was the key word of the Putin presidency”:1 
for the Russian leadership, in the hierarchy of political challenges facing 
Russia, centralisation and preserving control came before advancing 
pluralism.  
For the topic at hand it is also important to note that in the course of 
the 2000s Western political influence within Russia was severely reduced, 
both in rhetoric and in practice. The Russian leadership continuously 
insisted that Russia had made a “European choice”. Russia’s “European 
choice” and partnership with the West, however, emerged as a 
predominantly economic matter rather than one of political values and 
identity. From its very early days, Putin’s agenda on political reform was 
less committed to political rapprochement with the West than before: 
Putin’s political reforms were in the business of saving the Russian state, 
not recreating it in the image of foreign Western models.  
Pro-democracy and pro-Western rhetoric was replaced by the 
argument that, throughout the years of post-Soviet transition, the West 
often intervened in Russia’s internal affairs for purposes far removed from 
the promotion of democracy. Sensitivities about potential political 
manipulation and interference from abroad existed in Russia even in the 
1990s, when the country was surprisingly open to international political 
influence. By the beginning of Putin’s second term, it became clear how 
                                                     
1 Dmitri Trenin, “The Legacy of Vladimir Putin”, Current History, Russia and 
Eurasia, Vol. 106, No. 702, October 2007.  
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many Russian policy-makers remained deeply concerned about this issue 
and how many of them were dissatisfied with the formal and informal 
rules regulating how democracy aid was carried out in Russia. In 2006, 
Thomas Carothers already noted that: “the most systematic and forceful 
resistance to Western democracy aid has come from Russia”.2 
Just two of many factors contributing to this situation can be 
highlighted. First, it is a bitter irony that while the Russian leadership 
declared that it was working hard to accumulate power, large chunks of 
democracy aid to Russia, and even the aid directed at state institutions, 
were aimed at attempting further to distribute power, by trying to 
strengthen those parts of the state and society that may limit executive 
power. These two agendas clashed, and aid promoters lost opportunities 
either to appeal to the Russian government for support or to advance their 
top-down programmes. Over time, it also became clear that they did not 
succeed in adjusting aid programmes to the dramatically changing 
circumstances. Certainly, some aid providers tried to respond to the new 
situation by putting more focus on a primarily bottom-up approach. But 
the majority of them seemed to prefer to cut democracy aid programmes, 
arguing that neither the Russian government not the public was interested 
in far-reaching changes.  
Second, the Kremlin saw the 2003-05 wave of so-called ‘colour 
revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan not as a breakthrough in 
democracy but rather as regime change sponsored by the West in order to 
advance geopolitically into the post-Soviet space – and Russia’s immediate 
neighbourhood.3 And for many in Russia, the radicalism and extremism of 
these revolutions looked to be traumatic political experiences that the 
country would better to avoid in order to stay on a route of gradualist and 
moderate political change.4  
                                                     
2 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”, Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2006.  
3 Leonid Gankin, “Nizkopoklonstvo pered Vostokom” [Kowtowing to the East], 
Kommersant, 24 February 2005. 
4 For an example of this line of argumentation, see the text of the interview of 
President Putin to the Slovakian TV channel CTB on 22 February 2005 (available at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/02/22/2118_type63379_84394.shtml).  
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The ‘colour revolutions’ seem to have been the turning point in the 
Kremlin’s attitude toward international democracy assistance. From that 
point, Russian policy-makers started to invest more in developing policies 
aimed, firstly, to reduce Western political influence within Russia and, 
secondly, to re-assert Russia’s political influence within its post-Soviet 
neighbourhood. Russia’s 6-8% economic growth, largely based on the 
unprecedented rapid rise in hydrocarbon revenue since 2003, as well as the 
monopolisation of control over major economic assets in the country, 
provided the Kremlin with favourable conditions with which to play out 
this scenario. 
Within Russia, the centralisation of state institutions has intensified in 
proportion to the leadership’s efforts to design institutional arrangements 
that would control the links between state and society and channel societal 
demands in carefully managed directions. In the field of party politics, 
more and more deliberate efforts were invested into making institutional 
changes which would weaken everyone but the dominant pro-presidential 
United Russia party. Other parties were co-opted into the formal or 
informal hierarchy of the Russian government or marginalised, thus losing 
their role as influential political actors.5 With regard to the NGO sector, the 
Kremlin’s plans also became noticeably more ambitious during Putin’s 
second presidential term. Putin’s administration started to deal with NGOs 
in a more proactive manner and established several new institutions to 
serve as forums for both government and NGOs. As a result, the “public 
councils and chambers” boom hit Russian regions and ministers in 2004-
2006. In addition, those ‘policy intellectuals’ who supported the Kremlin 
advanced the idea of the importance of developing networks of ‘friendly’ 
NGOs as well as of offering the third sector in Russia larger amounts of 
domestically-sourced funding. 
At the same time, the Russian leadership repeatedly stressed that it 
strongly opposed the foreign funding of Russian political activities. The 
‘NGO law’ of 2006 – arguably the strongest and most widely discussed 
incarnation of this approach – was just part of the broader reform package 
aimed at introducing amendments to the Civil Code, the law on non-profit 
                                                     
5 Vladimir Gelman, “From Feckless Pluralism to Dominant Party Politics: The 
Transformation of Russia’s Party Sustem”, Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 545-
561.  
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organisations, the law on public associations, and the law on closed 
administrative territorial formations. The entire reform package was 
relevant to regulating the work of both Russian and international NGOs 
and dramatically changed the environment in which aid promoters 
operated: it provided Russian governmental agencies with many new 
opportunities to exert tighter control over foreign assistance aimed at 
developing NGOs within the country. Finally, on the rhetorical level, since 
early 2006 Putin’s administration started to promote the concept of 
‘sovereign democracy’ – the notion that the form and functioning of 
Russia’s political system must be determined by Russian citizens 
themselves.6 
In short, the leadership’s objective was to continue a Kremlin-
designed trajectory of political reforms while making the country less 
susceptible to Western leverage – and to do all this without losing the 
state’s international standing. In Russian official discourse the country’s 
preferable political system is still described as a democracy – at first 
“managed democracy” and then “sovereign democracy”. In practice, in the 
course of the 2000s, the Kremlin has managed, through a succession of 
skilful manoeuvres, first to weaken any system of checks and balances 
against presidential power and then to build a dominant party-based non-
competitive political system in the country,7 a system that has proved 
stable even during the 2008-09 economic recession.  
Outside Russia, Kremlin policy-makers faced the daunting task of 
keeping, and in some cases returning, Russia’s political leverage over its 
immediate neighbours. Part of the Kremlin’s more assertive policy towards 
its post-Soviet neighbourhood undoubtedly stemmed from its belief in the 
need to counterbalance the rhetoric and practice of ‘democratic 
transformation’ as pushed by the Bush administration –rhetoric and 
practice which, in Russia’s view, were instrumental in promoting American 
                                                     
6 Vladislav Surkov, “The Nationalization of the Future”, Expert, Vol. 43, No. 537, 20 
November 2006.  
7 Thomas F. Remington, “Putin, the Parliament, and the Party System”, in Dale R. 
Herspring (ed.), Putin’s Russia: Past imperfect, future uncertain, 3rd ed., Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, pp. 53-73; Vladimir Gelman, “Party Politics in Russia: 
From Competition to Hierarchy”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008, 
pp. 913-930.  
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unilateralism, undermining Russia’s position, and transforming the 
regional balance of power.8  
After many years of almost total neglect of foreign policy in the post-
Soviet domain, Russia found itself in a highly competitive environment, 
where political and policy ideas sponsored by the West invigorated the 
post-Soviet space and seemed to find supporters among Russia’s 
neighbours. Some scholars have noted that the ‘colour revolutions’ marked 
“a crisis of legitimacy for Russian influence in the former Soviet Union”9 
and sent out the message that the Kremlin’s ‘soft power’10 had been in 
decline.  
The Russian leadership, however, was able to pull together a quick 
response. It committed substantial resources to developing ‘soft power’ 
infrastructure to project and protect Russian influence beyond its borders. 
In 2005, the international television network “Russia Today” was set up “to 
improve Russia’s image in the world”. The same year, the directorate for 
interregional and cultural ties with foreign countries was established 
within the presidential administration of Russia, to deal mainly with the 
challenges in Russia’s post-Soviet neighbourhood. Pro-Kremlin policy 
intellectuals began to advocate the need to exert Russian influence in the 
post-Soviet space through forging relations and tactical alliances with a 
wide range of legitimate political parties and NGOs in neighbouring 
countries.11 Noticeable investments were made in NGO infrastructure 
within and outside Russia, and organisations started mushrooming in the 
                                                     
8 For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between Bush and Putin 
administrations, see Hans-Joachim Spanger, Between Ground Zero and Square One, 
How George W. Bush Failed on Russia, PRIF Reports, No. 82, Frankfurt, 2008.  
9 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2009: 295. 
10 Joseph Nye defines “soft power” as a state’s “ability to attract others by the 
legitimacy of its policies and the values that underlie them” together with the 
“ability to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment”. Joseph Nye, 
“The Decline of America’s Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.  
11 Gleb Pavlovky, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Space 
(http://www.kreml.org/other/77935249).  
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region with Russian support.12 It would seem that Russian policy-makers 
have learned the lesson and are eager to continue developing the country’s 
soft power infrastructure. Elected in May 2008, President Medvedev not 
only openly declared Russia’s desire to have its own sphere of influence 
and responsibility, but also set up a Federal Agency for the Commonwealth 
of Independent States’ Affairs, which will engage in international 
humanitarian cooperation and contacts with compatriots. According to its 
creators, Russia “has every resource to expand its influence in the 
Commonwealth using peaceful methods”, and the organisation is to 
become an analogue of the American USAID, promoting Russia’s influence 
in the near abroad through active cooperation with NGOs. 
Yet, while Russian soft power instruments may predominate on 
paper in a wide variety of policy areas, they seem to lack power in practice. 
The Georgian crisis of August 2008 clearly showed Russia’s limited ability 
to expand influence over its immediate neighbours by pulling only on the 
levers of soft power. And the situation is likely to become even more 
complicated in the near future. As a result of the crisis, the Russian cabinet 
has already announced budget cuts, so establishing and expanding new 
areas of external aid on a shrinking budget will be extremely difficult. 
At the moment, some institutional features of Russia’s political model 
seem to be attractive to quite a number of regimes in the post-Soviet region. 
Moscow’s impetuous rebellion against the “intervention of democracy 
promoters” seems to be viewed with some sympathy in many post-Soviet 
capitals. Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate Russia’s political 
attractiveness. With a younger generation of politicians soon to come to 
power, Russia’s leadership is likely to lose a large part of its capital of 
personalised relationships with post-Soviet political elites. The ongoing 
world economic crisis may dramatically change the structures of interest 
and power in the region and thus undermine the effectiveness and 
attractiveness of non-competitive political regimes. And last but not least, 
the EU’s serious attempts at projecting its own political influence far 
beyond its borders may also change the expectations of political actors 
populating the EU-Russia common neighbourhood.  
                                                     
12 For more detailed information, see Nicu Popescu, Russia Soft Power Ambitions, 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 115, CEPS, Brussels, October 2006.  
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Certainly, in years to come Russian leaders will have to decide what 
they are willing to stake to maintain their influence in the face of growing 
European criticism of Russian policies in the shared EU-Russian 
neighbourhood. While Russia’s support or opposition to the various 
governments in its surroundings seems to be instrumental in bolstering the 
country’s economic and security interests, European policy-makers argue 
for the urgent need to counter-balance what they fear is a coherent Russian 
‘anti-democratic’ foreign policy.  
In short, these competing visions13 have already left their mark on the 
relations between Moscow and Brussels, which are now more distant and 
mistrustful of one another than at any time since the beginning of the EU-
Russia dialogue. These divergent views are also likely further to complicate 
relations between Russia and those of its neighbours that have signed up 
for Europeanisation through joining the Eastern Partnership. Thus, one of 
the many challenges that Russian policy-makers will have to face is how to 
establish a long-term basis for the stability and continuity of Russia’s 
political influence in the post-Soviet region in the face of an advancing 
European neighbourhood policy.  
Conclusion 
The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a dramatic shift in Russia’s 
approach towards the Western policy of democracy promotion. At the 
beginning of the drift Russia’s leadership welcomed this policy in the hope 
that it would result in Russia’s modernisation and integration into the 
Western political system. The second half of the decade saw Russia’s key 
policy-makers exhibiting an almost allergic reaction to any sign of 
democratisation pressure on their country or its immediate neighbourhood. 
In the view of the Russian leadership, too many cases of democracy 
promotion had become deeply intertwined with both a hazardous regime 
change and a dangerous transformation of balance of power in the region. 
The Kremlin’s negative response to democracy promotion therefore came 
                                                     
13 For a detailed analysis of the discursive asymmetry between Russia and the EU, 
see Andrey Makarychev, “Neighbours, Exceptions and the Political: A Vocabulary 
of EU-Russia Inter-subjective (Dis)connections”, in Michael Emerson (ed.), The 
Elephant and the Bear Try Again: Options for a New Agreement between the EU and 
Russia, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2006, pp. 15-40.  
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from both inside and outside Russia: Russian policy-makers started to 
make more serious efforts to develop policies aimed, first, to reduce 
Western political influence within Russia and, second, to re-assert Russia’s 
political influence within its post-Soviet neighbourhood. 
The window of opportunity to engage Russia in political reforms 
along the lines of Western templates in the 1990s and 2000s has now closed. 
The Russian leadership has sought to regain self-confidence and establish 
long-term bases for the stability and continuity of a dominant party-based 
non-competitive political regime. In view of this, US and EU policy-makers 
have completely failed in their policy towards Russia. Moreover, the 
Western obsession with democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space 
grew commensurate to Moscow’s anxiety to counterbalance this policy, 
which was viewed as instrumental in serving the US and the EU’s security 
and economic needs. For its part, Russia’s efforts to re-assert influence over 
its immediate neighbours caused many in the West to see Russia as a rising 
anti-democratic power. As a result, Russia is now more distanced from 
both the US and the EU in its foreign policy than at any time since the 
beginning of the millennium. Finding a way out of this trap needs 
substantive efforts from actors on all sides.  
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11. AZERBAIJAN: POWER IN THE 
PETRO-STATE 
LEILA ALIEVA 
zerbaijan has emerged as an independent post-Soviet state bearing 
many of the legacies of the other former Soviet republics, but with 
a few peculiarities, the most notable of which is its abundant oil 
and gas resources. The EU’s democracy promotion policies have not taken 
into account the extent to which the oil factor has impeded reform, nor 
have they succeeded in separating energy interests from the larger 
democracy agenda in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s use of oil wealth to obtain 
legitimacy, both externally and internally, coupled with the legacy of Soviet 
institutions, and the failure of international donors to temper the obstacle 
of oil, have all contributed to the parlous state of freedoms in the country. 
The failure of democratic forces to adjust strategies to counteract the ruling 
regime’s clientelistic use of energy resources has further consolidated 
autocracy. 
Oil revenues and democracy 
Democracy promotion became even more difficult after 2003, when 
presidential elections were held following the death of President Heidar 
Aliyev. The rise in world oil prices from $11 per barrel in 1998 to $140 in 
2008 increased the flow of revenue to the country and deepened the 
political interests of external actors. The issue of succession became highly 
critical for all actors involved – both internal and external. Many favoured 
the continuation of the status quo out of fear that developments would 
otherwise put oil contracts and exploration deals at risk. The scenario of the 
‘appointed’ successor was also favoured as a measure against the possible 
instability of a redistribution of resources. As a true autocrat, Aliyev had 
not allowed the emergence of any one political figure in his surrounding 
A 
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circle capable of demonstrating leadership capabilities. As the state’s 
ownership of the country’s oil resources provided informal control over the 
energy sector by the president and his family, hereditary succession to 
Aliyev’s son Ilham became the ‘natural’ scenario.  
The significantly flawed presidential election of 2003 caused a split in 
the team of OSCE observers. Some 135 observers refused to sign the 
favourable assessment of the rest of the observer team and demonstrated 
outside the OSCE office in Warsaw in protest. The unprecedented use of 
state violence against the protesters, during which one person died and 
hundreds more were arrested, was met with silence from the EU and the 
US, both of which recognised the election results. Norwegian Ambassador 
Steinar Gil’s protest at the election violence was a lone voice among 
Western democracies. Despite of the fact that elections were at least as 
manipulated as in neighbouring Armenia and Georgia, the reaction to the 
violence by Western democracies was much milder in the case of 
Azerbaijan. 
The inaugural speech of the new President Ilham Aliyev sent a clear 
message to both local and foreign actors that he would continue with the 
policies started by his father. Taking into account a trend of increasing 
control over the economy, politics and the media, which characterised the 
final years of the late President Aliyev’s rule, this sounded discouraging. 
The message was that there would be no significant departure from 
existing oil policies or the politically-motivated redistribution of resources.  
Ilham Aliyev inherited a rather stable regime, based on the political 
patronage created by his father, which he had to ‘re-fill’ with the oil 
revenues. The lack of any degree of power diffusion during the 
parliamentary elections in 2005 meant that the increasing inflow of oil 
revenues allowed the new leader to strengthen the system of patronage. 
The national budget increased tenfold, from $1.2 billion in 2003 to $12 
billion in 2008.  
Some of Ilham Aliyev’s government’s initiatives deserved 
international praise, such as its joining the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative and the creation of the State Oil Fund in 2003. But 
the use of the country’s oil revenues to strengthen the network of political 
patronage trumped economically rational considerations. State investment 
went into mega-construction projects, and was easily misappropriated. Oil 
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revenues were distributed to the ministries as the primary power base of 
the regime, creating a “budget within the budget”.1 Patronage was 
extended through raising police salaries and through special stipends, 
pensions and awards for the loyal representatives of the intellectual, 
cultural and sporting elite. Resources were also spent on the creation of 
museums, parks and hospitals – named after the family members of the 
president in all regions of the republic. The accumulation of oil revenues in 
the nine years from December 1999 to January of 2009 amounted to $20 
billion. Almost half of this was spent in the period between 2003 and 
January 2009, or in only five years.2 
While diligently building the state institutions required by European 
organisations and US agencies, among them the Council of Europe, OSCE, 
and the various agencies of the USAID, the authorities continued to exert 
pressure on the opposition and the independent media. Major opposition 
parties such as the Musavat and the Popular Front, along with one of the 
leading opposition newspapers, “Azadlyq,” were deprived of their offices 
in central Baku. The arrests and harassment of journalists became more 
frequent, confirmed by the observation of the media monitoring group the 
Turan agency, in election years. The editors of the three most popular 
opposition newspapers, “Azadlyq,” “Gundelik Azerbaijan” and “Realnii 
Azerbaijan” were imprisoned, along with two other journalists. The editor 
of the popular critical journal “Monitor”, Elmar Huseynov, was killed in 
2005.  
Politically, foreign policy choices such as resistance to Russian 
pressure, increased the leadership’s sense of self-importance and served as 
a source of legitimacy. In terms of geopolitics, being at the centre of 
competition between regional powers such as Russia and Iran, increased 
the value of the country in the eyes of the West and afforded more room for 
manoeuvre in which to resist democracy.  
This particular understanding of priorities in the country’s relations 
with the EU and the US influenced policy choices in several situations, such 
as the suppression of public protests. Unlike in Georgia or Ukraine, the 
attempts at ‘velvet’ revolution were met with brute force. Politically, this 
                                                     
1 Azer Mehdiyev, “Oil Revenues and the State Spending”, Entrepreneurship 
Development Foundation, Information Bulletin No. 2, Baku, 2007.  
2 Interview with Ilham Shaban, economic expert, Baku, 15.02.09. 
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bolstered a perception by the leadership that it could always ‘get away’ 
with the use of violence. The preference of the ruling elite for ‘evolution’ 
rather than ‘revolution’ was shared by almost all external actors. Even 
George Soros, after meeting with President Ilham Aliyev in 2005, spoke to 
the local press about the impossibility of such revolutions in Azerbaijan.  
The fear of undermining the status quo in Azerbaijan on the part of 
the US and European actors was most evident when a group of public 
activists and media journalists presented an initiative to create an 
independent TV channel prior to the 2005 parliamentary election. Although 
at first supportive, when it came to implementation foreign agencies 
withdrew their promises to finance the project. 
Mobilisation strategies 
How much did the failure of opposition and civil society activists to 
mobilise the electorate contribute to the decline of democracy in 
Azerbaijan? The issue is one that engenders intense debate. Unlike in 
neighbouring Georgia, Azerbaijan’s opposition had few charismatic 
leaders. The consistent failure of the opposition to counter the state 
machinery of falsification gradually contributed to a decline in their 
popularity. There has been a discrepancy between the voters’ support for 
the opposition, on the one hand, and the latter’s inability to provide voters 
with strategies to protect their votes, on the other hand. The opposition 
became discouraged by the clear message from all powers, both regional 
and extra-regional, that there was no sufficient incentive to support change. 
The high expectations of the opposition, supported by the broad ‘protest 
electorate’ that the ‘Aliyev era’ was over, proved unfounded.  
The opposition miscalculated the power of the regime and its 
monopoly over oil resources. High economic dependency of citizens on the 
state militated against protest. Even the representatives of small- and 
medium-sized business, which could form the power base for liberal 
parties, were vulnerable to having their businesses shut down by the 
authorities if they were spotted in demonstrations or supporting the 
opposition. The arrests of two senior officials on the eve of the 2005 
election, Minister of Health Ali Insanov and Economic Development 
Minister Farhad Aliyev (no relation to President Aliyev), showed how 
ruthless the authorities were towards all possible dissent or opposition 
from within the government. The government’s reaction to opposition, the 
limited access to jobs for members of the opposition and their families and 
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the absence of significant independent economic classes, set Azerbaijan’s 
political conditions apart from those of Ukraine or Georgia. Recruitment 
among the emerging class of young entrepreneurs was also complicated, as 
very few were ready to give up their jobs, status, or levels of comfort to 
place themselves at risk of imprisonment or of losing their jobs, like 
members of a ‘traditional’ opposition.  
Civil society was another factor differentiating Azerbaijan from 
Georgia or Ukraine. Azerbaijan civil society, which was on the rise in the 
early 1990s, did not receive Western support in the same way as it did in 
Georgia. In fact, Azerbaijan received three times less aid for institution-
building than neighbouring states. The lack of funding for NGOs meant 
that young people educated abroad, who were one of the critical factors of 
political change in other republics, were recruited by the oil companies or 
international organisations, which ensured their isolation from the social 
movement as a whole. 
EU policies 
After the end of the cold war, the EU was slower than other regional 
powers to become involved in the South Caucasus, not least because of its 
‘realist’ approach to foreign affairs, prioritising Russia at the expense of the 
three South Caucasus states. The competition between the Iranian-Islamic, 
the Russian-autocratic and the Turkish-secular democratic models was 
clearly overshadowed by other, more pragmatic aspects of EU foreign 
policy. With the delay in Turkish integration into the EU, the coming to 
power of the AKP in Turkey and the weakening of its influence as a beacon 
of westernisation in the post-cold war Caucasus, the fate of democracy 
mainly depended on the political support for reforms and the amount, 
direction and timing of aid from the US and Europe.  
In spite of the shift in EU policy towards its neighbours, with 
numerous initiatives and programmes implemented in the Black Sea states 
and the South Caucasus, the EU has not yet become a significant actor in 
Azerbaijan – despite an increasing volume of trade. By excluding any real 
prospects of membership, the EU offers few integration options to the 
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country resisting Iranian and Russian influence.3 In addition, the EU’s aid 
policy did not take into account the influence of oil resources on the state 
and democracy building. The aid policies of the EU and the US did little to 
target the ‘oil curse’ problem. On the contrary, the representatives of 
Western aid agencies and institutions would even justify a lesser amount of 
aid to Azerbaijan’s civil society due to the availability of rich natural 
resources. 
On the other hand, ‘the strong state first’ approach to the Caucasus 
region seems to have taken over policy circles in Brussels and Washington, 
in particular after the failure of Yeltsin’s democratisation efforts in Russia. 
All this, along with the interest in alternative energy resources and 
diversified transport routes, has meant that stability at any expense has 
been preferred over other scenarios leading to change.  
The EU’s principal methodological dilemma towards democracy 
promotion in the oil rich state is to separate, in its policies and instruments, 
the resistance to change among the small group of elite controlling 
resources from the nation’s broader aspirations for change. Finding a 
solution to this dilemma would increase the EU’s weight as an actor in the 
international arena, and in areas of vital importance, such as the Caspian 
basin.  
Political responses to the economic crisis 
Not unlike other resource-dependent economies, the Azerbaijani economy 
is vulnerable to external shocks. Analysts and observers have tried to 
anticipate the political responses to the decline of oil production expected 
to start in 2011. The International Crisis Group (ICG), in its report on the 
Nagorno Karabagh conflict,4 even warned of the possibility of Azerbaijan 
launching a war around 2011 to distract public attention from the 
hardships associated with economic decline. 
                                                     
3 “A Future Vision of the Caucasus Caspian Region and its European Dimension”, 
Caspian Caucasus Commission, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 2007 
(http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_113.pdf).  
4 International Crisis Group, Nagorno Karabagh: Risking War, Europe Report No. 
157, 14 November 2007. 
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Azerbaijan’s GDP shrank 2.6% between January 2008 and January 
2009, according to the country’s State Statistical Committee. Officials, 
however, denied that the crisis would have any significant impact on the 
economy, due to the flow of petro-dollars. Independent experts point to the 
real reasons why the effects of the world crisis are delayed, which is due to 
the mainly ‘closed’ and informal character of the economy. The anticipated 
effect of the rapid spending of oil revenues and income from the informal 
economy, putting pressure on the consumer market that will lead to the 
natural fall in consumer prices, as the experts suggest, might be used in an 
official propaganda effort to strengthen the regime. But this decline will 
also be accompanied by a rise in unemployment.  
The referendum on changes to the constitution of the Azerbaijan 
Republic can also be viewed as a political response to the economic shocks, 
both ongoing and expected, in the coming years, including a fall in world 
oil prices, the decline in oil production and the negative effects of the global 
financial crisis on the country. Among other proposed constitutional 
changes, the key measure is to lift the presidential two-term limits, which 
would legally secure the durability of the current regime for unlimited 
periods of time. 
Yet, it will be hard to prevent social unrest if the government does 
not reform its self-interested economic policies, which are characterised by 
rampant corruption. An unlimited presidential term will also give rise to 
radical and extremist movements. For example, the reports of the interior 
ministry about discoveries of vast stores of illegal arms in the region have 
become more frequent. A resort to war as a means of distracting attention 
from domestic problems cannot be excluded. Although the probability is 
low, the fact that Armenian forces still occupy Nagorno Karabagh, in the 
eyes of general public this would justify an attempt to go to war. The most 
recent opinion polls confirm that the Karabagh issue tops the ratings of the 
most urgent problems in Azerbaijan. 
Conclusions 
The case of Azerbaijan is a good illustration of the concept of the ‘resource 
curse’, or ‘paradox of plenty’. At the same time, it also shows that this is not 
simply the influence of oil resources as a structural factor determining an 
inevitably unfavourable scenario for democracy-building. Rather it is the 
result of a combination of structural effects, rational policy choices, the use 
of oil as a political tool, the defective mobilisation strategies of the 
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opposition and civil society, and the mis-design of external aid to the 
country.  
Oil revenues contribute to the asymmetry between state and society, 
as such enormous resources are only at the disposal of the small group in 
control of oil and of the economy in general, as opposed to under-funded 
civil society and opposition forces; a situation aggravated by 
miscalculations about the far-reaching influence of oil in the strategies of 
the latter. 
For the EU, Azerbaijan may well become a test case for the 
development of new democracy promotion policies and instruments in 
states with such a structural obstacle as oil wealth. Europe cannot afford to 
‘lose’ Azerbaijan, not just because of its importance as an energy producer, 
but due to its traditions of modernisation and Europeanisation. There is 
significant reform potential, including a secular and educated population, a 
civil society, a liberal opposition and, in spite of the unfavourable 
conditions for the development of freedoms, independent journalists, 
lawyers, a number of other institutions and strong European aspirations. 
Reform would require two major adjustments in Azerbaijan. A 
distinction needs to be more clearly recognised between the structural 
resistance to reform of the oil-controlling elite and the openness of the 
majority to reform. The interest-based policies of the EU also need to be 
separated from the values-based, democracy promotion policies. The 
calibrated and compensatory nature of aid, directed at neutralising the 
asymmetry of the state versus society, needs to send clear political 
messages about the seriousness of democracy promotion, conveying high 
expectations in this regard to Azerbaijan as one of the ways of increasing 
the effectiveness of the EU in the East.  
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12.  KAZAKHSTAN: 
MODERNISATION FIRST  
NEIL J. MELVIN 
ince independence, Kazakhstan has been led by President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev – the former First Party Secretary of the Kazakh 
Republican Communist Party during the Soviet era. President 
Nazarbaev has forged a strong form of presidential rule. The political 
dominance of the president – backed by the security agencies and 
important economic and political actors – has led to the marginalisation of 
political opposition and tightly constrained opportunities to criticise the 
ruling regime. The political order in Kazakhstan is generally viewed as 
authoritarian and is subject to criticism for violations of human rights and 
for failing to meet its international commitments in the area of democracy.  
The reality of centralised political power in Kazakhstan, the 
importance of the country for the international community due to its 
abundant energy resources and the geopolitical significance attached to 
Kazakhstan by the Russian Federation, by China and by the West, means 
that promoting democratisation by seeking to ensure that the country 
abides by its international commitments is unlikely to succeed. Those 
seeking to promote democratisation from outside inevitably face 
opposition from the domestic authorities. At the same time, the political 
support and alternative opportunities available to Kazakhstan through its 
relationships to Russia and China, among others, will mean that the 
international community will lack the necessary consensus to press change 
on the country. 
The situation in Kazakhstan, and indeed Eurasia more broadly, over 
the last decade suggests that earlier approaches to encouraging 
democratisation are unlikely to succeed. Something new is required. This 
approach should aim to combine social and economic progress with 
S 
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political reform. That is, democratisation will ultimately have to come from 
within Kazakhstan, rather than being introduced from the outside world. 
This is not to suggest that the international community cannot provide 
effective democracy assistance. Rather, it is to be realistic about what that 
assistance can achieve on its own. In promoting a new approach to 
democratisation in Kazakhstan, the European Union has a key role to play.  
Building a presidential political order  
As was the case with the other former Soviet Central Asian republics, the 
liberalisation of political power that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union proved somewhat brief. Within the first few years of independence, 
the leadership of Kazakhstan moved to assert centralised control over the 
country and to weaken and then destroy all sources of serious opposition. 
The initial political challenge was to prevent the emergence of an 
ethnic-based political movement focused upon the non-Kazakh and 
Russian-speaking communities concentrated in the north, the east and in 
the capital, Almaty. In the first decade of independence, ethno-political 
movements were demobilised through manipulation of elections and the 
Constitution, and through the creation of institutions to manage ethnicity 
(the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan). Leaders of the Slavic 
movement were harassed and even violently attacked. Eventually they left 
politics or emigrated. Later, ethnicity was depoliticised as the ruling elite 
promoted ‘the Kazakh model of interethnic relations’ built upon the 
paternal role of the president as the arbiter of all issues and protector of 
ethnic communities. 
Parallel to the drive to undermine ethno-political movements, the 
ruling elite in Kazakhstan moved to marginalise and then eliminate other 
forms of opposition. Laws on political parties were adopted ensuring that 
opposition forces found it difficult to organise and impossible to effectively 
contest elections. The ruling group increasingly turned to the OTAN party 
(now Nur OTAN) of the president, built on the patronage power of the 
executive. The Constitution was revised to enable President Nazarbaev to 
remain in power unencumbered by term limits. Restrictions on the media 
were tightened. By the end of the 1990s, significant challenges for political 
power from outside the ruling elite had ceased. Thus, in the parliamentary 
election of August 2007, Kazakhstan became a one-party state – although 
de facto power had long been monopolised under the presidency. 
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While Kazakhstan is an authoritarian political order, the country 
presents something of a paradox within the context of Central Asia.1 
Kazakhstan is more open than most of its neighbours. Indeed, the 
concentration of political power at the centre of the Kazakhstani political 
order and in the person of the president was not the only story of the first 
two decades of independence. Kazakhstan followed a relatively liberal 
form of economic development, promoting the private sector and 
encouraging a dispersal of economic resources, as well as seeking 
integration into the global economy. Thus, even though the state has 
remained the key economic actor in Kazakhstan, a variety of individuals 
and groups - at the regional and national level - have acquired significant 
resources. 
Further, while the presidential system of power dominates the 
country, it is not a monolithic or entirely stable order. There are limits on 
the power of the regime and it cannot act with total impunity. Concerned 
about Russia’s reaction if the Kazakhstani state were to clamp down on the 
predominately non-ethnic Kazakh northern and eastern provinces, 
Nazarbaev has been unable to extend centralised control into all corners of 
Kazakhstan. While the president has marginalised opposition, he has not 
been able to eliminate its sources. Kazakhstan continues to be animated by 
struggles articulated by regionally-based interests, patronage and loyalty 
networks (often involving familial elements) and business concerns. 
As a result of these struggles, there are spaces for criticism, although 
carefully circumscribed. The media, notably the newspapers, provide 
opportunities for restricted forms of debate. There are openings in the 
Kazakhstani regime to promote new agendas, provided these elements do 
not challenge the established order in the country directly. On occasion, 
factional struggles spill over into direct challenges to the political regime. 
In 2001, the country experienced an important impulse for political 
change in the form of the drive by a technocratic group of regional 
politicians and businessmen to promote a rival political movement – the 
Democratic Choice for Kazakhstan. Although such initiatives have, to date, 
been contained, such events highlight the complex power dynamics in 
Kazakhstan. The authoritarian order that was forged under President 
                                                     
1 Freedom House categorises Kazakhstan as a “consolidated authoritarian regime”. 
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009. 
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Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan is thus different in important ways from those in 
the neighbouring Central Asian states.2  
Democratisation in Kazakhstan 
Although there are spaces for liberalism in Kazakhstan, the prospects of a 
process of democratisation emerging currently appear unpromising. While 
the current leadership is prepared to entertain, on occasion, a very limited 
and controlled opening up of the country, this times-often seems aimed 
more at countering international criticism than because of a genuine 
commitment to political change.  
The failure to promote real political change raises questions about the 
international approach to this issue. In Kazakhstan, the international 
community has been strongly concerned with the monitoring of elections 
and support for the creation of democratic institutions. The focus has been 
on strengthening legislation, efforts to reform the judiciary and parliament, 
to create political parties and so forth. There has been some progress in 
these efforts, but reform has generally been limited and subject to reversal 
as the political wind changes.  
This strategy has increasingly been a source of tension and even 
anger, not just in Kazakhstan but more broadly in Eurasia. It has been 
challenged as ‘interference in internal affairs’ and ‘regime change’. 
Opposition to this approach to fostering political change has been one of 
the contributory factors of the political marginalisation of the OSCE. The 
fierce challenge to this model of democracy promotion in Eurasia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has led some to conclude that it had run its 
course by the beginning of the 21st century.3  
What is needed is an approach more tailored to the realities of 
contemporary Kazakhstan. In the past, the international community has 
largely failed to engage its democracy promoting efforts with an 
indigenous and deep-seated movement in this direction, despite providing 
                                                     
2 Neil J. Melvin, “Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparative Analysis 
of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan”, in Yaacov Roi (ed.), 
Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia, London: Frank Cass, 2004, pp. 119-42. 
3 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002. 
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substantial support for fledgling civil society. An approach to democracy 
promotion that acknowledges the key role of socio-economic dimensions to 
the process of democratisation is likely to have a far greater prospect of 
success in Kazakhstan.  
Recently, authors have developed new insights into the key role that 
modernisation – urbanisation, rising levels of education and of income – 
plays in promoting mass political participation.4 Noting that in recent years 
the world has moved from a period of democratic boom to one of 
democratic recession, some analysts have concluded that is because it is 
unrealistic to assume that democratic institutions can be set up in all 
circumstances. Instead, democracy is far more likely to emerge and take 
root under certain favourable conditions.  
Socio-economic modernisation is therefore seen to be a key 
development in the promotion of broad political participation. Integration 
into the world economy is also important, bringing with it growth and the 
foundations of modernisation; primarily the creation of middle classes that 
press for liberal democracy – although other social groups, such as trade 
unions, can also be important. This revised theory of modernisation 
challenges past assumptions. Industrialisation does not lead automatically 
to democracy; modernisation is not linear. But there are key political 
moments – ‘inflexion points’ – when world views are changed. These 
changes bring with them the development of greater individualism and 
greater tolerance of difference. 
The EU and democratisation in Kazakhstan 
The EU has gradually developed its engagement with Kazakhstan. The 
country has been the hub of European activities in Central Asia since an EU 
delegation opened in the country in 1994. In 1999, Kazakhstan was among 
the first of the states in the region to conclude a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with the EU. In December 2006, Kazakhstan and 
the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Energy. Kazakhstan is also a partner country in the EU-supported Baku 
Initiative. 
                                                     
4 Ronald Inglehart & Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: 
What We Know About Modernization”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009. 
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In 2007, the European Union launched the initiative “The EU and 
Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”. The Strategy was 
subsequently elaborated through national priority documents agreed with 
the governments. The Strategy contains important commitments to 
democracy in the region. Democratisation issues are reportedly raised by 
the EU in bilateral political contacts, through the human rights dialogue 
and via the principal assistance programmes within the Strategy, which 
concern education, water and the rule of law. 
Despite the overt commitment to promoting democracy in its 
engagement in Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia, the EU Strategy in 
fact lacks clear political focus and does not offer a way to reconcile and 
prioritise the broad and often contradictory aims of the Strategy itself. The 
relatively small amount of assistance available for the region under the 
European Commission Indicative Programme 2007-10 within the context of 
the Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the period 2007-2013, also 
means that the resources for democracy promotion are meagre. 
The way in which the EU has approached democracy promotion in 
Central Asia has been strongly criticised, with some commentators seeing 
the EU as selling out on its democracy commitments for the sake of energy 
interests in the region.5 To date, there has been relatively weak 
coordination between the political strategy of stronger engagement and the 
agenda of promoting democracy. Many policy-makers within the EU seem 
to have drawn the conclusion that promoting democracy in Kazakhstan 
and other Central Asian countries will be fruitless and, in fact, will prevent 
the Union from pursuing key energy and security interests – and from 
being able to challenge Russia. As a result, a debate over values versus 
interests has framed discussion of the EU policies in the region, without 
offering a way forward. 
In fact, policy-makers have looked at the experience of democracy 
promotion in Central Asia in the past 18 years and drawn the wrong 
conclusions. Central Asians are not genetically or culturally averse to 
democracy, but it is important to be realistic about the conditions under 
which democratisation can emerge. Poor societies, with little prospect of 
                                                     
5 Gordon Crawford, “EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Central 
Asia: From Lofty Principles to Lowly Self-Interests”, Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008, pp. 172-91. 
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significant socio-economic change in the near and medium term, are not 
strong candidates for a deep-seated and sustainable process of 
democratisation. 
Kazakhstan, however, offers a different prospect. While Kazakhstan 
is currently far from democratic, the likelihood of significant future wealth 
generation in the country as a result of the exploitation of hydrocarbons 
suggests that the country will see the emergence of socio-economic 
conditions more conducive to democratisation in the decades ahead. 
Not only does Kazakhstan offer the best prospects for a future 
democratisation process in Central Asia, but the country’s current 
leadership is anxious to promote many of the domestic and international 
policies that are likely to strengthen this development. Ahead of the 2010 
Chairmanship of the OSCE, Kazakhstan has launched its policy of a Path to 
Europe. While intended in large part to head off criticism of the country’s 
political and human rights situation, the Path to Europe signals a clear 
ambition to build a closer relationship with Europe and to emulate 
European social and economic development in important ways. 
The combination of the prospects for substantial social and economic 
change in Kazakhstan, coupled with the willingness of the current 
leadership to foster links to Europe and develop a close partnership to 
achieve these aims are the reasons why the EU should make Kazakhstan a 
priority in its strategy in Central Asia. No other country in the region offers 
this prospect.  
The situation in Kazakhstan provides the EU with an opportunity to 
develop a new approach to the issue of democratisation, one which will 
allow the Union to play to its strengths as a normative and soft power 
actor.6 Relations with Kazakhstan should focus on a range of policies in the 
areas of education, trade, business, energy, environment, transport, and 
strengthening civil society (including working with professional and 
business associations). Through these engagements, the EU should seek to 
draw Kazakhstan into close involvement with European institutions and 
organisations. 
The aim should be to help to shape the form of modernisation in 
Kazakhstan so that Kazakh society becomes thick with the institutions of 
                                                     
6 Neil J. Melvin, The European Union’s Strategic Role in Central Asia, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 128, CEPS, Brussels, 28 March 2007. 
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civil society (including legal, social, environmental, professional, business 
and political groups), develops a highly educated workforce and becomes a 
country with a strong international perspective. The EU should also aim to 
ensure that modernisation develops as a process in which wealth is broadly 
distributed across the population and invested in the country rather than 
used to fund the consumption of the elite. 
A key element of this engagement will be relations with the president 
and the intertwined elite groups that support him. At this level, there is 
little appetite for the emergence of mass-based democratic politics, not least 
because the ruling elite might be displaced by such a system. In 
Kazakhstan, democracy today carries negative connotations and is 
associated with chaos, criminality and corruption. There is though a 
willingness to see a strengthening of rule of law, at least in areas that would 
protect the ruling group, for example property rights and a degree of 
political security from arbitrary state actions, particularly those by the 
security services. 
The president and key parts of the elite present themselves as 
pursuing an enlightenment role – advancing the nation while protecting its 
citizenry from the ravages of the mob. Ahead of the possible emergence of 
a genuine and deep-seated democratisation movement, there may be 
opportunities to work with the ruling regime within the framework of an 
‘enlightened modernisation’. Initiatives in this direction would help to lay 
down and strengthen the basis for democratic politics. This suggests that 
the existing rather weak and unfocused EU Rule of Law initiative and the 
human rights dialogue should be strengthened. 
Such initiatives would have the advantage of providing a more 
positive context within to raise individual human rights cases and to 
advance sectoral improvements in the rule of law. It would also be a means 
to counter the anti-democracy ideology promoted by Eurasian elites, which 
have sought to stress the destructive, chaotic and corruption of ‘democratic 
rule’ – as practised in the region in the early 1990s – as opposed to the idea 
of democratic governance as being a legitimate, effective and a restrained 
form of governance as it is understood in Europe. 
While socio-economic change leading to modernisation in 
Kazakhstan offers the best prospect for creating the conditions for 
democracy, it is not in itself a guarantee of democratisation. Many other 
hydrocarbon-rich countries have achieved high per capita income for the 
general population while resisting and containing democratisation. The 
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best prospect for achieving a breakthrough in Kazakhstan is to ensure that 
the EU, within the context of friendly relations and a broad engagement, is 
clear about the need to support greater openness and pluralism in the 
country, and at key moments – such as leadership transitions or threats of 
backsliding – stands firm on these principles. 
Conclusion 
Existing democracy promotion initiatives in the former Soviet Union have 
largely reached a dead end. Freedom House notes that there has been a 
serious deterioration in democracy within the region in recent years.7 
Clearly a new approach is required to meet this challenge. The priority 
accorded to the promotion of democracy has been further reduced, for 
many in the region, by the serious problems that confront the country due 
to the global economic crisis. As we look to the future, however, the rising 
levels of wealth in Kazakhstan, the consolidation and expansion of the 
private sector, the opportunities for developing a strong and high quality 
higher education sector (and study abroad) and the continued flow of 
wealth from the energy sector look set to promote significant socio-
economic change. These are precisely the sorts of developments that can 
provide the conditions for the onset of a sustainable democratisation 
process. 
Nevertheless, history shows there is nothing predetermined about the 
emergence of democracy – in the final count politics must play the key role. 
It will be the domestic politics of Kazakhstan that will ultimately determine 
the character of the polity. Here, the international community can help. 
Engagement can accelerate modernisation and the international 
community can seek to influence the form of socio-economic change in 
Kazakhstan. 
The EU – perhaps in cooperation with the United States – needs to 
develop an integrated programme of activities that links ‘modernisation’ 
policies with a realistic but firm political approach. In this regard, it will be 
important to take advantage of key political openings. One such 
opportunity is the decision by Kazakhstan to Chair the OSCE in 2010 and to 
                                                     
7 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009.  
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accept as part of this a variety of human dimension commitments.8 The 
leadership transition that will come with the eventual departure of 
President Nazarbaev will also be a critical period.  
Following such an approach is a tall order and will demand 
significant commitment from the EU. In particular it will require astute and 
well-informed political engagement and a willingness to deal with the fact 
that political change can move backwards as well as forwards. The EU does 
however have some carrots to encourage Kazakhstan to maintain a course 
of democratisation at key moments and in difficult times. The prospect of 
becoming a closer political partner of the EU through participation in 
initiatives such as the Eastern Partnership, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the Black Sea Synergy, the Energy Community and others could 
provide useful incentives for Kazakhstan to cooperate. Such a package 
could offer the real prospect of promoting democratisation in Kazakhstan 
at a time when the democratic project is in crisis in Central Asia and 
beyond. 
 
                                                     
8 Neil J. Melvin, “The European Union, Kazakhstan and the 2010 OSCE 
Chairmanship”, Security and Human Rights, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009. 
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13. BELARUS: INTO THE BUFFER ZONE 
BALAZS JARABIK & VITALI SILICKI 
fter the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, interest from 
several of the new member states put Belarus on the political map 
in Brussels. Five years on, the EU is becoming a major external 
player in the country’s political development. Several factors have 
persuaded eccentric president, Alexander Lukashenko, to change the 
country’s political course. These include the global economic crisis; the 
phasing-out of Russian subsidies; and the change in Moscow’s political 
stance from treating Belarus as a close ally to adopting a more aggressive 
tone. These circumstances have prompted Lukashenko and his team to try 
and change the framework of power in Belarus. Whether or not they have 
the luxury of time to achieve this remains to be seen.  
Belarus’ survival instinct  
Belarus gained independence in 1991 after the fall of Communism. The 
country underwent a half-hearted liberalisation period, thanks to a small, 
nationalistically-minded opposition, which lacked both the experience 
necessary to carry out a transformation, and a large enough support base in 
the Sovietised Belarusian society. The mass uprising against reform and 
liberalisation of 1994 brought populist maverick Alexander Lukashenko to 
power. He used his mandate to eliminate nascent democratic institutions, 
suppress the free media, crack down on opponents and reintroduce 
instruments of economic and political control. In exchange for loyalty and 
abstention from political and social activism, Lukashenko provided a social 
contract that guaranteed Belarusian citizens basic survival and indeed, 
during the more affluent mid-2000s, brought them relative prosperity. 
Many Belarusians saw this contract as a safer option than the risks and 
uncertainties of reform. Often referred to as a ‘jail with an open door’, 
Belarus’s semi-closed society was further stabilised by the offer of exit 
A 
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options for those who refused to buy into the social contract - for example, 
emigration or temporary employment abroad in countries with no 
language barrier such as Russia.  
The colour revolutions served to strengthen the Lukashenko regime’s 
repressive component. Aware of the downfall of weak post-Soviet 
autocrats who failed to survive the manipulation of free but largely unfair 
elections, Lukashenko prevented similar mobilisations and electoral regime 
changes by eliminating factors that would aid them. Presidential term 
limits were removed following a controversial 2004 referendum – the 
opposition claimed that removal of the two-term clause from the 
constitution could have been prevented had votes been counted fairly. By 
the time Lukashenko prepared to run for his third term in 2006, the 
government had closed down over 100 major NGOs and made their 
operation without official registration illegal; banned distribution of most 
independent media; arrested and isolated most active opposition leaders 
capable of mobilising the population; enforced arbitrary ‘hire and fire’ rules 
in public companies; and reinstated ideological indoctrination in schools 
and universities.  
These counter-reform tactics relied on demoralisation and fear. 
Images and stories of political and economic instability, even chaos, 
portrayed in the media following the ‘rose’ and ‘orange’ revolutions made 
the majority of Belarusians afraid of the very idea of regime change. The 
opposition was small. Based on independent pollsters’ estimates of the two 
opposition candidates’ real share of the vote in the 2006 presidential 
elections, it was supported by about 25% of the population. Its elite failed 
to offer any option other than opposition to Lukashenko, which meant that 
this sector of society, deprived of hope and effective leadership, was largely 
left to adapt to political reality. Following the 2006 elections, opposition 
supporters largely retreated into private life, with many young activists 
leaving Belarus to pursue their studies. At the same time, the opposition 
elite became entrenched in petty leadership battles and controversies of 
little relevance to their supporters.  
Pre-emptive autocracy 
Like most contemporary autocracies, the Lukashenko regime lacks a 
coherent legitimising ideology. Instead, it gives the system some semblance 
of democracy by manufacturing consent. Formally competitive elections 
take place, and the existence of opposition parties is tolerated as they have 
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no actual say in government affairs. Unlike the Russian government, 
Lukashenko’s regime has never created a fully controlled opposition to 
dance to its tune. The regime’s discourse of democracy is laden with 
excuses for the ‘abnormality’ of Belarus’ political system compared to those 
found elsewhere in Europe. Such excuses are usually based on the claim 
that this politically ‘young’ country must take its own ‘specific path’ to 
democracy and modernisation, and not merely ape Western prescriptions 
and standards.  
Belarus’ lack of a participatory democratic culture stretches back to 
the tradition of state paternalism that began in the post-war Soviet period. 
It was cemented by the ‘old’ Communist social contract: swift 
modernisation and industrialisation of the Belarusian republic financed by 
massive capital investment from the Kremlin, in exchange for 
unquestioning political loyalty and the rejection of a distinct Belarusian 
identity. This created a moral basis for anti-Communist resistance and a 
pro-European political agenda later on. The core of opposition in Belarus is 
a largely cultural construct – a substratum of society that has resisted 
linguistic Russification and cultural Sovietisation, preserving a Belarusian 
identity and associated pro-Western political connotations. However, since 
the mid-1990s government policies have severely restricted the space 
available to express this identity.  
Most Belarusians are not politically ideological. Political preferences 
are based on opportunities for personal economic survival and 
advancement. This approach is heavily supported by regime propaganda 
and its control system of rewards and punishments. As previously stated, 
Belarusians generally find the state-offered minimum criteria for survival 
preferable to the uncertainty of a more liberal and potentially more chaotic 
society and economy. In the mid-2000s, the majority of citizens believed 
that Belarus had greater need of a ‘strong hand’ than a rule of democratic 
law, and felt that the country was heading in the ‘right’ direction under 
Lukashenka. These beliefs have had logical consequences: support for 
European integration as a political alternative to post-Soviet order has 
decreased dramatically during the past decade.  
Toward a pragmatic approach? 
Over the past ten years, Belarus’s position in Transparency International’s 
corruption perception ratings has suffered a steep decline: in 2003 it was 
perceived as the 36th ‘cleanest’ country in the world; in 2008 it was 151st. It 
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is debatable whether this assessment accurately reflects the growth of 
corruption or only the better identification of corrupt practices in Belarus’ 
unreformed economy. However, the trend definitely illustrates the 
proliferation of conspicuous consumption among the ruling elite, and its 
members’ tendency to transform themselves into ‘state capitalists’. 
Although Lukashenko originally portrayed himself as the champion of 
‘clean’ government, an anti-corruption crusader fighting crooked state 
bureaucracy, he was eventually forced to reconcile himself with the 
nomenklatura and offer them increased opportunities for enrichment. This 
concession was a necessary device for the non-coercive control of the elite 
when a significant number of them defected to the opposition in the early 
2000s, and rumours of the state bureaucracy turning against Lukashenko 
were growing. Toleration of official corruption was also necessary to make 
government service more attractive to the younger generation, who could 
not easily be bought off by nominally low government wages.  
This new contract guaranteed the nomenklatura’s loyalty during the 
2004 and 2006 electoral campaigns. Crucial for Lukashenko, these 
campaigns saw him eliminate term limits and secure his own re-election. 
Nevertheless, intra-elite disputes over assets and bureaucratic rents 
controlled by the different government sectors increased. By mid-2007, a 
power struggle had broken out between a number of these factions, which 
included the group controlled by Lukashenko’s older son Viktar and the 
president’s loyal supporters from his native province of Mahileu, and other 
factions related to law enforcement agencies such as the Security Council, 
the Interior Ministry and the KGB. These groups used their clout to arrest 
and prosecute ‘unwanted’ opponents. When some of the country’s top 
officials were publicly beaten up by plain-clothes KGB thugs, Lukashenko 
was forced to intervene personally. He used the opportunity to carry out a 
major purge in the KGB and other agencies, and to eliminate those at the 
top who were too closely connected to Russia, a precaution motivated by 
worsening relations with the Kremlin.  
The bureaucratic tussle ended with the victory of Viktar 
Lukashenko’s relatively open-minded faction. Its supporters now occupy 
top posts in the presidential administration, and are helping to steer 
Belarus onto a more pragmatic economic and foreign policy course. This 
generational change in the ruling elite paved the way for dialogue between 
Belarus and the European Union and, by the end of 2008, brought about a 
limited political liberalisation. The regime’s pragmatists, such as Uladzimir 
Makey, Head of presidential administration, are offering an alternative to 
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Lukashenko’s politics of pre-emption: they are attempting to demonstrate a 
greater openness by engaging in dialogue with both the opposition and 
Belarusian citizens. However superficial this dialogue may be – the 
government seems more prepared to invite independent experts to discuss 
the improvement of Belarus’s external image than to change economic 
policies – it has helped to garner a greater commitment to liberalisation 
from government officials. For example, the distribution of printed media 
produced by several opposition parties is now permitted. However, 
Lukashenko is wary of this increased openness, and has warned state 
officials not to take exercises in democracy seriously. On balance, the new 
elite is not a team of fully-fledged reformers, but a coalition of pragmatists 
who understand what the boss expects from them: to find a formula for the 
regime’s survival that will please the West, yet will not result in ceding 
much (if any) domestic control. Furthermore, the government’s new tactics 
have left the opposition at a loss by challenging it to present its own vision 
for Belarus’s future; something that it has not been able to articulate well. 
European efforts to promote democracy 
Since the early 1990s, the regime has successfully countered efforts by 
international donors to promote democracy in Belarus. The EU has not put 
significant financial backing into such efforts. Since Belarus gained 
independence, only the US has been in a position to provide practical 
assistance with the democratic transition. European countries have not 
always made available the necessary funds, nor have they always 
cooperated fully to aid civil society and the independent media. However, 
from 2001 to 2006, the West presented a more or less united political front 
towards the Lukashenka regime. This was the time when Russian subsidies 
were at their peak, but civil society and the independent media’s capacity 
for resistance was decreasing due to a lack of external aid. By restricting the 
activities of independent organisations in Belarus, the government 
successfully eroded the efforts to assist democratic tendencies, and 
effectively pushed donors to deliver aid outside Belarus. As a result, 
Belarusian civil society activists and journalists have spent significant 
periods of time abroad and formed external institutions which, although 
they have mushroomed, have had no serious impact inside the country 
itself.  
In 2006, coordinated efforts to promote free and fair elections resulted 
in increased civic engagement. This showed that alternative political 
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discourses and opinions do exist in Belarus. Events after these elections, in 
particular the leadership disputes within the then-united opposition and 
changes in Russia’s political stance, inspired a policy of engagement with 
Poland and Lithuania, the two European countries most active in the 
promotion of Belarusian democracy. The EU has at last increased its 
presence in Belarus, opening a delegation in Minsk in 2008, and has become 
more flexible about delivering aid in Belarus. It has also put more 
conditions for aid in place – the November 2006 non-paper of the European 
Commission “What the EU can bring to Belarus” contained the 12 
conditions still being used by the EC as benchmarks to measure 
cooperation. It has also established socialisation and engagement schemes, 
such as supporting the exiled European Humanities University in Vilnius 
and giving scholarships to exiled students. Although democracy assistance 
programmes have received continuous support, the EU and other 
European countries have gradually phased out their political support for 
Belarus’ opposition. Thus, the foundations for dialogue between 
Lukashenko’s regime and Europe have been laid down. 
Financial crisis and the Russian dimension  
Recent changes in energy prices have had a significant impact on Belarus’s 
political affairs and foreign policy. The Kremlin’s sudden decision in 2006 
to move towards a realistic European market price for gas supplies to 
Belarus prompted the Belarusian government to reconsider the basic tenets 
of its economic and foreign policy, as well as its contract with the 
population. The regime could no longer rely on guaranteed revenue from 
the purchase of subsidised energy from Russia and its partial re-sale to the 
West at market prices. It managed to obtain an agreement from the Kremlin 
to phase in ‘European’ gas prices over a four-year period. This concession 
was purchased with the decision partly to privatise the Belarusian gas 
distribution network Beltransgaz, a prized asset for the Russian energy 
monopolies.  
Belarus faced an even more significant challenge when, in the second 
half of 2008, world energy prices began to drop as a result of the global 
financial crisis. Belarus did not immediately feel the benefit of the reduced 
prices due to the peculiarities of its agreement with Russia, but 
encountered a severe deterioration in its balance of payments as a result of 
the abrupt fall in profitability in the energy sector. Moreover, the crisis 
turned finding a solution to the balance of payments problem into a 
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political issue, as loans could only be obtained from government lenders 
(such as the Kremlin) or intergovernmental agencies (such as the 
International Monetary Fund). Most importantly, Belarus faced a dramatic 
decline in demand from the Russian market, a grave threat to the economy 
of the country that survived on cheap Russian energy and exports to the 
Russian market. 
This difficult situation was one of the main factors behind 
Lukashenko’s engagement in dialogue with both the EU and the US (from 
whom the Belarusian government tried to secure a $5 billion loan at the end 
of 2008). The acceptance of the IMF’s offer of a $2.5 billion stabilisation 
loan, announced on 31 December 2008, may not have been conditioned by 
political obligations, yet it came against guarantees of further economic 
reforms that began in 2008. These mostly consisted of macroeconomic 
adjustment measures such as currency devaluation and the improvement 
of conditions for private enterprise, which was also necessary to absorb the 
newly-unemployed workers of failing state companies. The financial crisis 
has forced Lukashenko to abandon his anti-Western stance, although his 
regime has so far failed to come up with ideological formulations to explain 
these shifts in policy to the population. The regime continues its 
geopolitical manoeuvring, attempting to ensure that Russia does not 
radically downscale its financial support. In February 2009, Lukashenka 
signed an essentially meaningless deal on joint air defence systems with 
Moscow that paved the way for a stabilisation loan from the Kremlin and 
for Russian military procurement programmes for Belarusian companies. It 
is not clear, however, if the Kremlin has the resources to offer Lukashenka 
the loans that the regime needs.  
Russia has always been a mixed blessing for Lukashenko, and has 
used its status as an energy superpower to support authoritarian structures 
against the ‘contagion’ of democracy in the former Soviet Republics. On the 
positive side, the Kremlin wholeheartedly supported Lukashenka’s re-
election campaign and helped protect Minsk from the revolutionary threat 
it faced from its west and south. Yet, once the ‘orange’ scare was over, the 
Kremlin became more demanding, stipulating that Minsk pay for political 
patronage with loyalty and increased integration into the Russian fold. The 
2006–2007 energy conflict set in motion the regime’s partial transformation, 
as Lukashenko tried to offset a decrease in Eastern financial support with 
Western loans and investment. The real turning point in Russia–Belarus 
relations was the August 2008 war in Georgia. Moscow was infuriated by 
Lukashenka’s failure to show outright support for the Kremlin and his 
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apparent attempt to turn his loyalty into yet another political commodity to 
be exchanged for economic favours. The tension never got out of hand, but 
Russia’s message to the Belarusian president was clear: his own position 
and personal security, not just the fate of the country, could be endangered 
by disloyalty to Moscow. Lukashenko’s reaction to the Kremlin’s fury was 
a move toward dialogue with the West, supported by the release of 
political prisoners. Several other factors may encourage Lukashenko to 
maintain a comfortable distance from the Kremlin in the near future. There 
is little Russia can offer Belarus to cope with the effects of the financial 
crisis, given the dire economic situation in Russia itself. As the crisis 
threatens to disrupt the Kremlin’s energy corridor projects and renews the 
importance of traditional transit routes (particularly those in Belarus, given 
the unpredictability of the Ukrainian elite), it is possible that Moscow may 
seek to replace Lukashenko with a more loyal leader to protect the security 
of its transit routes. Lukashenko’s exemplary behaviour during the 2009 
Russia–Ukraine gas conflict was a deliberate attempt to pre-empt such an 
attempt, as he sought to portray an image of reliable partner to both East 
and West.  
The moment to be honest with Lukashenko has arrived, as he is 
currently facing more threats from the East than from the West. The EU 
could offer him assistance for the modernisation of Belarus’ economy and 
political guarantees as he moves away from Russia, but only in exchange 
for political reform. In May 2009 Belarus was invited to join the Eastern 
Partnership, sanctions have been loosened and cooperation projects 
commenced. Brussels could design a policy package that would motivate 
Lukashenka to make the transition from policies where everyone loses to 
policies where everyone wins. The EU should insist upon real political 
progress in Belarus, and should facilitate this by demonstrating long-term 
commitment to the country’s development, modernisation and 
transformation. The EU would also need to acknowledge Belarus’s future 
as a European country, and show an active commitment to its 
modernisation by supporting its economic transformation, helping to 
reform its energy sector and adapting its internal regulations to meet 
European standards. If this is to be done through the Eastern Partnership, 
the initiative must receive a significant boost soon. Belarusian officials, 
including Lukashenko himself, would receive the idea favourably if 
dialogue with the EU and subsequent liberalisation could bring solutions 
not only for their country, but also for themselves. 
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Realistically, Lukashenko has little choice but to continue to play the 
game he started after the 2006 Russian policy change: trying to manipulate 
levers with East and West to keep himself in power. Even if the regime has 
a strong survival instinct, Lukashenko needs to ‘revolutionise’ its structures 
in order to convince Brussels that Belarus is ready for more than the 
Eastern Partnership, namely for a re-formatted European buffer zone. For 
political pundits in Brussels, Belarus’ incorporation into the buffer zone, 
and away from the Russosphere, perhaps represents the final piece of the 
jigsaw; a powerful symbol of the EU’s cultural power. 
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14. MOROCCO: SMART 
AUTHORITARIANISM REFINED 
KRISTINA KAUSCH 
ontrary to common perception, the prospects for genuine 
democratisation in Morocco have not significantly improved in 
recent years. Benefiting from favourable comparison with its more 
openly repressive neighbours, Morocco has often been hailed as an oasis of 
liberalism in the otherwise reform-resistant Arab world. Over the last 
decade, the establishment of democracy as an international norm and the 
ascension of Mohammed VI to the throne have not led to greater 
democratisation in Morocco, but to an adaptation of governance strategies 
to consolidate semi-authoritarian rule. These methods have become 
increasingly sophisticated and outweigh positive factors that favour 
democratisation. Political stalemate has been compounded by other 
negative factors, in particular recent developments in the international 
environment that have put democracy further on the back burner. As a 
result, the EU’s traction has decreased, and neither the EU nor the US are 
pushing for a systematic, structural political reform process in Morocco. 
Indeed, the EU’s and the Moroccan regime’s interests match: both desire a 
liberalised but stable Morocco that bears no risks for the ruling elite.  
Consolidating authoritarianism through soft power 
Morocco’s ‘upgraded authoritarianism’1 has aimed at substantial 
liberalisation in politically non-threatening areas while tight control is kept 
                                                     
1 Steven Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World, Saban Center, 
Brookings Institution, October 2007. 
C 
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over the policy areas and political opponents with the potential to 
meaningfully challenge the current distribution of powers. Selective top-
down liberalisation has significantly widened the political space for 
political parties, civil society and the media, but none of the reforms thus 
far have touched the powers of the palace.2 In today’s Morocco, selective 
liberalisation is slowly advancing, but democratisation has yet to kick-in. 
Moreover, given that the current piecemeal reforms also serve as a valve to 
channel and contain domestic and international demands for structural 
democratisation, the current course of selective liberalisation is likely to 
further consolidate the position of the incumbent elite.  
While the adaptation of governance strategies can be observed in 
many hybrid regimes, Morocco’s case stands out owing to the level of 
subtle and successful PR with which the regime manages to keep hold of 
the reins while also selling itself as a vanguard of Arab reform. Unlike 
some of their authoritarian neighbours, the Moroccan ruling elite 
(commonly called the ‘Makhzen’, which is broadly composed of the palace 
and its wide patronage network) resorts to open coercion and violent 
repression only very exceptionally. If it does so, it makes sure that 
measures of coercion are either well covered-up or are accompanied by a 
powerful public diplomacy that provides an internationally acceptable 
justification (for example, countering terrorism).  
The double reality of the Makhzen’s PR is mirrored in the parallel 
existence of interwoven formal and informal governance structures. The 
four most powerful ministers are directly appointed by the king. Official 
ministers are ‘backed’ by shadow ministers who are the real decision-
makers and who originate from the king’s inner circle. While government 
and parliament largely function as technocratic managers of state affairs 
and providers of legitimacy, the Makhzen maintains control over decisive 
political decision-making. The illusion of democratisation is maintained by 
the ruling elite through actions that follow a number of patterns.  
A piecemeal approach to the liberalisation of legislation leads to the 
adoption of laws that are broadly permissive but lack effective safeguards 
against arbitrary application of the law. Examples of this are almost all the 
texts dealing with public liberties, such as the associations law, the law on 
                                                     
2 See also Marina Ottaway & Meredith Riley, Morocco: From Top-down Reform to 
Democratic Transition?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2006. 
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public assembly and the press code. Laws do not target or question civil 
liberties as such but always leave enough loopholes for the regime to 
hamper the activities of dangerous opponents via systematic harassment. 
The constitution is not a guarantor of the rights of the citizen vis-à-vis the 
state, but a guarantor of the prerogatives of the palace vis-à-vis the people. 
Mohammed VI has made clear on numerous occasions that further 
constitutional reform is not on the agenda.  
The co-option of political elites sideline opponents in political parties, 
civil society, the media and the business sector. In civil society, co-option 
takes place above all via the creation of political and financial 
dependencies. A handful of major GONGOs, such as the Foundation 
Mohammed VI for Solidarity, receive most public NGO funding. At the 
same time, foreign funding is made difficult, and NGOs are obliged to 
report the receipt and purpose of any foreign funds. The political party 
system is weak and highly fragmented. With the exception of the Justice 
and Development Party (PJD), none of the political forces have the 
potential to challenge the Makhzen’s political dominance. The biggest 
established parties, Union of the Socialist Forces (USFP) and Istiqlal 
(Independence), are staid and are having trouble attracting broad 
constituencies as they have fallen into the trap of powerless government 
participation. Istiqlal’s unexpected gains in the 2007 legislative elections 
notwithstanding, the inability to meaningfully influence the political course 
has eroded much of the established parties’ credibility.  
The same pattern of co-opting emerging elites and sidelining resistant 
opponents can be observed in the media. Broadcasting media – the only 
outlets with nationwide coverage in a country with very remote areas and 
over 50% illiteracy – is dominated and in large part owned by the 
Makhzen. Print media, which reach a limited middle class readership in 
Rabat and Casablanca, are substantially freer, but the handful of truly 
independent outlets are engaged in a constant struggle with the Makhzen 
for survival as they are slowly being suffocated through decreasing 
advertisements, paper shortages, technical problems, legal persecution of 
individual journalists and other measures of harassment. The internet, and 
in particular the emerging blogger scene, is far less controllable. A number 
of recent telling incidents, such as a temporal government ban on YouTube 
or the penalising of bloggers and facebook-activists with high fines and 
prison sentences (before being pardoned by royal decree), show how the 
regime is struggling to adapt its usual PR strategy to a medium that is not 
easy to control unnoticed.  
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In spite of Morocco’s reputation of holding relatively ‘clean’ elections, 
the subtle management of political contestation is a basic pillar in the 
Makhzen’s hold on power. With international attention largely focused on 
the day of the polls, fraud on the actual day of election is the exception. 
Instead, most of the Makhzen’s electoral engineering happens in the run-up 
to the elections. Gerrymandering, vote-buying, changes to the electoral 
code and other technical adjustments are among the measures taken to 
ensure that the outcome is as desired. The experience of the 2007 elections 
is likely to have taught the ruling elite a number of lessons. As calls for a 
strengthening of the powers of parliament and the prime minister from 
political parties have become stronger, the palace’s interest in raising its 
profile in parliament has increased.  
In early 2008, Fouad Ali al Himma, former class-mate and close 
confidant of the King, suddenly declared his intention to run as an 
independent candidate in the September 2008 legislative elections. As a 
member of parliament he has since engaged in intensive activity to rally 
other MPs around him in a new parliamentary caucus, the “Movement for 
All Democrats”, and eventually founded a new party, “Authenticity and 
Modernity” (PAM). An independent paper called the group around 
Himma “an alliance of ex-gauchos with the neo-Makhzen”.3 The PJD was 
explicitly excluded from joining both the new parliamentary group and the 
new party. The PAM has attempted to portray the moderate Islamist party 
as reactionary and anti-democratic. The name ‘Authenticity and 
Modernity’ displays an attempt to take the wind out of the Islamists’ sails 
by drawing on two of their main stated virtues. Thus, the ruling 
establishment’s attempt to position itself as the only viable alternative to 
Islamist rule, has become institutionalised. Having avoided PJD 
participation in government by a whisker, the palace is pulling out all the 
stops to regain power over the parliament before the next legislative 
elections in 2013.  
Among opposition parties, the PJD is currently the most likely to 
push for democratisation. While the radical but non-violent Islamist 
movement Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Charity) is the most popular and 
most deeply rooted Islamist movement, and is often considered Morocco’s 
                                                     
3 Samir Achehbar, “Touche pas à mon parti”, Tel Quel (http://www.telquel-
online.com./341/maroc4_341.shtml – accessed 11 November 2008). 
144 | KRISTINA KAUSCH 
 
true opposition because of its open rejection of the monarchy, it is currently 
outlawed and does not even seek to participate in the political process. The 
PJD, by contrast, has in recent years been able to consolidate its reputation 
not only as an acceptable Islamist party but also as an internally 
democratic, transparent and relatively untainted one. It has also published 
a party programme that has no traces of an Islamist state.  
Paradoxically, the Makhzen’s hostile posture towards Islamist 
movements appears to have contributed to the moderation of the PJD’s 
religiously founded demands – a fact that Justice and Charity and even 
some of the PJD’s base condemn as a first step towards co-option. While the 
PJD’s ultimate behaviour in power – like that of any untested party – is not 
foreseeable, most international observers agree that a PJD participation in 
government would likely be a plus for democracy.4 In the current 
constitutional and legal framework, however, the Makhzen can prevent 
this from happening as it sees fit. Some in the PJD feel it might be a more 
promising option for the party to remain in opposition until it can be sure 
that the legal framework, backed up by an independent judiciary, would 
actually allow meaningful influence. The PJD leadership is aware that it 
could make a much stronger case for substantial reforms if it were able to 
enter into a parliamentary alliance with one of the well-established parties, 
and has therefore (so far unsuccessfully) been seeking a rapprochement 
with the UFSP. Yet as the party of the king’s crony, PAM is trying to rally 
all secular forces in parliament around it, apparently with the aim of 
isolating the PJD, the stakes for the latter party are running high. 
The instrumentalisation of international interests for domestic 
repression is a major feature of the Makhzen’s public diplomacy. Western 
interests such as countering terrorism or reducing migration are 
purposefully being played on in order to sanction authoritarian control. 
The counter-terrorism law adopted in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca 
bombings has given the government an almost unlimited legal margin to 
limit the human rights and basic civil liberties of any citizen. The still 
widespread Western fears of an Islamist government in Morocco, however 
                                                     
4 For an account of the PJD’s parliamentary record, see Amr Hamzawy, Party for 
Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and its Discontents, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, July 2008. 
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moderate, are being played on in order to obtain tacit approval for 
clampdowns, arrests, or more subtle measures of containment.  
While most of the tactics described are not new and indeed were used 
in King Hassan II’s time and before, their subtlety in times of increasing 
pressure for democratisation is no coincidence. It shows how the Moroccan 
ruling elite has been able to skilfully adapt its governance strategies to the 
requirements of a new era by extending and refining its authoritarian soft 
power tool box. Yet Western policy-makers still tend to take the Moroccan 
PR lines of gradualism at face value, and have yet to adapt their policies.  
International environment: Democracy on the back burner 
The 2007 legislative elections with their all-time-low turnout and high 
percentage of protest votes have displayed the increasing distrust of the 
Moroccan electorate towards political parties and government institutions. 
Yet polls confirm that although disillusion with public institutions and the 
electoral process is high, support for enhanced political participation, civil 
liberties, equal opportunities and the rule of law remains strong. Under the 
current precarious socio-economic conditions, however, the appeal of 
democracy is taking a back seat to development and employment. If 
anything, this trend is likely to be reinforced by the harsh impact of the 
global financial crisis, which is likely further to weaken Morocco’s feeble 
economy.  
At the time of writing, the nature and scope of the impact of the crisis 
are still hard to grasp. Its longer-term impact is, however, likely to 
substantially aggravate the already rampant structural unemployment, the 
huge socio-economic inequalities, and migration. Domestic pressure on the 
Moroccan government might result in riots over poverty, prices and 
unemployment, as seen in Egypt and other countries in the region over 
recent years. This may give a new sense of urgency to structural domestic 
reform, at least in the economic sphere. However, the economic 
downswing, greater protectionism and the expected slump in economic 
activities of non-competitive economies such as Morocco, are likely to 
strengthen the authoritarian status quo. 
As regards Morocco’s international partners, the urgent need for a 
concerted response to the crisis has already shifted EU and US priorities 
and will further limit their inclination to exert pressure on the Moroccan 
government. US President Obama’s first steps in the Mediterranean 
suggest that he will choose an approach of quiet diplomacy and 
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partnership rather than of conditionality and public pressure, and is thus 
unlikely to seek a qualitative shift in Morocco’s reform process. Moreover, 
given the Obama administration’s priority in the Mediterranean to cut the 
Gordian knot in the region’s hotspots (Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iranian 
nuclear proliferation, Syria’s diplomatic integration), it will not run the risk 
of destabilising its most reliable ally. 
The rise of political Islam in the MENA during recent years has 
further cemented Western support for the region’s semi-authoritarian 
regimes. Even a moderate player such as the PJD, which in recent years has 
gone a long way to present itself to Western policy-makers as an acceptable 
and trustworthy political interlocutor, is struggling to make itself heard. 
Against the background of Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory, European 
governments are still reluctant to engage with, let alone support, Islamist 
movements, including moderate political parties such as the PJD. The 
increasingly nuanced picture of political Islam has not yet trickled through 
to European electorates. Accordingly, the failure of the PJD to secure its 
participation in government in the 2007 legislative elections provoked a 
sigh of relief in Europe. The prospect of even a moderate, reform-oriented 
Islamist-led government ruling on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar 
nurtures popular fears that too often still equate Islamism with terrorism. 
European politicians, whose views on Islamist political actors are often not 
nuanced, are reluctant to provide any support to a genuine reform process 
that may end up replacing the authoritarian but predictable Moroccan 
government with an Islamist rule perceived as a potential threat. 
Europe and the ‘advanced status’ 
Morocco’s keen interest in further integration with the EU and its persistent 
demand to obtain ‘advanced status’ in its relations with the EU under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has given the EU substantial 
additional leverage over the Moroccan government. At the same time, the 
Makhzen’s interest in keeping up an international image as the vanguard 
of Arab reform, and the outlook for raising its international profile by being 
singled out as the EU’s closest partner in the Mediterranean, are important 
pull-factors. In October 2008, Morocco was the first ENP partner state to be 
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granted advanced status.5 The increased leverage, however, has not been 
meaningfully employed by the EU to tie the advanced level of partnership 
to deeper, systemic democratisation.  
European democracy promotion activities in Morocco largely echo 
the regime’s logic of slow and gradual change. This might be a reasonable 
approach if an incremental process were in place instead of occasional 
pieces of tame liberalisation in carefully chosen areas at the discretion of 
His Majesty. In light of the current distribution of powers in Morocco, the 
EU’s hopes for ‘gradualism’ appear unrealistic. In recent years, the 
European willingness to push Moroccan reform beyond a certain level has 
further decreased.  
In order to effectively support domestic demands for genuine 
democratisation, the EU would have to tie enhanced incentives to enhanced 
demands for a deeper and more systematic process of political reform. 
There is a possibility that the smart authoritarian PR discourse may in the 
long run turn into a self-made trap for the Makhzen, as its formal 
commitment to democratisation opens up a range of diplomatic options to 
hold the regime accountable to its commitments. Advantage should be 
taken of this and other weak spots in the Makhzen’s double-edged 
discourse. But it should be done systematically and in a way that goes 
beyond the Commission’s occasional mention of the international treaties 
to which Morocco is a signatory. At the moment, however, pressures and 
incentives for both the EU and the Moroccan government to take the 
country beyond a minimum level of democratic liberalisation are limited. 
                                                     
5 EU-Moroccan Association Council, “Document conjoint UE-Maroc sur le 
renforcement des relations bilaterales/Statut Avancé” 
(http://www.delmar.ec.europa.eu/fr/communiques/pdf/20090303.pdf).  
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15. ALGERIA’S CHEQUERED DEMOCRACY 
EXPERIMENT 
HAKIM DARBOUCHE 
n 10 April 2009, the results were announced of the fourth Algerian 
presidential election to take place since the liberalisation of the 
polity in 1989. These results seemed to confirm Algeria’s full entry 
into the club of quasi-monarchical Arab presidencies. Despite sharing some 
of the underlying democratic shortcomings of the more traditional 
members of this club (Tunisia, Egypt and Syria), Algeria had hitherto 
maintained a principle of power alternance. Even if this had merely 
attempted to conceal the unchanged military control over decision-making, 
it did guarantee a modicum of political competition. However, the re-
election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika for a third term with an unprecedented 
90% of the vote and an implausible 75% turnout signalled the end of the 
multi-factional political order that had fed this competition.  
The fact that Bouteflika was virtually unopposed in this ‘non-election’ 
raised many questions over the apparent resignation of traditional centres 
of contre-pouvoir, especially given that Bouteflika’s two-term record has 
been considered far from immaculate on most policy fronts. Accordingly, 
factors such as oil wealth and the West’s myopic interests in the ‘global war 
on terror’ became recurrent explanations for what has been described as 
Algeria’s democratic ‘backlash’. This chapter argues that the explanation 
for these recent political developments in Algeria lies foremost in the 
internal power-game that characterised much of Bouteflika’s tenure; in fact 
the energy factor and the counter-Islamist threat have played a secondary 
role. 
O 
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Political reforms under Bouteflika: the civilianisation imperative 
The process of reform that led up to the botched legislative elections of 1992 
was complex and is often misinterpreted – notably as failed developmental 
economic policy. The perception that the government’s options were 
limited to political concessions in the face of widespread popular 
discontent at deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the 1980s is not 
only a deliberate oversight of the myriad grievances of the rioters of 
October 1988, but is also a convenient oversimplification of the workings of 
an opaque and informal political system.  
Nevertheless, the interruption of the Islamists’ looming electoral 
victory by the army in 1992, the deposing of President Chadli and a 
protracted conflagration all cost the country dearly. As a result, successive 
presidents in the 1990s were unable to exercise their constitutional 
prerogatives to any meaningful degree, and often saw their presidential 
mandates interrupted in one way or another.  
In face of the violence that characterised the ensuing conflict pitting 
the military regime against Islamist insurgents, international efforts to 
bring the crisis to a peaceful end – let alone encourage the return to any sort 
of democratic form of governance – were at best timid. Notwithstanding 
the regime’s acute dependence on foreign economic and military assistance 
in the 1990s, Western and particularly European leverage remained 
tenuous. Even after the attitudinal shift that occurred in France in 1996 
towards the Algerian crisis and the more active EU interest that followed, 
the Algerian regime maintained its insistence on ‘non-interference’ by the 
external parties.  
The coming to power of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999 brought fresh 
hopes for the resolution of Algeria’s decade-long political turmoil. The 
blatant army sponsorship of his ticket inadvertently deprived him of the 
legitimating process of a pluralist election – owing to the last-minute 
protest withdrawal from the race of rival presidential candidates. 
Nonetheless, his untarnished political credentials earned him enough 
public sympathy to become Algeria’s seventh ‘independent’ president. The 
military commanders placed their confidence in Bouteflika’s diplomatic 
skills and liberal outlook to rehabilitate the state’s international standing 
and end the debilitating diplomatic embargo to which it had been 
implicitly subjected by Western governments. 
Correspondingly, Bouteflika’s first term (1999-2004) was predicated 
on promises of peace and reconciliation, of restoring Algeria’s international 
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image, and of liberal economic change. Even if democratisation and 
political reform were not and could not conceivably be on the agenda given 
that the country was on the brink of collapse, the nearest Bouteflika came to 
revealing his political intentions in this regard was when he elliptically 
stated that he was not prepared to rule as a ‘three-quarter president’, 
implying an impending consolidation of presidential power over army 
interference.  
Bouteflika’s record of achievements was deemed positive overall. The 
qualified amnesty offered to Islamist militants under the Civil Concord 
resulted in short-term successes: not only were guerrilla groups dissolved 
and violence reduced considerably, but Bouteflika was also offered the 
opportunity to compensate for his dubious election. He appropriated the 
peace policy and submitted it as his own to popular approval through a 
referendum. Even though this was nothing more than an army effort to 
imbue military victory over the Islamist insurgency with political and legal 
content, the president did thus win the legitimacy he so desperately 
needed. Besides strengthening his hand at home, the plebiscite allowed 
Bouteflika to face his Western, particularly French, opposite numbers 
uninhibited, and to set his country’s foreign relations on a new course. This 
resulted in renewed engagements with France, the EU (the conclusion of an 
association agreement), NATO (joining the Mediterranean Dialogue), 
China and Russia (strategic partnerships), and also regionally through 
more pro-activism in the African Union (New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development – NEPAD) and the Arab League. The economic repercussions 
of this diplomatic reinvigoration began to be seen through the increased 
participation of foreign investors in the process of liberalising the economy, 
which complemented a large public investment programme in 
infrastructure.  
The political dividends, in terms of domestic popularity and foreign 
endorsement of these early policy successes contributed to the 
consolidation of Bouteflika’s rule. But it was not until he had secured his 
re-election in 2004 for another five years that the domestic balance of power 
began to shift clearly in favour of the presidency. Even his earlier 
deliberately ambiguous stance vis-à-vis a series of domestic and 
international allegations of army wrongdoings during the 1990s crisis did 
not enhance his bargaining power with a core of hard-line army 
commanders. They had initiated efforts to undercut his advances, 
provoking riots in Kabylia in 2001, mounting a campaign of virulent 
broadsides in the secularist press against the president’s reconciliation 
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plans and exploiting the US-led global anti-terror campaign by rejecting the 
extension of existing amnesty provisions to residual armed groups, such as 
the Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). They also 
encouraged Prime Minister Ali Benflis, erstwhile ally of the president, to 
run against him in the 2004 presidential election. Nonetheless, the 
commanders of the état-major lost their duel with Bouteflika after his 
resounding electoral victory in what was Algeria’s most open and 
pluralistic presidential election to date.  
This new state of affairs cleared the way for the incumbent president 
to purge the army of a radically politicised tendency – a faction that 
considered its role in the fight against radical Islamists to be inseparable 
from meddling with the political institutions of the state. From 2005 
onwards, Bouteflika gained the upper hand over military commanders, 
with the exception perhaps of the head of the intelligence services. The 
president’s manoeuvres, however, could not have succeeded without the 
implicit consent of the intelligence chiefs, whose influence on all sectors of 
Algeria’s political and civil societies has been consolidated as a result of the 
fight against radical Islamist militancy. The achievements of Bouteflika’s 
enterprise are not without significance for the process of reform of the 
Algerian polity. The civilianisation and rationalisation of executive power 
is a precursor of reduced factionalism. This, in turn, is a fundamental 
precondition for any meaningful institutionalisation of politics. However, 
for these transformations to lay the foundations for democracy and the rule 
of law, they need to be accompanied by further reforms. Bouteflika’s record 
in this regard has been most disappointing.  
Indeed, part of Bouteflika’s strategy for the consolidation of 
presidential authority at the expense of the army high command consisted 
of undermining opposition political parties, disempowering parliamentary 
scrutiny, and neutralising the most outspoken media critiques by way of 
intimidation. This strategy was carried out cautiously before 2004, but 
became bolder thereafter. However, the unexpected faltering of 
Bouteflika’s political momentum at the end of 2005, owing to ill health, 
empowered his detractors. This coincided with a resumption of terror 
attacks in 2006, as a prelude to a much larger campaign following the 
GSPC’s conversion in early 2007 into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In 
this climate, Bouteflika’s physical frailty became a springboard for criticism 
of his peace plans. This was particularly so following the reported 
involvement of amnestied Islamist militants in the new wave of attacks. 
The thrust of these critiques focused subsequently on the presidential plan 
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for constitutional revision to allow the incumbent to run for another (third) 
term. 
Energy and counter-terrorism: secondary factors 
It is widely assumed that energy resources and the counter-terrorist issue 
have been the predominant factors in Algeria’s political process. But their 
importance can be easily over-stated. Rather, the country’s democratic 
prospects have been subject to the outcome of the domestic struggle for the 
civilianisation of the polity.  
It is certainly true that Algeria’s increasing hydrocarbon revenues 
have played a part in the country’s chequered political evolution. The 
curbing of army influence in the political sphere under Bouteflika is a case 
in point. The rapid rise in these revenues in 2003 reinforced Bouteflika’s 
political plans in three principal ways. First, the president’s economic 
recovery plan became more ambitious as the inflow of foreign currency 
reached unprecedented levels. He was able to inject up to $170 billion into 
the economy between 2003 and 2009, aimed primarily at redressing the lack 
of adequate infrastructure (housing, roads, schools, transport networks, 
dams, hospitals, and so forth). In addition to being able to increase public 
sector salaries, the results of Bouteflika’s vast public spending programme 
bolstered his domestic popularity, even though simultaneously soaring 
levels of official corruption and waste became a source of mounting 
criticism.  
Externally, such favourable financial conditions permitted the 
reimbursement of the entirety of Algeria’s debt of over $25 billion, owed to 
the Paris and London clubs, leading to Bouteflika’s renewed foreign policy 
assertiveness. Bouteflika has been able to use state largesse to offer 
generous compensation packages to the beneficiaries of his amnesty plan 
(‘repentant’ militants, victims of terror and state injustice, families of ‘the 
disappeared’); co-opt or isolate political parties and civil society 
organisations through the arbitrary allocation of economic privileges; and 
ensure continuing support from the administration by regularly granting 
budgetary extensions to regional and local authorities. Lastly, the president 
used the increased foreign currency reserves to pursue his strategy of 
professionalising the army in the context of his plans to demilitarise the 
political scene. He agreed to over $10 billion in military spending for the 
new generation of commanders he had promoted since 2004, the bulk of 
which was spent on hardware deals with Russia. In short, the energy factor 
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allowed Bouteflika to fuel the state’s redistributive role, only this time in 
the context of a duel between the presidency and army chiefs, rather than 
to quell social dissent. 
Similarly, the concerted international action against terrorism has 
been subjugated to Algeria’s domestic political game. Clearly, the events of 
11 September 2001 in the US and President Bush’s subsequent ‘global war 
on terror’ legitimated for Western audiences the Algerian state’s more 
longstanding struggle against the phenomenon. The exclusive 
appropriation by Bouteflika of peace efforts in Algeria has subsequently 
bestowed upon him a certain international reputation as peace-maker. 
Western leaders have since considered him a pillar of stability in Algeria, 
notwithstanding his inability to master radical Islamist terrorism. European 
governments offer applause for his role in returning Algeria to normality, 
but cast doubt on the sustainability of his engineered peace because of its 
limited institutionalisation. The experience and intelligence gathered by the 
army in the course of its war against radical Islamist militants have been a 
strategic source of courtship of Western defence establishments. This in 
itself could have given army commanders a source of external support to 
maintain their hegemony and undermine Bouteflika’s civilian rule. 
However, his political strategy outmanoeuvred the ambitions of army 
commanders, with the crucial support of the intelligence services. 
EU impotence 
Algeria’s relations with the EU have traditionally been of a tumultuous 
nature in comparison with other partner countries. This remained the case 
until the promulgation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and was largely the 
result of France’s controversial role in defining the EU’s policy towards 
Algeria. The introduction of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
represented for the Algerian regime – under increasing isolation at the time 
– a golden opportunity to renew outside support for its domestic struggle 
against the Islamist insurgency. However, the failure of EU member states 
to sympathise with Algiers’ predicament delayed the conclusion of an 
association agreement until 2002. The coming to power of Bouteflika 
revived Algeria’s interest in signing a free trade agreement, although its 
ultimate motive was more political than economic. Bouteflika saw in the 
association agreement, just like WTO accession, a means of selling his 
liberal pretensions to Western governments and reinforcing his position in 
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the domestic power game that pitted him against hard-line army 
commanders.  
In the 2000s, the return of stability to Algeria, the international fallout 
from 9/11 and high oil prices allowed the new president to reinvigorate 
Algeria’s foreign policy and assume greater assertiveness with European 
partners. As a result, the EU’s scrutiny of Algerian governance shortfalls 
was neutralised, as illustrated by the irregularity of Council declarations on 
political events. The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in this context represented no added value for the Algerian 
government, which has chosen to exclude itself from the EU’s new 
neighbourhood policy framework. To date, Algeria remains the only 
southern Mediterranean country with existing contractual relations with 
the EU not to have signed an Action Plan. Recent policy pronouncements 
emanating from Algiers express dissatisfaction with the impact of the 
association agreement on the national economy, suggesting that the 
government might even seek to revise the accord. This posturing is partly 
the result of the recent nationalist turn in Algeria and partly a reflection of 
concerns about the impact of the current global economic downturn. What 
is certain is that Algiers is unlikely to join the ENP any time soon. 
Conclusion 
Bouteflika’s re-election for a third term hardly constituted a democratic 
reversal .The alternative would have been a continuation under a different 
guise of the same system at best, or a forceful return of the influential army 
to the political scene at worst. The amount of authority accumulated by 
Bouteflika during his last two terms in office is so great that his failure to 
bequeath that power to a successor would have left a vacuum that could 
only be filled by the return of a strong and heterogeneous military 
command operating through a network of factionalised civilian political 
organisations. This scenario, which is still not inconceivable, would only 
take the Algerian polity back to where it was in the 1990s.  
Thus, Algeria’s democratic experience is not challenged primarily by 
high energy prices and a strategic position in the international fight against 
terrorism. Bouteflika chose to run for a third term at a time when Algeria’s 
hydrocarbon export revenues dropped by more than 70% and when the 
protraction of domestic terrorism was taking its toll on the population and 
began undermining Bouteflika’s reconciliation policy. Rather, the country’s 
democratic prospects have been subject first and foremost to the outcome 
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of the domestic struggle for the civilianisation of the polity. Bouteflika’s 
efforts in this context made use of rising oil income both to buy allegiance 
and keep army commanders at bay. However, his latest election 
masquerade showed that, in doing so, Bouteflika has encouraged the 
growth of a significant network of vested interests around him – including 
his own family entourage. Ranging from business operators to local 
authority officials, these actors have demonstrated their preparedness to go 
to great lengths to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. It is this 
aspect of the Bouteflika legacy that may prove detrimental to Algeria’s 
democratic prospects. 
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16. EGYPT AND THE RETREAT OF 
LIBERALISATION 
DINA SHEHATA 
n the wake of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the 
Egyptian political sphere began to experience a growing mobilisation 
around the issues of political and constitutional reform. In 2004-05, a 
number of old and new opposition parties and movements rallied behind 
long-standing demands for political reform. These demands included 
amending the constitution to allow for competitive presidential elections 
and for presidential term-limits, lifting the state of emergency, removing 
restrictive legal constraints on the activities of political parties, civil society 
organisations and the media, and a free and fair electoral process.  
New groups such the Kifaya movement and the Al Ghad party, and 
older groups such the Muslim Brotherhood, staged a series of protests 
during this period that broke with many of the taboos that had 
characterised public life in Egypt during the preceding decades. Protests 
occurred in public places without official permission, included direct 
attacks on the president and his family, and focused on domestic rather 
than foreign policy issues. This period also witnessed the emergence of a 
vocal independent media which began to play an important role in shaping 
public debate and in shedding light on the demands of opposition groups.  
Whereas in previous years the regime forcefully prevented such 
protests from taking place, external pressures raised the cost of repression 
and thus provided local groups with the cover they needed to mobilise 
against the regime. Moreover, the fact that the global media shed a 
spotlight on the activism and demands of local opposition groups made it 
significantly more difficult for the regime to crack down on the latter. More 
importantly, growing external and internal pressures forced the Egyptian 
regime to make some limited concessions to its challengers. In March 2005, 
I 
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President Hosni Mubarak announced a proposal to amend the constitution 
to allow for competitive presidential elections. However, the constitutional 
amendment included strict constraints that effectively allow the ruling 
National Democratic Party (NDP) to decide who may run against the 
incumbent.  
In September 2005, the first competitive presidential elections were 
held. Nine candidates ran against Mubarak. However, voter participation 
remained low and, as anticipated, Mubarak won the election with 87% of 
the vote. Ayman Nour came second with 7% of the vote. The 2005 
parliamentary elections, which were held shortly after the presidential 
elections, were also perceived as a watershed. The elections were 
supervised by the judiciary and monitored by local NGOs. NGOs and the 
independent media played an important role in covering the elections and 
in exposing instances of violence and fraud. As a result, opposition groups 
were able to make significant gains. The ruling NDP maintained its two 
thirds majority, but lost important electoral ground to the opposition. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition movement, won 88 seats - 20% 
of the total. Secular parties and movements won less than 2% of the seats.  
The brief political opening that characterised the 2004-05 period came 
to an end in the wake of the 2005 parliamentary elections. Shortly after 
these elections, the regime adopted a series of measures that led to the 
demobilisation of opposition movements and to the de-liberalisation of the 
political sphere. Such measures included the incarceration of a number of 
prominent activists such as Ayman Nour, the leader of the Al Ghad party, 
and a number of high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood members. During the 
spring of 2006, the regime penalised judges who had exposed election 
fraud, and in the fall of 2006 Brotherhood candidates were prevented from 
contesting labour union and student union elections. Brotherhood 
candidates were also prevented from contesting the 2007 Shura council (the 
upper house of parliament) elections and the 2008 local elections.  
Finally and most importantly, in April 2007 the NDP-dominated 
legislature adopted 34 constitutional amendments that placed additional 
constraints on the political process. Article 179 was amended to render 
constitutional some of the emergency powers enjoyed by the president; 
Article 88 was amended to end judicial supervision of the electoral process; 
and Article 5 was amended to prevent individuals and groups that adopt a 
religious platform from participating in the political process. It is widely 
expected that these measures will constrain political life for years to come 
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and that the upcoming 2010 parliamentary elections and 2011 presidential 
elections will be heavily manipulated to ensure the total exclusion of the 
Brotherhood.  
Causes of political de-liberalisation 
The de-liberalisation of the Egyptian political sphere after a short interval 
of political liberalisation can be attributed to a series of internal and 
external factors. On the internal front, the electoral success of the 
Brotherhood, and the parallel electoral failure of secular parties and 
movements, was the primary trigger for political de-liberalisation.  
The unexpected electoral success of the Brotherhood in the 2005 
elections had three distinct effects that derailed the process of liberalisation: 
it divided and polarised the opposition, dampened support for 
liberalisation among important segments of the Egyptian population and 
reduced external support for democratisation. Increased domestic 
polarisation and the parallel decline in internal and external pressures for 
reform provided the regime with the opportunity it needed to go on the 
offensive and crack down on its challengers in both the Islamist and the 
non-Islamist opposition.  
The Brotherhood for its part reinforced such polarisation by 
assuming a hard-line position in the months following the election. 
Particularly disconcerting was a paramilitary exercise undertaken by 
Brotherhood students at Al Azhar University after they were barred from 
contesting student union elections. This show of force, which was 
highlighted by the state-controlled media, caused uproar among the secular 
elite and exposed the Brotherhood to an unprecedented wave of criticism. 
Similarly, the release of a draft programme for a prospective Brotherhood 
political party caused a great deal of polarisation. The programme, which 
stipulated that only Muslim men could assume the highest executive 
positions and that a committee of clerics was to review legislation, was 
perceived as reactionary and as violating the constitution. Such actions 
further isolated the Brotherhood and allowed the regime to repress the 
movement with little response from civil society actors opposed to the 
Islamist agenda. 
Moreover, the wave of repression that succeeded the elections not 
only targeted the Brotherhood, but also extended to the secular opposition. 
Activists from Kifaya and the Al Ghad party were subjected to arrests and 
repression. Such repression was made possible by the fragmentation of the 
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opposition in the wake of the elections, and by a noticeable decline of 
internal and external support for democratisation. 
On the regional front, a number of factors contributed to renewed 
domestic de-liberalisation. Developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, 
countries that had convened democratic elections, created an association 
between democracy, anarchy and foreign intervention among important 
segments of the Egyptian elite. The breakdown of social order and stability, 
and the ascendance of radical groups in those Arab countries that had more 
advanced experiences with liberalisation, reinforced fears that 
democratisation was crumbling. Particularly worrying to the Egyptian elite 
was the electoral success of Hamas and its subsequent takeover of the Gaza 
Strip.  
Moreover, the direct intervention of external powers in the political 
process in those countries that convened free and fair elections created a 
strong association between democratisation and renewed foreign 
intervention. The three countries that had free elections were also the three 
most subject to external influence. Both Iraq and Palestine were under 
foreign occupation and Lebanon was subject to external intervention by a 
number of regional and international powers.  
In addition to the perceived association between democracy, anarchy 
and foreign intervention, the various human rights abuses committed by 
the Bush administration discredited Western efforts to promote democracy 
in the region. The detention centre at Guantánamo, the human rights 
violations at Abu Ghreib, and the refusal to recognise the legitimacy of 
Hamas after it won the January 2006 elections, reinforced the perception 
that democracy promotion efforts were only a ploy to weaken and 
subjugate the region to external control. Even groups in the opposition that 
benefitted from the space created by external pressure felt impelled to 
disassociate themselves from these pressures and to refuse any association 
with external powers. This was reflected in the words of one prominent 
opposition activist who maintained during a public speech that if 
democracy implies foreign hegemony, then he would stand with the 
authoritarian regime against democracy.  
On the geo-strategic level, Iran’s rise as a regional power in the wake 
of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan also had a negative effect on the 
prospects for liberalisation in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. The 
perceived ideological affinity between Iran and Islamist groups in the 
region, particularly Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, raised 
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the stakes of the democratisation game. The prospective rise of the 
Brotherhood began to be perceived not only as a domestic issue but as part 
of a larger regional struggle for hegemony between the Sunni moderate 
states, on the one hand, and revisionist state and non-state actors led by 
Iran, on the other. Statements made by Brotherhood leaders in support of 
Iran and the Iranian nuclear project reinforced the association between the 
Iranian threat and domestic Islamist groups among the ruling elite. Such a 
situation became most apparent during the late-2008 war in Gaza, when the 
Muslim Brotherhood supported the critiques of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran 
against the Egyptian regime for failing to open the border with Hamas and 
to sever ties with Israel. The Brotherhood accused the regime of 
collaboration with the US and Israel, while the regime for its part accused 
the Brotherhood of collaboration with Iran. 
Finally, on the international front, there was a noticeable decline in 
Western pressure on the Egyptian government in the wake of the 2005 
elections. Increased instability in Iraq and in Afghanistan undercut the 
‘freedom agenda’ propagated by the Bush administration across the region. 
Moreover, the rise of Hamas in Palestine and of the Brotherhood in Egypt 
through the ballot box raised fears about the rise to power of radical groups 
with an anti-Western and anti-Israeli agenda. Finally, the regional 
ascendance of Iran drove the US to seek to mend its strained relations with 
moderate Arab states. During the later years of the Bush administration, 
the goal of rebuilding the alliance of moderate Arab states took precedence 
over the goal of promoting democracy in the region. As a result, from 2006 
on there was a significant decline in democracy promotion efforts in the 
region.  
The path ahead 
Even though the 2005 elections marked the end of a brief political opening 
that allowed for broad-based mobilisation around issues of political and 
democratic reforms, the struggle for political reform is likely to continue in 
the future. 
This struggle in Egypt dates back to the late 1960s when students and 
workers took to the streets to demand the restoration of political rights and 
freedoms in the wake of the 1967 military defeat against Israel. Over the 
next three decades, the Egyptian polity experienced successive cycles of 
political liberalisation, followed by periods of renewed repression and de-
liberalisation. Even though these cycles of mobilisation have yet to produce 
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a fully-fledged transition to democracy, they have nonetheless contributed 
to the development of a much more complex and variegated political 
sphere than the one that existed in Egypt during the 1960s. Albeit still 
authoritarian, the Egyptian political system has now become far more 
liberalised than it used to be three decades ago. Egypt now boasts 24 
opposition parties, a vibrant civil society sector and an increasingly 
independent and assertive media. Although legally banned and 
periodically repressed, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to operate 
publicly and to participate in the political process.  
Moreover, with the implementation of important economic reform 
and liberalisation measures over the past two decades, new groups have 
emerged, such as the private sector bourgeoisie, the new middle class and 
private sector blue collar workers, which do not depend primarily on the 
state for their material well-being and which constitute a potential 
constituency for change. These groups have already demonstrated a 
willingness to challenge the regime on many issues that relate to their 
material and professional interests and have often succeeded in forcing the 
regime to make some important concessions. However, the demands of 
these groups continue to be parochial in nature and have not expanded to 
include the goal of democratisation. 
In recent years, even the ruling NDP has become a much more 
divided and complex entity than ever before. The party is often the site of 
bitter contests between different factions that uphold different policy 
orientations. And increasingly, legislation drafted by the government is 
contested in parliament by NDP MPs, who are no longer satisfied with 
their role as ‘rubber stamp’.  
In spite of these important developments, the Egyptian state has been 
able to successfully reproduce its power, albeit in a much less hegemonic 
manner. This is in part a result of the state’s repressive capabilities, which 
are formidable, but also of the state’s continued ability to co-opt important 
social groups and to maintain a cohesive and broad based ruling coalition. 
The six million-strong state bureaucracy constitutes the single most 
important base of social support for the regime. To maintain the continued 
acquiescence of this critical social group, the regime spends a considerable 
portion of its resources on wages and subsidies. Moreover, since the move 
to economic liberalisation, the regime has succeeded in forging a coalition 
with the private sector bourgeoisie by maintaining control over important 
economic resources (land, banks, energy, and subsidies) and also by giving 
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a privileged position to investors with close ties to the ruling party and the 
ruling elite. 
Moreover, the regime has been able to capitalise on the strength of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to institute what one analyst called the 
“legitimacy of blackmail”. So long as the Brotherhood remains the only 
viable and organised alternative to the existing regime, many important 
social groups, such as the private sector bourgeoisie, segments of the 
middle and working class, women and minorities will continue to lend 
their support to the existing regime. Similarly, external players who would 
otherwise favour a democratic and pro-Western regime continue to 
support the existing regime for lack of a better alternative. This situation 
was fully demonstrated in the wake of the 2005 elections, when internal 
and external actors dampened their support for democracy as a result of 
the electoral success of the Brotherhood and the parallel failure of secular 
parties and movements. The regime has prevented the emergence of a 
viable secular opposition movement, and has used an extensive battery of 
legal constraints to ensure that secular parties and movements remain 
weak and fragmented.  
Finally, an unstable regional environment has contributed to the 
stability of the regime while reinforcing societal and political polarisation. 
Regional conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict, continue to provide 
radical groups in Egypt and the Arab region with fuel to mobilise popular 
support and to undermine moderate voices that focus on issues of peace-
building, normal ties with the West, and economic development. Other 
conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and the Sudan, all of which involve a 
prominent role for external actors, also reinforce support for those groups 
that adopt an anti-Western and anti-imperialist agenda. The continued 
strength of radical groups significantly raises the cost of democratisation in 
the region and drives many democrats and would-be democrats to 
continue to align themselves with the regime.  
In the coming years, the trend towards greater societal pluralisation 
and differentiation – which manifests itself in the growth of the civil society 
sector and the independent media sector, and in the greater assertiveness of 
the private sector bourgeoisie and the professional middle class – is likely 
to continue. However, such a trend will only lead to peaceful and 
democratic change in the political system if radical groups begin to lose 
ground and moderate voices are able to mobilise broader popular support. 
Such an outcome will require three principle conditions: the expansion of 
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the economic development process to ensure the continued growth of 
social groups that can provide a constituency for democratic change; the 
adoption of legal reforms that allow for the growth and expansion of 
political parties and civil society organisations that adopt a moderate 
democratic agenda; and, finally, a more stable regional environment that 
strips radical voices of their main weapons and empowers those working 
towards peace, democracy and development in the region. 
External democracy promotion efforts in the region, especially those 
that seek to reinforce processes of economic and human development, 
empower civil society organisations and the media, and encourage legal 
and institutional reform, are important to the long-term prospects of 
political reform in Egypt. However, external players should be wary of any 
confrontational approach and instead work with the Egyptian government 
and Egyptian civil society towards creating a domestic and regional 
environment more conducive to the goal of democratisation.  
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